| | ECT-253Reasons (see also C3-41.2)    
| ECT | Article 253 | | Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | C-189/06-PA
TEA-CEGOS | 24-32 | Q4-94.1.a-impl
ECT-LegCert | 33 Par la seconde branche de ce moyen, les requérantes font valoir, premièrement, que le Tribunal s’est contredit en reconnaissant que, en omettant de définir la notion de groupement juridique, la Commission ne s’était pas dotée à l’avance de règles claires et compréhensibles, alors qu’il aurait, dans le même temps, souligné que de telles règles sont nécessaires lorsque la partie défenderesse jouit d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation. Deuxièmement, la considération, exposée au point 62 de l’arrêt attaqué, selon laquelle la Commission n’avait pas commis d’erreur manifeste d’appréciation ne suffirait pas pour que le Tribunal puisse conclure, au point 63 de cet arrêt, que celle-ci n’avait pas violé le principe de sécurité juridique. Troisièmement, le Tribunal n’aurait pas suffisamment motivé son appréciation selon laquelle la Commission avait effectué une analyse approfondie des circonstances de l’espèce.
34 S’agissant du premier de ces arguments, il convient de rappeler que, au point 52 de l’arrêt attaqué, le Tribunal a constaté «l’absence d’une définition textuelle ou jurisprudentielle de la notion de groupement juridique» pour en déduire que la Commission était obligée de procéder à un examen au cas par cas.
35 Au point 64 de cet arrêt, le Tribunal a constaté la nécessité pour le pouvoir adjudicateur de fixer à l’avance des règles claires et compréhensibles. En appliquant ce critère, le Tribunal a considéré que, en décidant du contenu du point 13 de l’avis de marché, la Commission n’avait pas dépassé les limites de son pouvoir d’appréciation.
36 Aucune incohérence ne peut être relevée entre ces deux éléments de la motivation de l’arrêt attaqué. En effet, il est cohérent de considérer que le point 13 de l’avis de marché suffisait à établir des règles claires et compréhensibles applicables à l’appel d’offres, sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’accompagner ce point de définitions plus détaillées. Il ne découle pas nécessairement de l’absence d’une définition préalable de la notion de groupement juridique que la Commission ne s’était pas dotée de règles claires et compréhensibles. L’argument tiré d’une contradiction entachant le raisonnement du Tribunal n’est donc pas fondé.
37 En ce qui concerne le deuxième argument, il est vrai que le point 63 de l’arrêt attaqué commence par l’expression «Dès lors». Cependant il ressort à l’évidence d’une lecture d’ensemble de cet arrêt que cette expression renvoie non pas au seul point 62, mais à l’ensemble des développements figurant aux points 52 à 62 dudit arrêt. La conclusion relative au principe de sécurité juridique qui figure au point 63 du même arrêt découle de manière cohérente de ces développements. Par conséquent l’argument tiré de ce que cette conclusion n’est pas assortie d’une motivation suffisante n’est pas fondé.
38 Quant au troisième argument, il convient de considérer que l’arrêt attaqué, et notamment ses points 49 ainsi que 81, exposent de façon claire et suffisante les motifs ayant conduit le Tribunal à la conclusion que les décisions attaquées avaient été adoptées à la suite d’un réexamen approfondi mené par la Commission. L’argument soulevé à cet égard n’est pas fondé.
39 Il en résulte que la seconde branche du moyen n’est pas fondée.
40 Par conséquent, le premier moyen doit être rejeté dans son intégralité. | C-189/06-PA
TEA-CEGOS | 42-50 | ECT-253-impl | 42 Par la présente branche de ce moyen, les requérantes font valoir que, aux points 52 à 61 de l’arrêt attaqué, le Tribunal a violé l’obligation de motivation, d’abord en admettant que les instituts en cause pouvaient être en situation de conflit d’intérêts alors qu’ils étaient autonomes, ensuite, en privilégiant le critère structurel au détriment du critère fonctionnel et, enfin, en examinant les éléments relevant du critère fonctionnel alors qu’il aurait écarté la pertinence de ce dernier.
43 S’agissant du premier de ces arguments, il est vrai que, au point 55 de l’arrêt attaqué, le Tribunal a constaté que le Centre «se compose de deux entités autonomes: le DIIS et le DIHR, les deux instituts et le Centre partageant les mêmes locaux».
