| | ECT-12Discrimination    
| ECT | Article 12 | Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | C-324/07
Coditel Brabant | 26-42 | ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49
ECT-EquTran | 26 The application of the rules set out in Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC, as well as of the general principles of which they are the specific expression, is precluded if the control exercised over the concessionaire by the concession-granting public authority is similar to that which the authority exercises over its own departments and if, at the same time, that entity carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority or authorities (see, to that effect, Teckal, paragraph 50, and Parking Brixen, paragraph 62).
27 As regards the second of those conditions, the national court stated in the order for reference that Brutélé carries out the essential part of its activities with its members. Accordingly, the scope of the first condition – that the control exercised over the concessionaire by the concession-granting public authority or authorities must be similar to that which the authority exercises over its own departments – remains to be examined.
28 In order to determine whether a concession-granting public authority exercises a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, it is necessary to take account of all the legislative provisions and relevant circumstances. It must follow from that examination that the concessionaire in question is subject to a control which enables the concession-granting public authority to influence that entity’s decisions. It must be a case of a power of decisive influence over both strategic objectives and significant decisions of that entity (see, to that effect, Parking Brixen, paragraph 65, and Case C-340/04 Carbotermo and Consorzio Alisei [2006] ECR I-4137, paragraph 36).
29 Of the relevant facts which can be identified from the order for reference, it is appropriate to consider, first, the holding of capital by the concessionaire, secondly, the composition of its decisionmaking bodies, and thirdly, the extent of the powers conferred on its governing council.
30 As regards the first of those facts, it should be borne in mind that, where a private undertaking holds a share of the capital of a concessionaire, this precludes the possibility for a concessiongranting public authority to exercise over that concessionaire a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments (see, to that effect, Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] ECR I-1, paragraph 49).
31 On the other hand, the fact that the concession-granting public authority holds, alone or together with other public authorities, all of the share capital in a concessionaire, tends to indicate – generally, but not conclusively – that that contracting authority exercises over that company a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments (Carbotermo and Consorzio Alisei, paragraph 37, and Case C-295/05 Asemfo [2007] ECR I-2999, paragraph 57).
32 It is clear from the order for reference that, in the case before the referring court, the concessionaire is an inter-municipal cooperative society whose members are municipalities and an inter-municipal association whose members in turn are solely municipalities, and is not open to private members.
33 Secondly, it is clear from the file that Brutélé’s governing council consists of representatives of the affiliated municipalities, appointed by the general assembly, which is itself composed of representatives of the affiliated municipalities. In accordance with Article 12 of the Law on intermunicipal cooperatives, the representatives at the general assembly are appointed by the municipal council of each municipality from among the municipal councillors, the mayor and the aldermen.
34 The fact that Brutélé’s decision-making bodies are composed of representatives of the public authorities which are affiliated to Brutélé shows that those bodies are under the control of the public authorities, which are thus able to exert decisive influence over both Brutélé’s strategic objectives and significant decisions.
35 Thirdly, it is evident from the file that Brutélé’s governing council enjoys the widest powers. In particular, it fixes the charges. It also has the power – but is under no obligation – to delegate to the sector or sub-sector boards the resolution of certain matters particular to those sectors or subsectors.
36 The question arises as to whether Brutélé has thus become market-oriented and gained a degree of independence which would render tenuous the control exercised by the public authorities affiliated to it.
37 In this regard, it should be pointed out that Brutélé does not take the form of a société par actions, or a société anonyme, either of which is capable of pursuing objectives independently of its shareholders, but of an inter-municipal cooperative society governed by the Law on inter-municipal cooperatives. Moreover, in accordance with Article 3 of that Law, inter-municipal cooperatives are not to have a commercial character.
38 It seems to be apparent from that Law, which is supplemented by Brutélé’s statutes, that Brutélé’s object under its statutes is the pursuit of the municipal interest – that being the raison d’être for its creation – and that it does not pursue any interest which is distinct from that of the public authorities affiliated to it.
39 Subject to verification of the facts by the referring court, it follows that, despite the extent of the powers conferred on its governing council, Brutélé does not enjoy a degree of independence sufficient to preclude the municipalities which are affiliated to it from exercising over it control similar to that exercised over their own departments.
40 Those considerations are all the more applicable where decisions relating to the activities of the inter-municipal cooperative society are taken by the sector or sub-sector boards, within the limits of the delegated powers granted to them by the governing council. Where one or more affiliated municipalities are recognised as constituting a sector or sub-sector of that society’s activities, the control which those municipalities may exercise over the matters delegated to the sector or subsector boards is even stricter than that which they exercise in conjunction with all the members within the plenary bodies of that society.
41 It follows from the foregoing that, subject to verification of the facts by the referring court as regards the degree of independence enjoyed by the inter-municipal cooperative society in question, in circumstances such as those of the case before the referring court, the control exercised, via the statutory bodies, by the public authorities belonging to such an inter-municipal cooperative society over that society’s decisions may be regarded as enabling those authorities to exercise over that cooperative society control similar to that exercised over their own departments.
