| | ECT-242 & 243Interim measures    
| ECT | Article 242 | | Actions brought before the Court of Justice shall not have suspensory effect. The Court of Justice may, however, if it considers that circumstances so require, order that application of the contested act be suspended. | | ECT | Article 243 | | The Court of Justice may in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | T-511/08-R
Unity | 10 | ECT-242
ECT-243 | 10 Under Articles 242 EC and 243 EC in conjunction with Article 225(1) EC, the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he considers that circumstances so require, order that application of an act contested before the Court of First Instance be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. | T-511/08-R
Unity | 13 | ECT-242 | 13 Finally, it is important to note that Article 242 EC lays down the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect (orders of the President of the Court in Case C-377/98 R Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-6229, paragraph 44, and Case T-191/98 R II Cho Yang Shipping v Commission [2000] ECR II-2551, paragraph 42). It is only in exceptional cases, therefore, that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order that application of an act contested before the Court be suspended or prescribe interim measures. | T-511/08-R
Unity | 22-43 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 22 It must be noted that the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the necessity for an interim order in order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to Page 3 of 6 http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?where=&lang=en&num=79909876T19... 14/03/2009 the party applying for those measures. It is for that party to prove that it cannot wait for the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering damage of that kind (see orders of the President of the Court in Case T-151/01 R Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2001] ECR II-3295, paragraph 187; Case T-195/05 R Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission [2005] ECR II-3485, paragraph 124; and of 25 April 2008 in Case T-41/08 R Vakakis v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 52 and case-law cited).
23 Where harm depends on the occurrence of a number of factors, it is enough for that harm to be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability (orders of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-335/99 P(R) HFB and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-8705, paragraph 67, and of the Court of First Instance in Case T-369/03 R Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II-205, paragraph 71; see also, to that effect, order in Case C-280/93 R Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667, paragraphs 32 to 34). However, the applicant is still required to prove the facts which are deemed to attest to the probability of serious and irreparable damage (orders in Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission, paragraph 72, and HFB and Others v Commission, paragraph 67).
24 It is therefore necessary to consider whether, in the present case, the applicant has established with a sufficient degree of probability that it will suffer serious and irreparable damage if the interim measures it seeks are not granted.
25 As regards the seriousness of the damage pleaded in the present case, it must be noted that this is said to have been suffered on the occasion of a tendering procedure for the award of a contract. However, the purpose of such a procedure is to enable the authority concerned to select from a number of competing tenders that which appears to the authority to comply best with predetermined selection criteria. Moreover, the Community body which initiates such a procedure has a broad discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award the contract (Case T-145/98 ADT Projekt v Commission [2000] ECR II-387, paragraph 147; Case T-169/00 Esedra v Commission [2002] ECR II-609, paragraph 95; and Joined Cases T-376/05 and T-383/05 TEA-CEGOS and Others v Commission [2006] ECR II-205, paragraph 50).
26 Therefore, a company taking part in a tendering procedure never has an absolute guarantee that it will be awarded the contract, but must always keep in mind the possibility that the contract could be awarded to another tenderer. Under those circumstances, the adverse financial consequences which the company in question would suffer as a result of the rejection of its tender have, generally, to be considered to be part of the normal commercial risk which each company active in the market must face (order of the Judge hearing the application for interim measures of 14 September 2007 in Case T-211/07 R AWWW v Eurofound, not published in the ECR, paragraph 41).
27 It follows that the loss of an opportunity to be awarded and to perform a public contract forms an integral part of exclusion from the tendering procedure in question and cannot be regarded as constituting in itself serious damage, whether or not a specific assessment is made of the seriousness of the precise prejudice alleged in each case considered (see, to that effect, order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission, paragraph 150).
28 Therefore, the applicant undertaking’s loss of an opportunity to be awarded and to perform the contract in the tendering procedure would constitute serious damage if it had shown to the requisite legal standard that it would have been able to derive sufficiently sizeable benefits from the award and performance of that contract. Furthermore, the seriousness of material damage must be assessed inter alia in the light of the size of the applicant undertaking (see, to that effect, order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission, paragraphs 151 and 156 and case-law cited).