44 Si dans ce passage dudit point, le Tribunal admet que ces deux entités apparaissent, dans une certaine mesure, comme distinctes l’une de l’autre, dans les points suivants de l’arrêt attaqué il énumère de façon détaillée les éléments de connexité qui les unissent. Ainsi, au point 56 de cet arrêt, il précise que les finances, les ressources humaines, l’administration et la bibliothèque commune des deux instituts sont gérées en commun par le Centre. Au point 57 dudit arrêt, il rappelle que certains membres du conseil d’administration du Centre sont désignés par le DIIS et le DIHR. Au point 59 de ce même arrêt, il explique de quelle manière la relative autonomie financière de ces instituts est limitée par l’influence du Centre. Enfin, au point 60 de l’arrêt attaqué, le Tribunal considère que l’appartenance à un même groupement juridique n’exclut pas nécessairement une autonomie décisionnelle des différentes entités qui coexistent au sein de celui-ci.
45 Il convient d’estimer que, de cette manière, le Tribunal a motivé de façon complète et pertinente sa conclusion selon laquelle, malgré un certain degré d’autonomie, les deux instituts en question étaient suffisamment connexes pour pouvoir se trouver en situation de conflit d’intérêts.
46 En ce qui concerne le deuxième argument, il convient de relever que le Tribunal était appelé à trancher la question de savoir si les deux instituts en cause appartenaient au même groupement juridique au sens du point 13 de l’avis de marché. À cette fin, le Tribunal devait interpréter cette disposition en fonction de l’objet, du système et du libellé de celle-ci. À cet égard, il apparaît que cette disposition vise à éviter que la concurrence soit faussée ou que se présentent des conflits d’intérêts dans le cadre de l’appel d’offres. Il est conforme à cette interprétation de retenir le critère de l’appartenance structurelle à un groupe pour décider du point de savoir si certaines entités font partie d’un groupement juridique au sens de ladite disposition. Partant, il était loisible au Tribunal de privilégier le critère structurel par rapport au critère fonctionnel.
47 Sur ce point, il ressort de l’arrêt attaqué, et notamment de son point 58, que la motivation retenue, à cet égard, par le Tribunal est cohérente et claire, et n’est pas erronée.
48 Quant au troisième argument invoqué, il convient de relever, d’une part, que, contrairement à ce qu’allèguent les requérantes, le Tribunal n’a pas écarté la pertinence des éléments relevant du critère fonctionnel. Au contraire, il ressort du point 53 de l’arrêt attaqué que, si le Tribunal attribue davantage d’importance au critère structurel, il n’exclut pas pour autant que le critère fonctionnel puisse revêtir une certaine importance. D’autre part, étant donné que les requérantes avaient fait état d’une prétendue autonomie fonctionnelle des instituts pour dénier l’existence d’un groupement juridique, il était légitime que le Tribunal réponde à cet argument.
49 Il s’ensuit que la motivation de l’arrêt attaqué n’est pas entachée d’une contradiction en raison du fait qu’elle comporte un examen des éléments relevant du critère fonctionnel.
50 Par conséquent, la première branche du deuxième moyen doit être écartée comme non fondée. | T-406/06
Evropaïki Dinamiki | 46-54 | Q4-100.2
M4-149.2
ECT-253 | 46 The applicant claims, on several occasions, that the contested decision must be regarded as failing to state adequate reasons. It claims, in the plea alleging that the relative merits of the successful tender were not disclosed, that the Commission informed it on 26 October 2006 merely of the successful tenderer’s identity and of the number of points it had received (88 out of 100), without stating the relative merits of the successful tender compared with the applicant’s tender, contrary to Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation. In addition, in the course of its arguments alleging manifest errors of assessment, it claims that the Commission is attempting to justify the contested decision retrospectively, which leads to discrepancies, demonstrating, in the applicant’s view, the lack of reasoning behind the contested decision.
47 It must be borne in mind, first of all, that the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure (Case C-17/99 France v Commission [2001] ECR I- 2481, paragraph 35).
48 In addition, pursuant to Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation and Article 149(2) of the Implementing Regulation, the Commission was under a duty to notify the applicant of the grounds on which its offer was rejected and, the applicant having submitted an admissible tender, of the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender and the name of the tenderer to whom the contract was awarded, within not more than 15 calendar days from the date on which a written request was received.