42 Accordingly, the answer to Questions 1 and 2 must be that: – Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, and the concomitant obligation of transparency, do not preclude a public authority from awarding, without calling for competition, a public service concession to an inter-municipal cooperative society of which all the members are public authorities, where those public authorities exercise over that cooperative society control similar to that exercised over their own departments and where that society carries out the essential part of its activities with those public authorities; – Subject to verification of the facts by the referring court as regards the degree of independence enjoyed by the inter-municipal cooperative society in question, in circumstances such as those of the case before the referring court, where decisions regarding the activities of an inter-municipal cooperative society owned exclusively by public authorities are taken by bodies, created under the statutes of that society, which are composed of representatives of the affiliated public authorities, the control exercised over those decisions by the public authorities may be regarded as enabling those authorities to exercise over the cooperative society control similar to that exercised over their own departments. | C-220/06
Asociacion Profesional de Empresas | 73-88 | ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49
ECT-86 | 73. Treaty provisions that specifically apply to public service contracts whose value does not reach the thresholds established by Directive 92/50 include, in particular, Articles 43 EC and 49 EC.
74. Besides the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is also to be applied to such public service contracts even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality (see, by analogy, Case C458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I8585, paragraph 48, and Case C410/04 ANAV [2006] ECR I3303, paragraph 20).
75. The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty of transparency which enables the contracting public authority to verify that those principles are complied with. That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the public authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the public service contract to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed (see, by analogy, Parking Brixen , paragraph 49, and ANAV , paragraph 21).
76. As a rule, a complete lack of any call for competition in the case of the award of a public service contract like that at issue in the main proceedings does not comply with the requirements of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more than with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency (see, by analogy, Parking Brixen , paragraph 50, and ANAV , paragraph 22).
77. Furthermore, it follows from Article 86(1) EC that the Member States must not maintain in force national legislation which permits the award of public service contracts without a call for tenders since such an award infringes Article 43 EC or 49 EC or the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency (see, by analogy, Parking Brixen , paragraph 52, and ANAV , paragraph 23).
78. Admittedly, the combined effect of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 86 EC is that paragraph (2) of the Article may be relied upon to justify the grant by a Member State to an undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest of special or exclusive rights which are contrary to, inter alia, the provisions of the Treaty, to the extent to which performance of the particular task assigned to that undertaking can be assured only through the grant of such rights and provided that the development of trade is not affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community (Case C340/99 TNT Traco [2001] ECR I4109, paragraph 52).
79. It is also necessary to point out that an undertaking like Correos, responsible by virtue of the legislation of a Member State for securing the universal postal service, constitutes an undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest for the purposes of Article 86(2) EC (see, to that effect, TNT Traco , paragraph 53).
80. However, even on the assumption that the duty imposed on Correos, pursuant to Article 58 of Law 14/2000, to provide public authorities with services connected with its company objects could be considered to be an exclusive right for the benefit of Correos, the fact remains that Article 86(2) EC cannot be used to justify national legislation like that in issue in the main proceedings in so far as it concerns non-reserved postal services within the meaning of Directive 97/67.
81. As the Advocate General observed in paragraph 99 of his Opinion, Directive 97/67 implements Article 86(2) EC with regard to the possibility of reserving certain postal services to the provider of the universal postal service. As recalled in paragraph 67 of this judgment, the Court has already held that Member States do not have the option of extending the services reserved for the universal postal service provider pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 97/67, as such extension goes against the purpose of the Directive, which aims to establish gradual and controlled liberalisation in the postal sector.
82. In this context, it must be recalled that, within the framework of Directive 97/67, account is taken of whether, in order to enable the universal postal service to be carried out under economically acceptable conditions, it is necessary to reserve some postal services to the provider of that universal postal service (Case C162/06 International Mail Spain [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 50).
83. Therefore, as regards non-reserved postal services within the meaning of Directive 97/67, to which this analysis is limited, Article 86(2) EC cannot provide the basis for justifying an exclusive right for the provider of the universal postal service to provide such services to public authorities.
84. The Spanish Government submits, however, that the Cooperation Agreement cannot be subject to the rules governing the award of public service contracts because of its nature, which is instrumental rather than contractual. Correos is unable to refuse to enter into a cooperation agreement like the one in issue in the main proceedings, but is under an obligation to accept it.
85. In this respect, it must be noted that, as observed in paragraph 54 of this judgment, only if the Cooperation Agreement is in actual fact a unilateral administrative measure creating obligations solely for Correos and departing significantly from the normal conditions of a commercial offer made by that company - which it is for the Audiencia Nacional to establish - would it have to be held that such a contract falls outside the Community rules on the award of public service contract.
86. As regards the argument of the Spanish Government according to which the Cooperation Agreement cannot be subject to the rules governing public procurement because it concerns an in-house' situation, it is admittedly the case that, in the sphere of public service contracts, the application of the rules set out in Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC, as well as the general principles of which they are the specific expression, is precluded if the control exercised by the contracting public authority over the entity to which the contract was awarded is similar to that which the authority exercises over its own departments and if that entity carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority (see, by analogy, Parking Brixen , paragraph 62, and ANAV , paragraph 24).
87. However, as held in paragraph 63 of the present judgment, a cooperation agreement like the one in issue in the main proceedings does not fulfil the second of the conditions referred to in the preceding paragraph and therefore cannot, on that basis, fall outside the application of the rules set out in Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC, as well as the general principles of which they are the specific expression.
