| | ECT-GoodAdmGood Administration    
| ECT | Good administration | | The principle of good administration, involving the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case. [As stated in case T-376/05] |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | C-189/06-P
TEA-CEGOS | 60-67 | ECT-GoodAdm | 60 Par leur troisième moyen, les requérantes reprochent au Tribunal d’avoir considéré, aux points 79 à 81 de l’arrêt attaqué, en se référant à la complexité inhérente à la diversité des informations soumises lors des procédures d’appel d’offres, que la Commission n’a pas violé le principe de bonne administration en ne soulevant la question de l’appartenance des instituts au Centre qu’à un stade tardif de la procédure.
61 À cet égard, les requérantes invoquent quatre arguments. Premièrement, l’appartenance au Centre des instituts en cause aurait été révélée non pas par l’examen des documents fournis par les requérantes, mais par des informations fournies par un tiers.
62 Deuxièmement, les documents et déclarations fournis à la suite du courrier de la Commission du 20 mai 2005 ne viseraient pas à justifier la véracité des déclarations initiales, mais constitueraient une confirmation de la validité des premières déclarations.
63 Troisièmement, la Commission ne se serait pas donné les moyens informatiques nécessaires pour atteindre l’objectif à poursuivre, à savoir l’exclusion des candidats non qualifiés.
64 Quatrièmement, la Commission n’aurait pas fait preuve de diligence dans ses contacts avec les requérantes pendant la période de réexamen du dossier.
65 Force est de constater que ces quatre arguments sont inopérants. En effet, à supposer même que les affirmations contenues dans ces arguments soient exactes, aucune d’entre elles ne pourrait entraîner l’annulation de l’arrêt attaqué, car en aucun cas elles n’infirmeraient la conclusion, décisive pour l’arrêt attaqué, selon laquelle le DIIS et le DIHR faisaient partie du même groupement juridique, de sorte que le point 13 de l’avis de marché était applicable.
66 Par conséquent, il convient de rejeter le troisième moyen.
67 Il résulte de tout ce qui précède que le pourvoi doit, en application de l’article 119 du règlement de procédure, être rejeté dans son intégralité. | T-411/06
Sogelma | 127 | ECT-GoodAdm | 127 As regards the argument that the EAR was slow to take and give notice of the decision to cancel the procedure, it must be observed that the applicant does not explain what effect that fact could have on the legality of that decision. | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | 76-80 | ECT-GoodAdm | 76. According to settled case-law, the guarantees conferred by the Community legal order in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of good administration, involving the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (Case C269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I5469, paragraph 14; Case T44/90 La Cinq v Commission [1992] ECR II1, paragraph 86; and Case T70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] ECR II3495, paragraph 182). Furthermore, the Commission is bound to ensure, at each stage of a tendering procedure, compliance with the principle of equal treatment and, thereby, equality of opportunity for all the tenderers (see, to that effect, Case C496/99 P Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I3801, paragraph 108, and ADT Projekt v Commission , paragraph 164).
77. In the present case, on 20 May 2005 the Commission informed the applicants that their tenders had been accepted for lot 7 on the condition that the applicants produced documents to prove that they were not in any of the situations corresponding to the grounds for exclusion set out in point 2.3.3 of the Practical Guide.
78. The DIHR indicated that it belonged to the Centre when the TEA-CEGOS Consortium applied to participate, and also mentioned that one of its partners was the DIIS. The DIIS stated that it did not belong to any group or network. However, if the DIIS really considered that it did not belong to any legal group, in view of the information required in the declaration form, it should at the very least have notified the Commission that it had links with the Centre and was therefore part of a network, since the Centre's statutes expressly provide that the DIIS is one of its entities.