49 Such a course of action is consistent with the duty to state reasons laid down in Article 253 EC, according to which the reasoning followed by the authority which adopted the measure must be disclosed in a clear and unequivocal fashion so as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thereby enable them to defend their rights and, on the other, to enable the Court to exercise its power of review (Case T-19/95 Adia interim v Commission [1996] ECR II-321, paragraph 32, and judgment of 12 July 2007 in Case T-250/05 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 68 and 69).
50 Moreover, the observance of the duty to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the information available to the applicant at the time the application was brought (see Case T-183/00 Strabag Benelux v Council [2003] ECR II-135, paragraph 58, and Case T-4/01 Renco v Council [2003] ECR II-171, paragraph 96).
51 In the present case, it is accepted that the contested decision sets out the grounds on which the offer was rejected. Accordingly, by letter and fax of 19 October 2006, the Commission informed the applicant that its tender had been rejected at the award stage and reproduced the evaluation committee’s findings on each of the award criteria.
52 In addition, in response to a written request from the applicant, also dated 19 October 2006, the Commission, by letter of 26 October 2006, informed the applicant that it had been eliminated because the minimum points required for the ‘Project management and availability’ criterion had not been obtained. The Commission referred to the evaluation committee’s findings, giving the number of points obtained by the applicant for each award criterion. It also stated the name of the successful tenderer, the price that tenderer had offered for the contract and the number of points it had obtained.
53 Although it appears that the letter of 19 October 2006 notifying the applicant of the rejection of its tender reversed the titles of two of the award criteria, that reversal cannot, however, be regarded as a failure in the contested decision to give adequate reasons. In the light of the content of each of the assessments, the wording of the invitation to tender, the content of the letter of 26 October 2006 and the extract from the minutes of the evaluation committee sent to the applicant on 30 November 2006, the applicant was able to identify the specific reasons for the decision to reject its offer, so that that reversal is of no relevance in the present case.
54 Consequently, the argument alleging a failure to give a proper statement of reasons must be rejected. | T-272/06
Evropaïki Dinamiki | 27-45 | Q4-100.2
ECT-233-impl
ECT-253 | 27 It must be recalled at the outset that, in accordance with settled case-law, the statement of the reasons on which a decision adversely affecting a person is based must allow the Community Court to exercise its power of review as to its legality and must provide the person concerned with the information necessary to enable him to decide whether or not the decision is well founded (Case 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, paragraph 22, and Case C-166/95 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I-983, paragraph 23).
28 Accordingly, the fact that a statement of reasons is lacking or inadequate, hindering that review of legality, constitutes a matter of public interest which may, and even must, be raised by the Community Court of its own motion (Case 18/57 Nold v High Authority [1959] ECR 41, at p. 52, and Case C-166/95 P Commission v Daffix, cited above, paragraph 24).
29 Although the applicant has not in the present case raised a failure to state reasons, the Court considers that, in the circumstances set out below, it must examine the question as to whether the Court of Justice has discharged the obligation upon it to state reasons.
30 It follows from the above summary of the pleas in law and arguments put forward by the applicant that the present action was formulated on the basis of information furnished by the Court of Justice in its letters of 3 and 23 August 2006, in response to the applicant’s request for the reasons upon which the decision was based in accordance with Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation.
31 Thus, the pleas in law advanced against the contested decision are confined to putting in issue the way in which the references supplied by the applicant in accordance with the contract conditions were evaluated, these references being relevant only at the selection stage of the procedure. In other words, the present case has been brought upon a basis induced by the reasons given by the Court of Justice, to the effect that the applicant’s bid had been excluded at the end of the selection stage upon the ground that the bid had been placed in sixth position in accordance with the evaluation criteria for that phase of the procedure and that only five tenderers had been retained for consideration at the award phase.
32 However, the documents produced by the Court of Justice on foot of the measure of organisation of the procedure (see paragraph 15 above) show that the information given to the applicant in the letters of 20 July, 3 and 23 August 2006 was wrong and did not reflect the true basis upon which the decision to award the contract to the two successful tenderers had in fact been taken by the Court of Justice.
