| | ECT-LegExpLegitimate expectations    
| ECT | Legitimate expectations | The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, extends to any individual in a situation where the Community authorities, by giving him precise assurances, have caused him to entertain legitimate expectations.
Such assurances, in whatever form they are given, are precise, unconditional and consistent information from authorised and reliable sources. [As stated in case T-376/05] |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | 87-91 | ECT-LegExp | 87. First, it should be noted that the retroactive withdrawal of a favourable decision is generally subject to very strict conditions (Herpels v Commission , paragraph 38). According to settled case-law, while it must be acknowledged that any Community institution which finds that a measure which it has just adopted is tainted by illegality has the right to withdraw it within a reasonable period, with retroactive effect, that right may be restricted by the need to fulfil the legitimate expectations of a beneficiary of the measure, who has been led to rely on its lawfulness (Case 14/81 Alpha Steel v Commission [1992] ECR 749, paragraphs 10 to 12; Case 15/85 Consorzio Cooperative d'Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005, paragraphs 12 to 17; Case C248/89 Cargill v Commission [1991] ECR I2987, paragraph 20; Case C365/89 Cargill [1991] ECR I3045, paragraph 18; and de Compte v Parliament , paragraph 35).
88. Second, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, extends to any individual in a situation where the Community authorities, by giving him precise assurances, have caused him to entertain legitimate expectations. Such assurances, in whatever form they are given, are precise, unconditional and consistent information from authorised and reliable sources (Joined Cases T66/96 and T221/97 Mellett v Court of Justice [1998] ECRSC IIA449 and II1305, paragraphs 104 and 107). However, a person may not plead breach of the principle unless he has been given precise assurances by the administration (Case T290/97 Mehibas Dordtselaan v Commission [2000] ECR II15, paragraph 59, and Case T273/01 Innova Privat-Akademie v Commission [2003] ECR II1093, paragraph 26).
89. In the present case, first, as regards the applicants' argument relating to the withdrawal of an administrative act, it should be noted that the decisions of 20 May 2005 were conditional acts. The signing of the framework contract for lot 7, provided for by the contested decisions, was subject to the condition that the applicants produced evidence that they were not in any of the situations corresponding to the grounds for exclusion provided for in point 2.3.3 of the Practical Guide. In these circumstances, it is apparent that the applicants were not awarded the contract, not as a result of the withdrawal of a decision awarding them that contract, but because they did not meet the conditions to which such a decision was subject. Consequently, the applicants' argument on this point is irrelevant.
90. Second, as regards the breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations claimed by TEACEGOS and STG, the decisions of 20 May 2005 did not contain precise assurances as to the fact that the framework contract would be signed under any circumstances, and could not therefore cause the applicants to entertain legitimate expectations to that effect, since they expressly stated that the signing of the framework contract was subject to the applicants producing evidence that they were not in any of the situations corresponding to the grounds for exclusion provided for in point 2.3.3 of the Practical Guide. It follows that the arguments put forward by the applicants relating to the breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations are unfounded.
91. The fourth plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded. It follows that the present applications must be dismissed. | | T-195/05 Deloitte | 86-90 | ECT-LegExp | 86. In accordance with established case-law, the right to rely on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, which is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, extends to any individual who is in a situation in which it is clear that the Community administration has, by giving him precise assurances, led him to entertain reasonable expectations. Such assurances include, irrespective of the form in which they are given, precise, unconditional and consistent information coming from authorised and reliable sources (Joined Cases T66/96 and T221/97 Mellett v Court of Justice [1998] ECRSC IA449 and II1305, paragraphs 104 and 107).
87. In the present case, without otherwise substantiating its assertions in that regard, the applicant merely refers to the position adopted by the Commission in other procurement procedures. Such facts, even if proven, do not constitute precise assurances given by the institution and, accordingly, cannot form the basis of legitimate expectations as to the Commission's acceptance of the procedure proposed by Euphet in the context of the contract in question.
88. The applicant's allegation that the unlawful exclusion of Euphet led to the award of the contract to a tenderer whose tender was not the most economically advantageous is ineffective since, having regard to the existence of the conflict of interest found in Euphet's case (see paragraphs 77 and 78 above), the Commission was required to reject its tender.