88. Therefore, the answer to the question referred must also be that Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 86 EC, as well as the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and transparency, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that allows public authorities to entrust, without regard to the rules governing the award of public service contracts, the provision of non-reserved postal services within the meaning of Directive 97/67 to a public limited company whose capital is wholly state-owned and which, in that State, is the provider of universal postal service, in so far as the contracts to which that legislation applies
- do not reach the relevant threshold as provided for in Article 7(1) of Directive 92/50, and
- do not in actual fact constitute a unilateral administrative measure creating obligations solely for the provider of the universal postal service and departing significantly from the normal conditions of a commercial offer made by that company,
which are matters for the national court to establish. | C-410/04
ANAV | 18-19 | ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49 | 18. Notwithstanding the fact that public service concession contracts are excluded from the scope of Directive 92/50, replaced by Directive 2004/18, the public authorities concluding them are, none the less, bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty, in general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, in particular (see, to that effect, Case C324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 60; Case C231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16, and Parking Brixen , paragraph 46).
19. The provisions of the Treaty which are specifically applicable to public service concessions include, in particular, Article 43 EC and Article 49 EC (Parking Brixen , paragraph 47). | C-410/04
ANAV | 20-23 | S2-3.2-impl
ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49
ECT-86 | 20. Besides the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is also to be applied to public service concessions even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality (Parking Brixen , paragraph 48).
21. The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty of transparency which enables the concession-granting public authority to ensure that those principles are complied with. That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the public authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed (see, to that effect, Telaustria and Telefonadress , paragraphs 61 and 62, and Parking Brixen , paragraph 49).
22. Theoretically, a complete lack of any call for competition in the case of the award of a public service concession such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not comply with the requirements of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more than with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency (Parking Brixen , paragraph 50).
23. Furthermore, it follows from Article 86(1) EC that the Member States must not maintain in force national legislation which permits the award of public service concessions without their being put out to competition since such an award infringes Article 43 EC or 49 EC or the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency (Parking Brixen , paragraph 52). | C-410/04
ANAV | 24-33 | ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49 | 24. However, in the field of public service concessions, the application of the rules set out in Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC, as well as the general principles of which they are the specific expression, is precluded if the control exercised over the concessionaire by the concession-granting public authority is similar to that which the authority exercises over its own departments and if, at the same time, that entity carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority (Parking Brixen , paragraph 62).
25. National legislation which reproduces literally the wording of the conditions specified in the preceding paragraph, as does Article 113(5) of Legislative Decree No 267/2000 as amended by Article 14 of Decree Law No 269/2003, theoretically complies with Community law, with the proviso that the interpretation of that legislation must also comply with the requirements of Community
26. It should be made clear that, since it is a matter of a derogation from the general rules of Community law, the two conditions stated in paragraph 24 of this judgment must be interpreted strictly and the burden of proving the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the derogation to those rules lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (see Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] ECR I-1, paragraph 46, and Parking Brixen , paragraph 63).
27. According to the written observations submitted to the Court by AMTAB Servizio, the Municipality of Bari decided, on 27 December 2002, to transfer 80% of the shares it owned in the capital of that company and, on 21 May 2004, it decided to initiate for that purpose the call for tenders in order to select the majority private partner. That information was confirmed by ANAV at the hearing before the Court.
28. However, at the same hearing, the Municipality of Bari stated that it had altered its intention to transfer part of its shareholding in the capital of AMTAB Servizio. On 13 January 2005, it decided not to act on its previous decision and not to privatise that company. That decision was not put in evidence in the file before the national court since it was taken after the decision to refer.
29. It is a matter for that court, and not for the Court of Justice, to determine whether the Municipality of Bari intends to open the capital of AMTAB Servizio to private shareholders. However, in order to provide that court with the guidance it needs for the purpose of ruling on the proceedings before it, it is useful to provide the following clarification.
30. If, for the duration of the contract at issue in the main proceedings, the capital of AMTAB Servizio is open to private shareholders, the effect of such a situation would be the award of a public services concession to a semi-public company without any call for competition, which would interfere with the objectives pursued by Community law (see, to that effect, Case C29/04 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 48).
31. In fact, the participation, even as a minority, of a private undertaking in the capital of a company in which the concession-granting public authority is also a participant excludes in any event the possibility of that public authority exercising over such a company a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments (see, to that effect, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau , paragraph 49).
32. Therefore, in so far as the concessionaire is a company which is open, even in part, to private capital, that fact precludes it from being regarded as a structure for the in-house' management of a public service on behalf of the controlling local authority (see, to that effect, Coname , paragraph 26).
33. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred must be that Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 86 EC, and the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and transparency do not preclude national legislation which allows a public authority to award a contract for the provision of a public service directly to a company of which it wholly owns the share capital, provided that the public authority exercises over that company control comparable to that exercised over its own departments and that that company carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority. | C-458/03
Parking Brixen | 44-50 | ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49
ECT-EquTran | 44. By its second question, the referring court is asking, in essence, whether the award of a public service concession without it being put out to competition is compatible with Community law, if the concessionaire is a company limited by shares resulting from the conversion of a special undertaking of a public authority, a company whose share capital is at the time of the award 100% owned by the concession-granting public authority, but whose administrative board enjoys all extensive powers of routine administration and can effect independently, without the agreement of the shareholders' meeting, certain transactions up to a value of EUR 5 million.
45. That question refers, first, to the conduct of the concession-granting authority in relation to the award of a specific concession and, second, to the national legislation which permits the award of such a concession without a call for tenders.