33 On the basis of the proofs which have been furnished to it, the Court finds that what happened during the course of the evaluation procedure was as follows:
– on 21 June the Informatics and New Technologies Division of the Court of Justice (‘the Informatics Division’) presented to the evaluation committee its report No 16/2006 on the call for tenders Ref. CJ AM 13/2004, containing an evaluation by reference to both the selection and the award criteria;
– the Informatics Division informed the evaluation committee that on the basis of this evaluation six tenderers including the applicant had received the minimum 70 points in the evaluation of the selection criteria stage. However, the applicant, with 70.1 points, was placed in sixth position. Accordingly, only the bids of the other five tenderers had been evaluated at the phase of the award criteria;
– in the evaluation of the bids by reference to the award criteria, the Informatics Division had placed the two tenderers who were subsequently successful in first and second position and recommended that the committee should award them the contract;
– at its meeting on 12 July 2006 the evaluation committee had considered the Informatics Division report but decided to postpone its decision on the award of the contract and to await additional information which it requested from the Informatics Division;
– on 18 July 2006, the Informatics Division furnished a supplementary report entitled ‘Addendum to Report No 16/2006’; this report, together with its annexes, clearly shows that the Informatics Division had carried out a new evaluation of the award criteria in order to take into account the applicant’s bid as well as the five bids which had previously been assessed;
– for the two categories of award criteria, the Informatics Division had placed the applicant’s bid in fourth position for quality (38.13 points out of 60) and in second place on price (39.18 points out of 40). On the combined quality/price criteria the applicant’s bid had been placed in fourth position with a total of 77.91 points out of 100;
– on 20 July 2006, the Court of Justice informed the two successful tenderers of the award of the contract and informed the applicant that its bid had been rejected.
34 The description of the conduct of the evaluation procedure as set out in the preceding paragraph does not establish that, on the one hand, the applicant’s bid had been rejected on the grounds that it had been placed in sixth position at the end of the selection stage or, on the other hand, that no technical and financial evaluation of the bid had been made.
35 The formal decision to award the contract to the two successful tenderers was in reality taken on the basis of the supplementary report of 18 July 2006, which includes an evaluation of all six bids which had attained 70 points at the selection stage, including that of the applicant. The applicant’s bid was not therefore rejected at the end of the selection stage but upon the basis that it had been placed in fourth position at the end of the award stage. Moreover, this fact was known to the Court of Justice when it sent its letter of 20 July 2006 to the applicant.
36 At the hearing the Court of Justice argued that the evaluation of the applicant’s bid by reference to the award criteria was merely an informal exercise designed to confirm the earlier decision to reject the bid at the selection phase. That argument cannot be accepted. The supplementary report of 18 July 2006 clearly shows that the bid had been fully evaluated at the award stage and had even been placed in second position on price. It was on the basis of that evaluation, which took into account the applicant’s bid, that the Court of Justice adopted its formal and definitive decision to award the contract to the two successful tenderers.
37 It is also apparent that, in formulating its present case, the applicant was induced into error by the description given of the evaluation of the references in the letters of 20 July and 3 and 23 August 2006. In particular this last letter suggests that the mark of 17.5 out of 35 points was attributable to the three factors cited at paragraph 10 above, including the fact that some of its references concerned activities which were carried out more than three years previously. The applicant, as is shown clearly in the application, interpreted this explanation to the effect that the references in question had not been taken into account in the evaluation of the selection criteria upon the ground that they covered work which had been commenced or finished on dates outside the relevant period, running from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2005, even though the work was being performed during those years.
38 That interpretation was, in effect, further confirmed by the defence which, at paragraph 29, reads as follows: ‘First the applicant’s contention is misconceived in fact. Even though all the aforementioned references cover work carried out by the applicant or by the partner companies in a consortium during the past three years, it would have been contrary to the principles of transparency and equal treatment to take into account the work and activities which were carried out more than three years ago by the applicant. The [Court of Justice] indeed took into account the work carried out by the applicant or by the partner companies in a consortium during the past three years, excluding however the activities [relating to the projects “EUR-Lex”, “ESP5”, “Circa”, “SEI-JOS”, “IDA Tools”, “Stadium” and “Chopin”] which were anterior to this period.’
39 Although paragraph 29 of the defence is open to an interpretation to the effect that the references in question had been excluded from consideration only to the extent that they covered work performed outside the relevant period, the defence pleading did not correct the impression created by the letter of 23 August 2006. It was not until the Court of Justice, in its rejoinder, declared unequivocally that all of the references had been taken into account in respect of work performed during the relevant period that the applicant and the Court were able to understand that the meaning first given to the letter of 23 August 2006 was mistaken.