89. The applicant's argument cannot therefore be accepted. Accordingly, the third part of the first plea must be rejected.
90. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first plea in law must be rejected in its entirety. | | T-195/05 Deloitte | 104-109 | ECT-LegExp | 104. Secondly, with regard to the alleged infringement of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, it is appropriate to recall that, in accordance with established case-law cited in paragraph 86 above, no party may allege infringement of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations without having been given precise assurances by the administration.
105. In the present case, the applicant bases its argument on a standard practice of the Commission - confirmed, moreover, by case-law - which consists in systematically requesting additional information from a tenderer before excluding it.
106. As it is, the documents submitted by the applicant concern a single invitation to tender to which it responded, that is to say, invitation to tender PO/200462/B3 relating to Ex-ante evaluation of the activities of the TV, radio services and studios Unit'. What is more, the request for additional information made in that case by the evaluation committee related, on the one hand, to the question whether Deloitte's presence in the whole of the European continent in 300 cities [confirmed] its ability to cover the operations under the contract in all the Member States of the EU' and, on the other, to the fact that the Commission had not received attestations of good performance', and not to a risk of conflict of interest.
107. Furthermore, the applicant does not submit any concrete proof showing that the Commission gave Euphet a precise assurance that it would receive from the evaluation committee a request for additional information on the question of a risk of conflict of interest and on the satisfactory nature of the response given by Euphet to that question.
108. In those circumstances, the applicant cannot claim infringement of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.
109. That finding is not affected by the applicant's reference to the judgment in Fabricom , paragraph 57 supra, which deals with a legal question and a factual situation which are not analogous to the dispute before the Court of First Instance in the present case. | | T-195/05-R Deloitte | 107 | ECT-LegExp | 107. Thirdly, as regards the Commission's alleged breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations on account of its rejection of a way of resolving conflicts of interest, it has already accepted, prima facie, that the applicant does not, at this stage, describe an earlier practice that can satisfactorily justify such expectations. | | T-195/05-R Deloitte | 118 | ECT-LegExp | 118. Third, in so far as the applicant claims a breach of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the e-mails annexed to its observations of 13 June 2005 concern only one tendering procedure and do not, at this stage, give proof of the existence of a consistent practice on the part of the Commission whereby it asks tenderers for additional information. | T-60/98-R
Ecord | 28-33 | ECT-LexExp | 28. In support of its application for interim measures the applicant confines itself to pleading that the contested decision constitutes a prima facie breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
29. Despite the express warning in the invitation to tender (see paragraph 4 above), the applicant indicated on DHL's air consignment note that the consignment in question was intended for the 'European Commission (see paragraph 8 above).
30. The application for interim measures is therefore based on the incorrect premiss that the applicant followed scrupulously the instructions in the invitation to tender.
31. As is clear from the oral pleadings, the purpose of those instructions was precisely to prevent events such as those which occurred in this case. If the Commission's name features on the air consignment note there is a great risk that the consignment in question will be delivered to the central mail office at Evere, in accordance with the general instructions of 1991 (see paragraph 9 above).
32. The applicant cannot plead lack of experience in this area. It does not dispute the Commission's claims, first, that it had already responded to invitations to tender from the TACIS Procurement Unit without making any mistakes in the address and, second, that it recently signed an extension of contract following an invitation to tender organised in the same way as that in this case.
33. As it did not heed the warning in the invitation to tender, it could not legitimately expect that its tender would be delivered in time to the TACIS Procurement Unit. Accordingly, the plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations appears prima facie to be unfounded. | T-203/96
Embassy Limousines | 86-88 | ECT-288 [ex 215]
ECT-LegExp | 86 It follows from the foregoing that the Parliament, first, induced on the part of the applicant a legitimate expectation by encouraging it to take a risk which went beyond that normally run by tenderers in a tendering procedure and, secondly, failed to inform the applicant of an important change in the conduct of the tendering procedure.
87 In that regard it is not necessary to determine whether the officials of the Parliament acted in a way that was excusable. As the contracting body in the procedure for the award of contracts, the Parliament is obliged to show a coherent and consistent attitude towards its tenderers. The interventions of various administrative and political bodies within the Parliament cannot therefore justify the failure to comply with its obligations to the applicant.
88 It follows that the Parliament has committed a fault which gives rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community. |
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