46. Notwithstanding the fact that public service concession contracts are, as Community law stands at present, excluded from the scope of Directive 92/50, the public authorities concluding them are, none the less, bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty, in general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, in particular (see, to that effect, Case C-324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 60, and Case C-231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16).
47. The prohibition on any discrimination on grounds of nationality is set out in Article 12 EC. The provisions of the Treaty which are more specifically applicable to public service concessions include, in particular, Article 43 EC, the first paragraph of which states that restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State are to be prohibited, and Article 49 EC, the first paragraph of which provides that restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community are to be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
48. According to the Court's case-law, Articles 43 EC and 49 EC are specific expressions of the principle of equal treatment (see Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, paragraph 8). The prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality is also a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment (see Case 810/79 Überschär [1980] ECR 2747, paragraph 16). In its case-law relating to the Community directives on public procurement, the Court has stated that the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is intended to afford equality of opportunity to all tenderers when formulating their tenders, regardless of their nationality (see, to that effect, Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, paragraphs 33 and 54). As a result, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is to be applied to public service concessions even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality.
49. The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty of transparency which enables the concession-granting public authority to ensure that those principles are complied with. That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the public authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed (see, to that effect, Telaustria and Telefonadress , cited above, paragraphs 61 and 62).
50. It is for the concession-granting public authority to evaluate, subject to review by the competent courts, the appropriateness of the detailed arrangements of the call for competition to the particularities of the public service concession in question. However, a complete lack of any call for competition in the case of the award of a public service concession such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not comply with the requirements of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more than with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency. | C-458/03
Parking Brixen | 56-61 | S2-1.c-impl
ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49 | 56. Secondly, the Italian Republic, Stadtwerke Brixen AG and the Gemeinde Brixen contend that the application of the rules of the Treaty and of the general principles of Community law to a situation such as that in the main proceedings is precluded by the fact that Stadtwerke Brixen AG is not an entity independent of that municipality. In support of that argument, they rely on the judgment in Case C-107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraphs 49 to 51.
57. In that regard, it is important to recall that, in Teckal , cited above, the Court held that Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 1) is applicable where a contracting authority, such as a local authority, plans to conclude in writing, with an entity which is formally distinct from it and independent of it in regard to decision-making, a contract for pecuniary interest for the supply of goods.
58. As regards the existence of such a contract, the Court stated, in paragraph 50 of the judgment in Teckal , that, in accordance with Article 1(a) of Directive 93/36, it is in principle sufficient if the contract was concluded between, on the one hand, a local authority and, on the other, a person legally distinct from that local authority. The position can be otherwise only in the case where the local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities.
59. The Court has confirmed that the same considerations apply to Directive 92/50 on public service contracts and Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54) (see, respectively, Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] ECR I-1, paragraphs 48, 49 and 52, and Case C-84/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-139, paragraph 39).
60. Those considerations are based on the premiss that the application of Directives 92/50, 93/36 and 93/37 depends on the existence of a contract concluded between two distinct persons (see Teckal , paragraphs 46 and 49). Yet the application of Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC, as well as the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency associated with them, does not depend on the existence of a contract. As a result, the considerations developed in the case-law cited in paragraphs 56 to 59 of this judgment do not apply automatically either to those provisions of the Treaty or to those principles.
61. Nevertheless, it must be held that those considerations may be transposed to the Treaty provisions and to the principles which relate to public service concessions excluded from the scope of the directives on public procurement. Indeed, in the field of public procurement and public service concessions, the principle of equal treatment and the specific expressions of that principle, namely the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality and Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, are to be applied in cases where a public authority entrusts the supply of economic activities to a third party. By contrast, it is not appropriate to apply the Community rules on public procurement or public service concessions in cases where a public authority performs tasks in the public interest for which it is responsible by its own administrative, technical and other means, without calling upon external entities (see, to that effect, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau , paragraph 48). | C-458/03
Parking Brixen | 62-72 | ECT-12
ECT-43
ECT-49
ECT-EquTran | 62. Consequently, in the field of public service concessions, the application of the rules set out in Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC, as well as the general principles of which they are the specific expression, is precluded if the control exercised over the concessionaire by the concession-granting public authority is similar to that which the authority exercises over its own departments and if, at the same time, that entity carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority. 63. Since it is a matter of a derogation from the general rules of Community law, the two conditions stated in the preceding paragraph must be interpreted strictly and the burden of proving the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the derogation to those rules lies on the person seeking to rely on those circumstances (see Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau , paragraph 46).
64. It is appropriate to examine, first, whether the concession-granting public authority exercises a control over the concessionaire which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments.
65. That assessment must take account of all the legislative provisions and relevant circumstances. It must follow from that examination that the concessionaire in question is subject to a control enabling the concession-granting public authority to influence the c oncessionaire's decisions. It must be a case of a power of decisive influence over both strategic objectives and significant decisions. 66. It is clear from the order for reference that under Article 1 of the statutes of the special undertaking, Stadtwerke Brixen, it was a municipal body whose specific function was the uniform and integrated provision of local public services. The municipal council laid down the general guidelines, allocated the start-up capital, ensured that any social costs were covered, monitored the operating results and exercised strategic supervision, the undertaking being guaranteed the necessary independence.