40 Moreover, it follows from the foregoing that the debate between the parties in the present case as to the validity of the evaluation of the references is in effect redundant in these circumstances, because the evaluation of the selection criteria is no longer relevant once the bid is admitted to the award stage. If the Court of Justice had informed the applicant of the fact that the limit of five tenderers at the outcome of the selection phase had not been applied and that its bid had been placed in fourth position at the end of the award stage, the present case might not have been brought, or, at the very least, would have been founded on a totally different basis.
41 As the applicant points out, Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation requires that ‘all public contracts … comply with the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and nondiscrimination’. Moreover Article 100(2) of the regulation provides that ‘[t]he contracting authority shall notify all candidates or tenderers whose applications or tenders are rejected of the grounds on which the decision was taken.’
42 It is undeniable that this last provision requires every contracting authority to give a tenderer the true reasons for the rejection of its bid. Moreover, the reasons given must reflect the actual conduct of the evaluation procedure. In that connection it must be recalled that the reasons given for a decision which has adverse effect must be logically compatible with the decision as adopted (see, to that effect, Case 2/56 Geitling v High Authority [1957] ECR 3, at p. 16).
43 A statement of reasons which does not identify the true basis upon which a decision rejecting a bid has been taken and does not reflect faithfully the manner in which the rejected bid has been evaluated is not transparent and does not fulfil the obligation to state reasons in Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation.
44 It follows from the above findings that the decision rejecting the applicant’s bid disregarded the obligation to state reasons and that in consequence it is necessary to annul that decision, as communicated to the applicant by the letter of 20 July 2006.
45 As regards the applicant’s claim for annulment of the decision awarding the contract to the two successful tenderers, the Court finds it impossible to judge whether it is well founded because, as the obligation to state reasons was disregarded, no examination of the evaluation of the award criteria could take place in the present action. | T-264/06
DC-Hadler Networks | 29-36 | Q4-100.2-impl
ECT-253 | 29 Conformément à une jurisprudence constante, la portée de l’obligation de motivation exigée par l’article 253 CE dépend de la nature de l’acte en cause et du contexte dans lequel il a été adopté. La motivation doit faire apparaître de manière claire et non équivoque le raisonnement de l’institution auteur de l’acte, de manière à permettre au juge communautaire d’exercer son contrôle et aux intéressés de connaître les justifications de la décision attaquée (voir arrêts de la Cour du 15 avril 1997, Irish Farmers Association e.a., C-22/94, Rec. p. I-1809, point 39, et du 10 mars 2005, Espagne/Conseil, C-342/03, Rec. p. I-1975, point 54, et la jurisprudence citée).
30 En l’espèce, la décision attaquée se fonde sur l’insuffisance de concurrence pour justifier l’annulation de la procédure de passation du marché. Dans sa lettre du 27 juillet 2006, la Commission a ensuite répondu à la requérante que la décision attaquée était fondée sur l’article 101 du règlement financier.
31 Dans sa défense, la Commission invoque comme motif de l’annulation de la procédure de passation du marché la dérogation à la règle d’origine accordée par ses propres services à la requérante. En outre, dans sa duplique, la Commission se réfère au contexte de l’adoption de la décision attaquée et allègue que la requérante aurait dû en déduire que le grief relatif à l’insuffisance de concurrence était fondé sur la dérogation qui lui avait été accordée dans l’application de la règle d’origine.
32 Si l’on peut attendre des personnes concernées par une décision un certain effort d’interprétation lorsque le sens du texte n’apparaît pas à la première lecture (arrêt du Tribunal du 12 décembre 1996, Rendo e.a./Commission, T-16/91, Rec. p. II-1827, point 46), il convient toutefois de constater que, en l’espèce, la requérante ne pouvait déduire de la notion de « concurrence insuffisante » que la raison pour laquelle la Commission avait décidé d’annuler la procédure de passation du marché était liée à la dérogation à la règle d’origine dont elle avait bénéficié.
33 Les services de la Commission ont accordé d’office cette dérogation à la requérante, avant de lui attribuer le marché. Dans la mesure où la décision attaquée était défavorable à la requérante, contrairement aux décisions antérieures sur la recevabilité de son offre et l’attribution du marché, alors même que le contexte de l’offre de la requérante était identique, il appartenait à la Commission de développer son raisonnement de manière explicite dans la décision attaquée ou dans sa lettre du 27 juillet 2006 (voir, par analogie, arrêt de la Cour du 26 novembre 1975, Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique e.a./Commission, 73/74, Rec. p. 1491, point 31). La décision attaquée est donc entachée d’une insuffisance de motivation.