79. Although the DIIS's statement was inaccurate, it should be noted that the technical tender submitted by the GHK Consortium indicated the names of the various members of the Consortium and that the DIIS was the third name mentioned there. Consequently, the Commission could have realised that the DIIS's statement was not accurate. However, the fact that the Commission realised that the institutes belonged to the Centre only at an advanced stage of the procedure has no bearing on the outcome of the present case, since, even at that stage, the tender submitted by the GHK Consortium had to be excluded in accordance with Article 13 of the procurement notice.
80. Whatever the case, the inherent complexity of the range of information submitted in tendering procedures can explain why the Commission realised that the institutes belonged to the Centre only once the two tenders had been conditionally accepted. It was only at this stage of the procedure that the applicants were required to produce documents to prove the veracity of their initial statements. It follows that the Commission did not breach the principle of good administration by failing to raise the question whether the institutes belonged to the Centre until after the tender submitted by the GHK Consortium had been conditionally accepted. | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | 81-83 | ECT-GoodAdm | 81. With regard to the way the Commission conducted the tendering procedure, it is clear that as early as 22 June 2005 the Commission asked TEA-CEGOS to explain the link between the DIHR and the Centre and asked GHK International to provide it with clarification as to the legal status of the DIIS. Further to the information supplied by TEA-CEGOS, on 27 June 2005, before adopting the decision of 18 July 2005, the Commission asked it to provide supplementary information. In addition, it is apparent from the facts that between 18 July and 12 October 2005 the Commission was in constant contact with the applicants and, among other things, informed them that it was reviewing the evidence submitted and would notify them as soon as possible of the final position it adopted. Furthermore, the Commission endeavoured to answer the applicants' questions promptly, in particular by informing TEA-CEGOS' lawyers of the state of the procedure as early as 13 September 2005, after those lawyers expressed a desire to find out about this on 8 September 2005.
82. As regards the contradictory information allegedly circulated on the EuropeAid website, it should be stated that the names of the successful tenderers mentioned on that website were those that had been conditionally accepted by the Commission. It was therefore logical for the applicants' names to appear there, since it became clear and unequivocal that the DIIS and the DIHR belonged to the Centre only when the applicants were required to prove the veracity of their statements, in this case following the decisions of 20 May 2005. Once the decisions of 18 July 2005 had been adopted, the applicants' names were removed from the website, with effect from 25 July 2005.
83. In the light of the foregoing, the applicants have not shown that the Commission breached the principle of good administration and failed to exercise due care, with the result that their complaints are in any event unfounded. The third plea must therefore be rejected. | T-59/05
Evropaiki Dynamiki | 151-159 | ECT-GoodAdm | 151 The infringement of the principles of diligence and good administration claimed by the applicant is in actual fact bound up with the claim that the Commission, because it did not reply to the applicant’s requests of 29 and 30 December 2004 within a reasonable time, is partly responsible for the present dispute and has thereby forced the applicant to bring this action.
152 It must be recalled that the need to act within a reasonable time in conducting administrative proceedings is a component of the general Community law principle of good administration which is incumbent on all Community institutions throughout such proceedings (Case T-394/03 Angeletti v Commission [2006] ECR II-000, paragraph 162).
153 The reasonableness of a period must be assessed, furthermore, in relation to the particular circumstances of each case and, in particular, the background of each case, the various procedural stages which the Commission must follow and the complexity of the case (Case T-347/03 Branco v Commission [2005] ECR II-2555, paragraph 114; see also, as regards examination of a complaint relating to State aid, Case T-395/04 Air One v Commission [2006] ECR II-1343, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
154 That is the context in which it is appropriate to assess the reasonableness of the period of approximately five weeks which elapsed between the applicant’s requests of 29 and 30 December 2004 and the posting of the Commission’s reply on 7 February 2005.
155 It is to be noted in this regard that the information sought by the applicant in those requests related, essentially, to the general observations in the evaluation committee report, and to the results of the comparison of its tender with that of the successful tenderer. However, at the time of the applicant’s requests of 29 and 30 December 2004, the phase of evaluation of tenders had already been completed, and the decision to award the contract to a tenderer other than the applicant had also been taken. In those circumstances, it is clear that the Commission was in possession of the information requested by the applicant, relating to the tender evaluation phase, at the moment when those requests were sent to it, if not before, namely on the date on which the Commission notified the applicant, by letter of 10 December 2004, of the reasons for rejecting its tender.