67. By contrast, Stadtwerke Brixen AG became market-oriented, which renders the municipality's control tenuous. Militating in that direction are:
(a) the conversion of Stadtwerke Brixen - a special undertaking of the Gemeinde Brixen - into a company limited by shares (Stadtwerke Brixen AG) and the nature of that type of company;
(b) the broadening of its objects, the company having started to work in significant new fields, particularly those of the carriage of persons and goods, as well as information technology and telecommunications. It must be noted that the company retained the wide range of activities previously carried on by the special undertaking, particularly those of water supply and waste water treatment, the supply of heating and energy, waste disposal and road building;
(c) the obligatory opening of the company, in the short term, to other capital;
(d) the expansion of the geographical area of the company's activities, to the whole of Italy and abroad;
(e) the considerable powers conferred on its Administrative Board, with in practice no management control by the municipality.
68. In fact, as regards the powers conferred on the Administrative Board, it is clear from the decision of reference that the statutes of Stadtwerke Brixen AG, particularly Article 18 thereof, give the board very broad powers to manage the company, since it has the power to carry out all acts which it considers necessary for the attainment of the company's objective. In addition, the power, under the said Article 18, to provide guarantees up to EUR 5 million or to effect other transactions without the prior authority of the shareholders' meeting shows that the company has broad independence vis-à-vis its shareholders.
69. The decision of reference also states that the Gemeinde Brixen has the right to appoint the majority of the members of Stadtwerke Brixen AG's Administrative Board. However, the referring court notes that the control exercised by the municipality over Stadtwerke Brixen AG is limited, essentially, to those measures which company law assigns to the majority of shareholders, which considerably attenuates the relationship of dependence which existed between the municipality and the special undertaking Stadtwerke Brixen, in the light, above all, of the broad powers possessed by Stadtwerke Brixen AG's Administrative Board.
70. Where a concessionaire enjoys a degree of independence characterised by elements such as those noted in paragraphs 67 to 69 of this judgment, it is not possible for the concession-granting public authority to exercise over the concessionaire control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments.
71. In those circumstances, and without it being necessary to consider the question whether the concessionaire carries out the essential part of its activities with the concession-granting public authority, the award of a public service concession by a public authority to such a body cannot be regarded as a transaction internal to that authority, to which the rules of Community law do not apply.
72. It follows that the reply to the second question referred for a preliminary ruling must be as follows: Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, and the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency, are to be interpreted as precluding a public authority from awarding, without putting it out to competition, a public service concession to a company limited by shares resulting from the conversion of a special undertaking of that public authority, a company whose objects have been extended to significant new areas, whose capital must obligatorily be opened in the short term to other capital, the geographical area of whose activities has been extended to the entire country and abroad, and whose Administrative Board possesses very broad management powers which it can exercise independently. | C-225/98
France | 46-54 | W2-35.1
ECT-12 [ex 6] | 46 The Commission claims that, in expressly setting forth as an award criterion in a number of contract notices a condition relating to employment linked to a local project to combat unemployment, the French authorities have infringed Article 30 of Directive 93/37. The Commission acknowledges that the taking into account of employment-related projects may be regarded as a condition of performance for the purpose of the rule in Beentjes (Case 31/87 Beentjes v Netherlands State [1988] ECR 4635, paragraphs 28 and 37), but it points out that, in the present case, that possibility was characterised as an award criterion in the contract notices in question. Under Article 30 of Directive 93/37, award criteria must be based either on the lowest price or on the most economically advantageous tender.
47 Relying on paragraphs 28 and 37 of Beentjes, the French Government contends that an additional award criterion of that kind has been permitted by the Court of Justice. It states, furthermore, that the award criterion in question in this case does not constitute a primary criterion, such as those referred to in Article 29 of Directive 71/305, the purpose of which is to make it possible to determine which is the most advantageous tender, but a secondary criterion which is not decisive.
48 The first point to be noted here is that, by this complaint, the Commission alleges that the French Republic has infringed Article 30(1) of Directive 93/37 purely and simply by referring to the criterion linked to the campaign against unemployment as an award criterion in some of the disputed contract notices.
49 Under Article 30(1) of Directive 93/37, the criteria on which the contracting authorities are to base the award of contracts are either the lowest price only or, when the award is made to the most economically advantageous tender, various criteria according to the contract, such as price, period for completion, running costs, profitability, technical merit.
50 None the less, that provision does not preclude all possibility for the contracting authorities to use as a criterion a condition linked to the campaign against unemployment provided that that condition is consistent with all the fundamental principles of Community law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination flowing from the provisions of the Treaty on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, Beentjes, paragraph 29).
51 Furthermore, even if such a criterion is not in itself incompatible with Directive 93/37, it must be applied in conformity with all the procedural rules laid down in that directive, in particular the rules on advertising (see, to that effect, on Directive 71/305, Beentjes, paragraph 31). It follows that an award criterion linked to the campaign against unemployment must be expressly mentioned in the contract notice so that contractors may become aware of its existence (see, to that effect, Beentjes, paragraph 36).
52 As regards the Commission's argument that Beentjes concerned a condition of performance of the contract and not a criterion for the award of the contract, it need merely be observed that, as is clear from paragraph 14 of Beentjes, the condition relating to the employment of long-term unemployed persons, which was at issue in that case, had been used as the basis for rejecting a tender and therefore necessarily constituted a criterion for the award of the contract.