29 In the present case, it must be held that the applicant has not produced any evidence at all to permit the inference, particularly in the light of its size, that the loss which it may suffer would be sufficiently serious to justify interim measures being ordered. In particular, it has not described the global, regional or local nature of its business of providing security services, indicating whether it was part of a group of undertakings which operate in a number of geographical markets or whether, on the contrary, the bulk of its turnover was achieved through EUPOL Afghanistan. However, as regards essential elements of fact and law establishing urgency, such information, substantiated by numerical data, should have been included in the application for interim measures (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court in Case T-236/00 R Stauner and Others v Parliament and Commission [2001] ECR II-15, paragraph 34; Case T-306/01 R Aden and Others v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2387, paragraph 52; and Case T-85/05 R Dimos Ano Liosion and Others v Commission [2005] ECR II-1721, paragraph 37).
30 Therefore, in the absence of relevant evidence in the application for interim measures, the President is not in a position to determine whether, for the applicant, the loss of an opportunity to obtain the income arising from the performance of the contract in question would be sufficiently serious to justify ordering interim measures.
31 It should be added that the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant cannot be regarded as being irreparable, or even reparable only with difficulty, since it may be the subject of subsequent financial compensation. The applicant has, in particular, failed to show that it would be unable to obtain such compensation by means of an action for damages under Article 288 EC (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court in Case T-303/04 R European Dynamics v Commission [2004] ECR II-3889, paragraph 72 and case-law cited).
32 It is true that the applicant maintains that its damage cannot be adequately compensated by the award of pecuniary damages. However, the applicant submitted a tender for the contract at issue. It would be possible, therefore, in any future damages action, to compare that tender with the tender accepted by EUPOL Afghanistan (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of 15 July 2008 in Case T-202/08 R CLL Centres de langues v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 79).
33 In that context, it is apparent from the recent case-law of the Court of Justice that, where the Court of First Instance awards damages on the basis of the economic value attributed to the damage suffered as a result of a loss of income, that reparation is, generally, capable of complying with the requirement to ensure that the individual damage actually suffered by the party concerned because of the particular unlawful acts of which it was the victim is fully compensated (see, to that effect, Case C-348/06 P Commission v Girardot [2008] ECR I-833, paragraph 76).
34 It follows from this that, should the applicant be successful in the main action, an economic value can be attributed to the damage suffered as a result of the loss of the opportunity to win the disputed tender procedure, which is capable of complying with the requirement that the individual damage actually suffered be fully compensated (see, to that effect, order in Vakakis v Commission, paragraph 67).
35 In the light of the foregoing, the interim measures sought could be justified in the circumstances of the present case only if it were apparent that in the absence of such measures the applicant would be in a situation which could endanger its very existence or irretrievably alter its position in the market (see, to that effect, order in European Dynamics v Commission, paragraph 73).
36 The applicant has not, however, adduced proof that, in the absence of the interim measures sought, it would be liable to be placed in such a situation.
37 The applicant has failed to provide data concerning its size and financial situation (see paragraph 29 above). Moreover, although the applicant submits that, if it did not obtain the contract at issue, it would suffer serious upheaval owing to the fact that it would have to move equipment out of Afghanistan, redeploy or dismiss its staff and give up its premises in Kabul, these are mere assertions which are not substantiated by any evidence that could lead the President to conclude that the applicant’s existence will be endangered until the Court rules on the main action.
38 Furthermore, as regards in particular the argument that the applicant would be obliged to dismiss some of its employees, it is settled case-law that, in order to establish that the condition of urgency is met, an applicant is required to show that the suspension of operation sought is necessary in order to protect his own interests. However, in order to establish urgency, an applicant cannot plead damage to an interest which is not personal to him, such as for example to the rights of third parties (see order of the President of the Court in Case T-316/04 R Wam v Commission [2004] ECR II-3917, paragraph 28 and case-law cited). Therefore, the damage suffered by the applicant’s employees cannot properly be invoked in order to substantiate the urgency of the suspension of operation sought. It is not damage to interests which are personal to the applicant (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court of 2 August 2006 in Case T-69/06 R Aughinish Alumina v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 81, and in Case T-31/07 R Du Pont de Nemours (France) and Others v Commission [2007] ECR II-2767, paragraphs 147 and 168).
39 In so far as the applicant pleads damage to its reputation, suffice it to note that participation in a public tendering procedure, by nature highly competitive, involves risks for all the participants and the elimination of a tenderer under the tender rules is not in itself in any way prejudicial. Where an undertaking has been unlawfully eliminated from a tendering procedure, there is even less reason to believe that it is liable to suffer serious and irreparable harm to its reputation, since its exclusion is unconnected with its competences and the subsequent annulling judgment will in principle allow any harm to its reputation to be made good (see order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission, paragraph 126 and case-law cited).