34 Le fait que la Commission ait fourni les raisons de cette décision en cours d’instance ne compense pas l’insuffisance de la motivation initiale de la décision attaquée. En effet, il est de jurisprudence constante que la motivation doit figurer dans le corps même de la décision et qu’elle ne peut être explicitée pour la première fois et a posteriori devant le juge, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles qui, en l’absence de toute urgence, ne sont pas réunies en l’espèce (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du Tribunal du 2 juillet 1992, Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening/Commission, T-61/89, Rec. p. II-1931, point 131, et du 15 septembre 1998, European Night Services e.a./Commission, T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 et T-388/94, Rec. p. II-3141, point 95, et la jurisprudence citée).
35 La seule référence à l’insuffisance de concurrence ne peut donc pas constituer une motivation suffisante de la décision attaquée, dans la mesure où elle ne permet ni à la requérante de connaître ni au Tribunal de contrôler les raisons pour lesquelles la Commission a décidé de revenir sur sa décision d’attribuer le marché à la requérante.
36 Il résulte de l’ensemble des considérations qui précèdent que la décision attaquée doit être annulée pour violation des exigences de motivation requises par l’article 253 CE, sans qu’il y ait lieu d’examiner le second moyen d’annulation soulevé par la requérante. | T-125/06
Centro Studi Antonio Manieri | 57-63 | Q4-100.2-impl
ECT-253 | 57 As a preliminary point, in connection with the plea in question, the applicant is confusing infringement of the obligation to state reasons and manifest error of assessment. Although the heading of this plea refers to an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the arguments put forward in that connection relate, instead, to the errors allegedly made by the Council in assessing the advantages entailed by a decision to have recourse to the services of the OIB.
58 It should be recalled that these are two distinct pleas in law that may be invoked in an application for annulment, The first, which relates to the fact that a statement of reasons is lacking or inadequate, constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements for the purposes of Article 253 EC and is a matter of public interest which must be raised by the Community judicature of its own motion (see Case C-166/99 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I-983, paragraph 24, and the case-law cited). On the other hand, the second, which concerns the substantive legality of the decision in question, can be examined by the Community judicature only if it is raised by the applicant.
59 Consequently, it is necessary to rule on the arguments put forward in connection with the third plea by examining first of all those alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons and, subsequently, those alleging manifest errors of assessment.
60 As regards any infringement of the duty to state reasons, according to established case-law, that duty depends on the type of document at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution in such a way, first, as to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thus enable them to defend their rights and to verify whether or not the decision is well founded and, secondly, as to permit the Community judicature to exercise its power of review (Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraphs 15 and 16; Case T-217/01 Forum des migrants v Commission [2003] ECR II-1563, paragraph 68; and Case T-195/05 Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission [2007] ECR II-871, paragraph 45).
61 In the circumstances, the letter of 16 January 2006 expressly states that the tendering procedure had been abandoned as a result of the favourable evaluation of the proposal which the OIB had made to the Council. In that letter, the General Secretariat of the Council therefore informed the applicant that, as a result of the decision to entrust the management of the services in question to the OIB on the basis of the latter’s proposal, there was no longer any reason to continue with the tendering procedure. It follows that the letter of 16 January 2006 discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Council in such a way, first, as to make the applicant aware of the reasons for the measure and thus enable it to defend its rights and to verify whether or not the decision was well founded and, secondly, to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. It follows that, in its decision to abandon the tendering procedure, the Council did not infringe the obligation to state reasons.
62 As regards the existence of any manifest errors of assessment, it must be borne in mind that an institution using the tendering procedure has broad discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract and that review by the Court must be limited to checking that the rules governing the procedure and statement of reasons are complied with, the facts are correct and there is no manifest error of assessment (see judgment of 12 July 2007 in Case T-250/05 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 89, and the case-law cited). The applicant has not put forward any facts capable of establishing that the decision to abandon the tendering procedure was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. With regard to the decision to have recourse to the services of the OIB and, in particular, the supposed advantages to be gained from such a decision, while the Council is of course required to justify its choice to the political authority and internal auditors, it is not required to demonstrate to a participant in a tendering procedure the advantages of the decision to perform the services in question by its own means. Such a decision is a matter of policy and thus within the Council’s discretion. It follows that the Court is not required in these proceedings to examine whether the decision to have recourse to the services of the OIB is justified economically and at institutional level.