53 In this case, as has been stated in paragraph 48 above, the Commission criticises only the reference to such a criterion as an award criterion in the contract notice. It does not claim that the criterion linked to the campaign against unemployment is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Community law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination, or that it was not advertised in the contract notice.
54 In those circumstances, the Commission's complaint relating to the additional award criterion linked to the campaign against unemployment must be rejected. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | N-071221
Damm Cellular Systems | 1-4+K1 | C3-2-impl
ECT-12-impl
ECT-49-impl
KNL2-1 | Ad påstand 1 – 10
1. Den centrale beslutning, som efter klagerens opfattelse indebærer en overtrædelse af det EU-retlige ligebehandlingsprincip, er Den Danske Stats beslutning om på et tidspunkt at tildele en virksomhed Tetra-frekvenser i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz, forinden det ved gennemførelse af et EUudbud var blevet konstateret, hvilken virksomhed der kunne afgive det økonomisk mest fordelagtige tilbud på en kontrakt om tilslutning til og brug at et landsdækkende radiobaseret telekommunikationsnet, uanset at det allerede på dette tidspunkt var besluttet, at der skulle indgås en sådan kontrakt, eller uanset at det lå klart, at der ville blive truffet beslutning om, at der skulle indgås en sådan kontrakt. Klageren har herved gjort gældende, at den korrekte fremgangsmåde havde været først under et EU-udbud vedrørende kontrakten om tilslutning til og brug af et landsdækkende radiobaseret telekommunikationsnet at konstatere, hvilken virksomhed der kunne afgive det økonomisk mest fordelagtige bud på denne kontrakt, dernæst at indgå kontrakt med den pågældende tilbudsgiver om telekommunikationsnettet, og derefter at foranledige, at den pågældende tilbudsgiver fik tildelt de frekvenstilladelser, som var nødvendige, for at tilbudsgiveren som fremtidig kontraktspart kunne præstere den aftalte ydelse. 1 22.
2. En sådan eventuel tilsidesættelse af ligebehandlingsprincippet er imidlertid ikke en tilsidesættelse at det EU-udbudsretlige ligebehandlingsprincip, da den relevante beslutning ligger forud for iværksættelsen af det EU-udbud, som klagen vedrører, og da den relevante beslutning er truffet af andre danske statsmyndigheder end den ordregivende myndighed Økonomistyrelsen.
3. Efter lov om Klagenævnet for Udbud § 1 omfatter Klagenævnets kompetence overtrædelser af fællesskabsretten, men som det fremgår til dels af § 1, og som det i øvrigt er fastlagt i Klagenævnets praksis, omfatter Klagenævnets kompetence kun overtrædelser af fællesskabsretten, som sker i forbindelse med indgåelse af offentlige konktakter.
4. Da påstand 1 – 10 som anført ikke vedrører overtrædelser af det EUudbudsretlige ligebehandlingsprincip begået af en offentlig udbyder under et udbud, men derimod en påstået overtrædelse af den generelle EU-retlige ligebehandlingsprincip begået af Den Danske Stat, afviser Klagenævnet påstand 1 – 10.
Herefter bestemmes:
K1. Påstand 1 – 10 afvises.
[Påstand 1 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen i afsnit III.2.3. »Teknisk Kapacitet« at have fastsat følgende betingelse, som virksomheder, der ønsker at blive prækvalificeret, skal opfylde, uagtet denne betingelse for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den virksomhed, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»Oplysninger og formaliteter, som er nødvendige for at vurdere, om kravene er opfyldt:
……
5) En erklæring om, hvilket materielt og teknisk udstyr, herunder frekvensadgangen, jf. lov om radiofrekvenser, tjenesteyderen disponerer over til opfyldelse af kontrakten.«
Påstand 2 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen i afsnit VI, 3 »Yderligere oplysninger« at have fastsat følgende betingelse, som virksomheder, der ønsker at blive prækvalificeret, skal opfylde, uagtet denne betingelse for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den virksomhed, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz: P2 R1 5.
»Oplysninger og formaliteter, som er nødvendige for at vurdere, om kravene er opfyldt:
……
3) »Yderligere oplysninger« under nr. 4:
4) Tjenesteydere, der ikke afgiver alle de [i] punkt III.2 udbedte oplysninger, kan ikke forvente at blive udvalgt til at deltage i udbudsforretningen. Ved sammenslutninger af tjenesteydere (konsortier) skal oplysningerne, der udbydes i punkt III.2, afgives for samtlige tjenesteydere.«
Påstand 3 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen i afsnit IV.1.2. »Begrænsning af det antal økonomiske aktører, som vil blive opfordret til at afgive tilbud eller deltage« at have fastsat følgende betingelse, som virksomheder, der ønsker at blive prækvalificeret, skal opfylde, uagtet denne betingelse for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den virksomhed, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»Objektive kriterier for valg af det begrænsede antal kandidater:
……
4) Karakteren af det materiel og tekniske udstyr, som tjenesteyderen disponerer over, og som tjenesteyderen planlægger at anvende.«
Påstand 4 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen i afsnit IV. 3) »Yderligere oplysninger« at have fastsat følgende betingelse, som virksomheder, der ønsker at blive prækvalificeret, skal opfylde, uagtet denne betingelse for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den virksomhed, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»7) Det vil være en betingelse for tildeling af ordren, at tjenesteyder besidder den efter lov om radiofrekvenser (lovbekendtgøreles nr. 680 af 23. juni 2004) for udførelsen af tjenesteyderens påkrævede tilladelse. Tilladelsen skal forligge senest 7 dage efter udløbet af fristen for afgivelse af endeligt tilbud.«
Påstand 5 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbetingelsernes kravsspecifikationer at have fastsat følgende, uagtet dette krav for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den tilbudsgiver, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»II.6.1.1. Frekvensområde«
II.6.1.1.1) Tilbudsgiver skal oplyse om, hvilke frekvenser det foreslåede net skal operere i. Såfremt tilbudsgiver ikke har frekvenser til rådighed, skal tilbudsgiver oplyse om, hvornår frekvenser er til rådighed samt hvilket frekvensbånd, der vil være til rådighed.«
Påstand 6 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbetingelsernes kravsspecifikationer at have fastsat følgende, uagtet dette krav for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den tilbudsgiver, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»II.3.2.7 Dækning i luften
II.3.2.7.1 Tjenesteyder skal levere dækning for luftfartøjer for alle højder op til 500 m over jordens overflade.