156 That being the case, there was nothing to prevent the Commission conveying that information when it sent its letter on 10 December 2004, or at the very least doing so in a period shorter than five weeks, since no particular steps had to be taken in order to reply to the applicant’s requests. It must, furthermore, be noted that the letter in question, although it bears the date of 26 January 2005, was not posted until 7 February 2005. The Commission therefore allowed another 12 days to elapse before posting it to the applicant, while fully aware that the period for bringing proceedings was very close to expiry. Consequently, it must be concluded that, since the period of almost five weeks which elapsed between those requests and the reply of the Commission by the letter posted on 7 February 2005 was not justified by the circumstances of this case, the Commission failed in its duty of diligence and good administration.
157 However, it does not, in this case, necessarily follow from the establishment of such an infringement either that the contested decision was unlawful or that the decision should be annulled, since the delay in the Commission’s replying to the applicant’s requests did not, contrary to what the applicant claims, affect its rights of defence in relation to the contested decision.
158 As has been established in paragraphs 127 to 130 above, the letter of 10 December 2004 contained all the information required to enable the applicant duly to assert its rights before the Court and to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction on legality. The more detailed explanations provided to the applicant by the letter sent on 7 February 2005 are not such as to affect that assessment.
159 Having regard to all of the foregoing, the Court finds that the fact, regrettable as it may be, that the Commission replied to the applicant’s requests of 29 and 30 December 2004 with a significant delay, but in any event before expiry of the period for bringing proceedings laid down in Article 230 EC, did not restrict the applicant’s ability to assert its rights before the Court in the form of this action and is, consequently, not such as to entail annulment of the contested decision. | T-139/99
Alsace | 41-46 | ECT-10-impl
ECT-GoodAdm | 41 Nevertheless, in accordance with the principles of sound administration and solidarity as between the Community institutions and the Member States, the institutions are required to ensure that the conditions laid down in an invitation to tender do not induce potential tenderers to infringe the national legislation applicable to their business.
42 In the present case, the Parliament stated that the French legislation did not ban the provision in unmarked taxis of the transport services forming the subject-matter of the invitation to tender, provided that those services were covered by an entry in the register of undertakings engaged in public passenger transport by road. It must be observed that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that that assertion by the Parliament was manifestly erroneous. The applicant merely invoked the French legislation concerning the taxi business; it has not established that the legislation on non-urban private passenger transport services by road could not apply to taxis operating unofficially, where the latter provide the services provided for in the invitation to tender. Moreover, it is not contested that Coopérative Taxi 13 provided a certificate establishing that it is entered in the register of undertakings engaged in public passenger transport by road. The Parliament has shown that that registration was required by the abovementioned French legislation on private transport services, which lends credence to its arguments.
43 In those circumstances, the applicant has not demonstrated that the Parliament manifestly misdirected itself in its interpretation of the French legislation.
44 Nor, moreover, is the applicant entitled in law to rely on the clause in the draft framework contract under which the services must be provided in conformity with the legislation in force. That clause cannot be interpreted as imposing a requirement on the Parliament to check, not only that the person to whom the contract is awarded is entered in the register, as mentioned above, but also that that person is performing the contract in accordance with French legislation. As the Parliament has clearly stated, under that clause, the person to whom the contract is awarded must ensure that he is acting in conformity with the French legislation and, consequently, must suffer the consequences of a failure to do so.
45 It should be added that the Parliament stated at the hearing that, should it be wrong in its interpretation of the French legislation, it would be compelled to rescind the contract under that clause.
46 It follows from the foregoing that the first plea based on an infringement of the French legislation applicable to the taxi business and of the description of services to be provided must be rejected. |
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