| | ECT-AbuPowAbuse of Powers    
| ECT | Abuse of powers | The concept of misuse of powers has a precisely defined scope in Community law and refers to cases where an administrative authority exercises its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred.
In that respect, it has been consistently held that a decision may amount to a misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken for purposes other than those stated. [As stated in case T-169/00] |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | T-169/00
Esedra | 198-203 | ECT-AbuPow | 198 The concept of misuse of powers has a precisely defined scope in Community law and refers to cases where an administrative authority exercises its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred. In that respect, it has been consistently held that a decision may amount to a misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken for purposes other than those stated (see, for example, the judgment in Joined Cases T-149/94 and T-181/94 Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commission [1997] ECR II-161, paragraphs 53 and 149, upheld on appeal by judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-161/97 P Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commission [1999] ECR I-2057).
199 In the present case, the matters raised by the applicant do not show that the Commission pursued any object other than that of awarding the contract to the lowest and economically most advantageous bid, taking account of the criteria laid down in the contract notice and the contract documents.
200 Accordingly, the applicant has not adduced objective, relevant and consistent evidence, within the meaning of the judgment cited above, to show that the Commission exercised its powers to eliminate the applicant from the contract in question by reason of the allegations that paedophilic acts were committed at the CPE Clovis when it was under the applicant's management and by reason of the alleged hostility to the applicant on the part of the parents' association and the bodies representing the staff.
201 Similarly, the fact that only three candidates, of which Esedra and Manieri were two, responded to the first invitation to tender cannot justify the claim that the Commission misused the powers conferred upon it by the Financial Regulation and Directive 92/50 in deciding to close the invitation to tender so as not to award the contract in question to the applicant.
202 In that connection the judgment in the case of Fracasso and Leitschutz, cited above, offers no support for the applicant's argument. In that case, a national court referred to the Court of Justice a question as to whether Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54), as amended by Directive 97/52, must be interpreted as meaning that the contracting authority must award the contract to the only candidate deemed suitable for participation. The Court's reply was in the negative, observing in particular that, in order to meet the objective of the development of genuine competition in the field of public works contracts, Article 22(2) of Directive 93/37 (which is in similar terms to Article 27(2) of Directive 92/50) provides that, where the contracting authorities award a contract by restricted procedure, the number of candidates invited to tender must in any event be sufficient to ensure genuine competition (see the judgment in Fracasso and Leitschutz, cited above, paragraph 27).
203 The Commission could therefore properly decide to close the first invitation to tender issued by the contract notice of 26 May 1999 on the ground that it did not have a sufficient number of applications to ensure genuine competition. 204 The plea alleging misuse of powers must therefore be dismissed. | 56/77
Agence | 41-46 | Q2-59.2.1
ECT-AbuPow | 41 As has already been stated, the applicant claims that there was a misuse of powers in that the procedure for request for tenders was used not to supply the Commission with the most attractive services of competing firms but to favour Randstad.
42 This is apparent, according to the applicant, not only from the fact that the price proposals made by it were more attractive than those of Randstad but also from the fact that Randstad signed up the applicant’s temporary staff in march 1977 immediately after the procedure for request for tenders and that the Commission’s officials were involved in this, as was necessary if Randstad was to fulfil its contractual obligations towards the Commission.
43 On 17 March 1977 at a meeting held in Brussels Randstad, with the improper assistance of certain officials of the Commission, proceeded to sign up almost the whole of the temporary staff which the applicant had made available to the Commission.
44 This wrongful conduct by the Commission’s officials corroborates the applicant’s claim that the procedure for requests for tenders was used to favour one of the tenderers, namely Randstad.
45 Nevertheless, such conduct, which, however, is denied by the Commission, is no ground for challenging the choice of Randstad made previously by the Commission having regard to the fact that the applicant has not succeeded in establishing the unjustified nature of the said choice for the requirements of the Commission and having regard to article 59 (2) of the financial regulation.
46 Accordingly the application for annulment must be dismissed. |
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