II.3.2.7.2 Dækningen skal give uplink og downlink tale- og dat service til terminaler i luftfartøjet.
II.3.2.7.3 Tale- og data service skal være tilgængelige ved alle hastigheder op til 240 km/t.
II.3.2.7.4 Tilbudsgiver skal specificere sin løsning for dækning for luftfarttøjer og angive hvor mange sites, der er nødvendige for at levere dækning til luftfartøjer.«
Påstand 7 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbetingelserne herunder »Kravsspecifikationens« afsnit »II.3.3. Kapacitetskrav « at have fastsat krav, som de virksomheder, der ønsker at få tildelt 7. kontrakten, skal opfylde, ved at have udvidet området for geografisk dækning og samtidig fastholdt øgede krav vedrørende kapaciteten i nettet, uagtet at disse krav for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den tilbudsgiver, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgangen på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz.
Påstand 8 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbekendtgørelsen i afsnit II.1.5. »Kortfattet beskrivelse af kontrakten eller indkøbet/ene« at have fastsat følgende betingelse, uagtet denne betingelse for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den virksomhed, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»nr. 2. Af hensyn til nettets væsentlighed for nød- og beredskabsbrugerne vil økonomistyrelsen i udbuddet, der gennemføres som en konkurrencepræget dialog, sikre:
2) at nettet kan integreres med Danmarks nabolandes nød- og beredskabsnet. Dette med henblik på at muliggøre kommunikation mellem beredskabsmyndigheder på tværs af grænser.«
Påstand 9 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbetingelserne i afsnit II.4.1.5. »Integration af fremmed net« at have fastsat følgende betingelserne, uagtet denne betingelse for så vidt angår relevant frekvensadgang tilgodeser den tilbudsgiver, der allerede har fået tildelt frekvensadgang på 2 x 4,15 MHz i frekvensbåndet 380-400 MHz:
»II.4.1.5.1 Nettet skal give mulighed for integration til de tilsvarnde beredskabsnet i Danmarks nabolande, herunder som minimum til Sverige og Tyskland.«
Påstand 10 Klagenævnet skal konstatere, at indklagede har handlet i strid med Udbudsdirektivets artikel 2 (ligebehandlingsprincippet) ved i udbudsbetingelserne (version 1.3.) at have fastsat følgende supplerende underkriterium vedrørende vurderingen af økonomien i tilbudene, uagtet dette 8. forhold favoriserer den tilbudsgiver, der allerede har fået tildelt de frekvenser, der passer til det udstyr, som brugerne af nød- og beredskabsnettet i forvejen råder over:
»I vurderingen af økonomi lægges vægt på den laveste, samlede pris for etablering og drift af nettet og for optioner, ændringer og øvrige ydelser. Der lægges samtidig vægt på kundens og de forventede bestilleres samlede, skønnede interne organisatoriske og tekniske omkostninger forbundet med den tilbudte løsning set over hele kontraktperioden.
Når der ved forventede skønnede interne organisatoriske og tekniske omkostninger forstås følgende:
- De forventede bestillere er danske beredskab forstået som politiet, det statslige, regionale og kommunale beredskab (blå blink).
- Det fremhæves, at Økonomistyrelsen vil anlægge et sagligt skøn over de interne omkostninger, idet det ikke vil være muligt allerede i tilbudsevalueringen at foretage en egentlig opgørelse af omkostningerne.
- Organisatoriske omkostninger er især beredskabernes interne omkostninger til uddannelse og vejledning i brug af nettet og andre direkte omkostninger forbundet med organisatoriske ændringer i beredskaberne som følge af tilslutning til nettet mv.
- Tekniske omkostninger er især de direkte omkostninger relateret til migrering, parallel drift af eksisterende radiosystemer, tekst i forbindelse med tilslutning til nettet, udvikling af snitflade til kommunikation med nettet på eksisterende eller kommende applikationer og tilslutning af kontrolrumssoftware eller andet software til kommunikation via nettet.«] | N-981111
Vestergaard | 2-4 | ECT-12 [ex 6]
ECT-28 [ex 30
ECT-EquTran-impl] | 2. Dundalk-dommen angik et stort projekt, hvis værdi utvivlsomt overskred tærskelværdien i det dagældende Bygge- og anlægsdirektiv. Dundalkdommen kan derfor ikke antages at tage stilling til, om der efter Traktatens artikel 30 kan udledes et krav om angivelse af et bestemt mærke »eller dermed ligestillet«, hvis grunden til, at et udbud ikke er omfattet af pligt til 1 2 5. EU-udbud, er, at det udbudtes værdi ikke når op på tærskelværdien i vedkommende direktiv. Udbud af mindre værdi har almindeligvis ikke interesse og betydning i EUsammenhæng.