63 The third plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded. | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | 47-49 | Q4-100.2-impl
ECT-253-impl | 47. First, as regards the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons, it should be stated that the reasons for which the Commission rejected the applicants' tenders can be clearly seen from the grounds of the contested decisions.
48. According to consistent case-law, the scope of the obligation to state reasons depends on the nature of the measure at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure so that they can defend their rights and ascertain whether or not the measure is well founded, and so as to enable the Community judicature to exercise its power of review (Case C350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I395, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case T217/01 Forum des migrants v Commission [2003] ECR II1563, paragraph 68).
49. In the present case, the contested decisions expressly mention that the tenders submitted by the two consortia infringed Article 13 of the procurement notice because the DIIS and the DIHR belonged to the same legal group, the evidence which enabled the Commission to make this finding also being set out in those decisions. In addition, it should be stressed that the contested decisions were adopted following a thorough review by the Commission, after the decisions of 18 July 2005 and after hearing the views of the applicants. The applicants were therefore aware of the Commission's questions as to the nature of the link between the two institutes and the Centre. In these circumstances, this complaint cannot be upheld. | | T-195/05-R Deloitte | 108-110 | Q4-100.2-impl
ECT-253-impl | 108. Fourthly, doubts must be raised at this stage as to the existence of the failure to state reasons for the decision rejecting the tender claimed by the applicant. According to settled case-law, the scope of the obligation to state reasons must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure so that they can defend their rights and ascertain whether or not the measure is well founded and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review (Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France [1998] ECR I1719, paragraph 63; Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission [2003] ECR II435, paragraph 278; and Case T-109/01 Fleuren Compost v Commission [2004] ECR II-127, paragraph 119).
109. The reason stated for the decision rejecting the tender is the existence of a risk of a conflict of interest connected, first, with the grants received by certain members of Euphet and certain experts which it might use to perform the framework contract and, secondly, the inadequate guarantees provided by Euphet in this regard.
110. As regards the allegedly erroneous nature of the reason stating that Euphet failed to acknowledge the involvement of certain experts in the implementation of the programme of Community action in the field of public health, the applicant does not mention any passage in its tender where it specifically acknowledged, or even merely suggested, that certain experts whom it intended to use received Community grants in that field. | T-465/04
Evropaïki Dinamiki | 46-50 | Q4-100.2
Q4-105
M4-149.2
ECT-253 | 46 As a preliminary point, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, the provisions of Directive 92/50 – which, pursuant to Article 105 of the Financial Regulation, applies to public contracts awarded by the institutions of the Communities on their own account only in respect of matters relating to thresholds which determine the publication arrangements, the choice of procedures and the corresponding timelimits – are not those relevant to examination of whether the Commission has complied with its obligation to provide to the unsuccessful tenderer a statement of the reasons for rejection of its tender. As was stated in paragraph 1 above, the award of the contract at issue is, in fact, governed by the provisions of the Financial Regulation and of the Implementing Rules and, as regards the obligation to state reasons, specifically by Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation and Article 149 of the Implementing Rules.
47 It is clear from those articles, and from the case-law of the Court, that the Commission fulfils its obligation to state reasons if it confines itself first to informing unsuccessful tenderers immediately of the reasons for the rejection of their respective tenders and then subsequently, if expressly requested to do so, provides to all tenderers who have made an admissible tender the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected as well as the name of the successful tenderer, within a period of 15 days from the date on which a written request is received (see, to that effect and by analogy, Case T-19/95 Adia Interim v Commission [1996] ECR II-321, paragraph 31; Case T-169/00 Esedra v Commission [2002] ECR II-609, paragraphs 188 and 189; and Case T-183/00 Strabag Benelux v Council [2003] ECR II-135, paragraph 54).
48 Such a manner of proceeding satisfies the purpose of the duty to state reasons enshrined in Article 253 EC, according to which the reasoning followed by the authority which adopted the measure in question must be disclosed in a clear and unequivocal fashion so as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thereby enable them to defend their rights; and, on the other, to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction (Adia Interim v Commission, cited in paragraph 47 above, paragraph 32; Esedra v Commission, paragraph 47 above, paragraph 190; and Strabag Benelux v Council, cited in paragraph 47 above, paragraph 55).