3. Ved udbud af mindre værdi ville det desuden være uforholdsmæssigt omkostningskrævende for udbyderne at skulle overholde udbudsdirektivernes regler om tekniske specifikationer og at skulle foretage den deraf følgende nødvendige tekniske vurdering af tilbudene. Reglerne om tærskelværdier i EU’s udbudsdirektiver må antages at have til formål at identificere de udbud, for hvis vedkommende de nævnte forhold gør sig gældende, og dermed generelt udskille dem fra det EU-retlige dækningsområde. Klagenævnet finder herefter, at Traktatens artikel 6 og artikel 30 i hvert fald almindeligvis ikke indebærer et krav om, at angivelse af et bestemt mærke ikke må forekomme uden tilføjelse »eller dermed ligestillet« ved udbud, der ikke når op på tærskelværdien i vedkommende udbudsdirektiv.
4. Som følge heraf, og da der ikke er fremkommet noget, som kan føre til andet resultat, tages klagen ikke til følge.
[Sagsfremstillingen: Boligselskabet har videre henvist til, at man er nødt til at have ensartede produkter, som man kender og har tillid til. Man kender således Hvidbjerg Vinduets produkter, der er af god kvalitet og som erfaringsmæssigt medfører lavere vedligeholdelsesudgifter end andre produkter. Man bliver som bygherre konstant presset af Byggeskadefonden til at udføre byggerierne således, at der ikke senere opstår skader.] | N-961016
Danske Vognmænd | 2 | ECT-12 [ex 6]
ECT-30 [ex 30] | 2. Kravet i udbudsbetingelsernes punkt 9 om, at der ved indsamlingen af sækkene skal anvendes en komprimeringsenhed, som er forsynet med en automatisk sækkeisætter, der - efter at aflæsningen af den fyldte sæk er sket - automatisk sætter den nye sæk i sækkestativet, er et teknisk krav til den ydelse, som indklagede har udbudt. Det indebærer ikke nogen overtrædelse af Traktatens artikel 6 eller artikel 30, at de renovationsbiler, der skal anvendes ved den udbudte tjenesteydelse, efter det oplyste for tiden alene kan købes hos én forhandler i Danmark, og at det efter det oplyste må anses for teknisk vanskeligt og i hvert fald økonomiske urealistisk at ombygge de nuværende danske renovationsbiler, så de kan anvendes ved den udbudte tjenesteydelse. Det indebærer endvidere ikke nogen overtrædelse af udbudsreglerne, at indklagede ved sin beslutning om at vælge et system med automatisk sækkeisætter bl.a. har taget arbejdsmiljømæssige hensyn. Indklagede har således ikke ved fastsættelsen af dette tekniske krav til tjenesteydelsen tilsidesat EU-retlige regler, og Klagenævnet tager derfor ikke vedrørende dette krav i udbudsbetingelsernes punkt 9 klagerens påstand til følge. | N-961016
Danske Vognmænd | 3 | S2-3.1+11.1-impl
ECT-12 [ex 6]
ECT-30 [ex 30] | 3. Kravet i udbudsbetingelsernes punkt 9 om, at der ved indsamlingen af sækkene skal anvendes en komprimeringsenhed med høj indlæsning, er et tekniske krav til den ydelse, der udbydes. Indklagede har fastsat dette tekniske krav med henblik på at minimere risikoen for, at renovationsarbejderen også i forbindelse med indlæsningen af sækken i renovationsbilen kommer i kontakt med affaldet eller med bakterier eller aerosoler stammen de fra affaldet. Indklagede har med dette krav ønsket at tilgodese arbejdsmiljømæssige hensyn, og indklagede har ved fastsættelsen af kravet været fuldt klar over, at der herved stilles et arbejdsmiljømæssigt krav, der går videre end de krav, som Arbejdstilsynet for tiden har opstillet. Klagenævnet finder ikke, at indklagedes fastsættelse af dette krav til den udbudte tjenesteydelse er i strid med Traktatens artikel 6 eller artikel 30 eller indebærer en tilsidesættelse af Tjenesteydelsesdirektivet. Kravet burde være formuleret som et krav til den udbudte tjenesteydelse, nemlig som et krav om, at renovationsarbejderen heller ikke under tømningen af sækken kommer i kontakt med affaldet eller med bakterier eller aerosoler stammende fra affaldet, således at det var overladt til tilbudsgiverne selv at vælge metoden til opnåelse af dette mål. På baggrund af det oplyste om, at den eneste nuværende renovationsbil med automatisk sækkeisætter også har høj indlæsning, finder Klagenævnet dog ikke, at indklagede under de foreliggende omstændigheder med den anvendte formulering har tilsidesat udbudsreglerne. Klagenævnet tager derfor heller ikke vedrørende dette krav i udbudsbetingelsernes punkt 9 klagerens påstand til følge. |
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