49 It is also important to bear in mind that the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom the measure is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63 and case-law cited).
50 Accordingly, in order to determine whether the requirement to state reasons laid down by the Financial Regulation and the Implementing Rules has been satisfied, the Court must examine not only the contested decision but also the letter of 18 October 2004, sent to the applicant in reply to its express request, which was made several times in its letters of 16 September, 11 and 19 October 2004, for additional information on the decision to award the contract at issue. | T-183/00
Strabag | 54-59 | C2A1-3.2=W2-8.1.1
ECT-253 | 54 It is apparent from Article 8(1) of Directive 93/37, as amended by Directive 97/52, and from the judgment in Adia interim v Commission, cited above, that the Council fulfils its obligation to state reasons if it first informs eliminated tenderers immediately of the fact that their tender has been rejected by a simple unreasoned communication and then subsequently, if expressly requested to do so, informs tenderers of the relative characteristics and advantages of the successful tender and the name of the successful tenderer within 15 days of receipt of a written request.
55 Such a manner of proceeding satisfies the purpose of the duty to state reasons enshrined in Article 253 EC, according to which the reasoning followed by the authority which adopted the measure must be disclosed in a clear and unequivocal fashion so as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thereby enable them to defend their rights and, on the other, to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction (Case T-166/94 Koyo Seiko v Council [1995] ECR II-2129, paragraph 103, and Aida interim v Commission, cited above, paragraph 32).
56 Consequently, in order to determine whether the Council fulfilled its obligation to state reasons, the Court considers that it is necessary to examine the letter of 11 May 2000 sent to the applicant in response to its express request of 26 April 2000 for a copy of the decision awarding the contract and for the reasons for the decision.
57 Clearly, in the letter of 11 May 2000 (see paragraph 14 above) the Council gave a sufficiently detailed statement of the reasons for which it had rejected the applicant's tender and stated the characteristics and advantages of De Waele's tender. That letter clearly indicates the procedure which was followed in evaluating the tenders of the three tenderers and the fact that De Waele's tender was successful because it was the most economically advantageous. The Court considers that the applicant could immediately identify the specific reason for the rejection of its tender, namely the level of its price in relation to that of De Waele. The adequacy of that statement of reasons is not affected by the fact that, on 4 July 2000, the Council provided, at the express request of the applicant, an even more detailed explanation of the evaluation of its tender.
58 In any event, and contrary to what the applicant claims (see paragraph 49 above), the duty to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the information available to the applicant at the time when the action was brought. If, as in the present case, the applicant, before bringing an action but after the date laid down by Article 8(1) of Directive 93/37, asks the institution concerned for additional explanations about a decision and receives those explanations, he cannot ask the Court not to take them into consideration when determining whether the statement of reasons is adequate; however, the institution is not permitted to substitute an entirely new statement of reasons for the original statement of reasons, but that is not the position in this case.
59 It is apparent from the foregoing that the second plea, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons, must be rejected. | T-169/00
Esedra | 188-190+192 | C2A1-1.2=S2-12.1
EC-253 | 188 Article 12(1) of Directive 92/50 provides as follows:
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189 Pursuant to the abovementioned provision, the Commission must, within 15 days of receipt of his request, inform an unsuccessful tenderer of the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected as well as the name of the successful tenderer, except for information described as confidential.
190 This manner of proceedings satisfies the purpose of the obligation to state reasons enshrined in Article 253 EC, according to which the reasoning followed by the authority which adopted the measure in question must be disclosed in a clear and unequivocal fashion so as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thereby enable them to defend their rights; and, on the other, to enable the Court to exercise its power of review (see judgments in Case T-166/94 Koyo Seiko v Council [1995] ECR II-2129, paragraph 103, and in Adia Interim v Commission, cited above, paragraph 32).
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192 It must be found that, in the letter of 9 June 2000, the Commission gave a sufficiently detailed explanation of the reasons for which it rejected the applicant's tender by giving the name of the successful tenderer and the relative advantages of the tender selected by comparison with the applicant's tender with respect to the criteria laid down by the contract documents. That statement of reasons also has enabled the applicant to assert its rights and the Court to exercise its power of review. |
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