40 The applicant also maintains that the damage it will suffer is not confined to financial damage. In that regard, it complains of the risk of losing its security licence in Afghanistan and its capacity to carry out other work in that country if it were to lose the contract at issue. Nevertheless, again, these are mere assertions which are not substantiated by any evidence capable of being reviewed by the President. In particular, the applicant has failed to adduce evidence to show that the loss alone of the contract at issue would prevent it from being able to provide other security services on the same scale in the future or from participating in any tendering procedures launched by EUPOL Afghanistan in that sphere.
41 In any event, the applicant states that, without interim measures, any remedy granted to it after 30 November 2008 (date of the end of its contract with EUPOL Afghanistan) will have little practical effect and that its position will be irrevocably altered from 1 December 2008 (commencement date of the contract between EUPOL Afghanistan and ArmorGroup). Thus the applicant itself claims that, after those dates, the damage will have been caused and consequently cannot be ‘prevented’, as referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, by the adoption of the interim measure sought. However, the purpose of proceedings for interim relief is not to ensure reparation for damage (orders of the President of the Court in Case T-47/03 R Sison v Council [2003] ECR II-2047, paragraph 41, and of 27 August 2008 in Case T-246/08 R Melli Bank v Council, not published in the ECR, paragraph 53).
42 Having regard to the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicant has not established with the requisite degree of probability that, if the President does not grant the interim measures applied for, it will suffer serious and irreparable harm.
43 Therefore, the application for interim measures must be dismissed for lack of urgency, and there is no need to consider whether the application may be deemed admissible and, if so, whether the other conditions for the grant of the suspension of operation sought are satisfied. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 16 | ECT-242
ECT-243 | 16 En vertu des dispositions combinées des articles 242 CE et 243 CE, d’une part, et de l’article 225, paragraphe 1, CE, d’autre part, le Tribunal peut, s’il estime que les circonstances l’exigent, ordonner le sursis à l’exécution d’un acte attaqué devant lui ou prescrire les mesures provisoires nécessaires. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 31-34 | Q4-89.1-impl
ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 31 Afin de déterminer si la condition relative au fumus boni juris est remplie en l’espèce, il y a lieu de procéder à un examen prima facie du bien-fondé des griefs invoqués par le requérant à l’appui du recours principal et donc de vérifier si les arguments quant à la prétendue illégalité de la décision attaquée présentent un tel caractère sérieux qu’ils ne sauraient être écartés dans le cadre de la présente procédure en référé (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du juge des référés du Tribunal du 28 septembre 2007, France/Commission, T-257/07 R, non encore publiée au Recueil, point 59, et la jurisprudence citée).
32 En l’espèce, le requérant reproche à la Commission, par son premier grief, d’avoir commis une erreur de droit en s’abstenant d’exercer le pouvoir d’appréciation dont elle disposerait en l’espèce et dans l’exercice duquel elle aurait pu, voire dû, admettre sa candidature tardive, étant donné qu’aucune disposition n’aurait imposé son exclusion de la procédure litigieuse.
33 À cet égard, il suffit de constater qu’aucun élément du dossier ne permet, à première vue, de conclure que la Commission aurait renoncé à exercer un éventuel pouvoir d’appréciation et qu’elle aurait « automatiquement » rejeté comme tardive la demande de participation du requérant. Au contraire, ainsi qu’il ressort de la décision attaquée, celle-ci a été adoptée « [a]près examen des demandes de participation reçues ». Par ailleurs, en réponse à un courrier du requérant du 30 mai 2008, la Commission a, par lettre du 3 juin suivant, motivé le maintien de cette décision par la nécessité « d’assurer le plein respect du principe d’égalité de traitement des candidats et de sécurité juridique », après avoir déclaré que ledit courrier du requérant avait « fait l’objet d’une étude approfondie ».
34 Il s’ensuit que le premier grief ne saurait, à première vue, être retenu dans la mesure où le requérant excipe d’une erreur de droit. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 35-38 | M4-140.1
ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 35 Cependant, il convient encore d’examiner s’il apparaît, prima facie, que la Commission, en rejetant la candidature du requérant comme étant hors délai, a commis une erreur manifeste d’appréciation dans l’exercice de son prétendu pouvoir d’appréciation.
36 Dans ce contexte, le requérant ne conteste pas que le pouvoir adjudicataire puisse fixer des délais et des dates limites. Il fait, cependant, valoir que la réglementation communautaire applicable ne confère à ces délais et dates limites aucun caractère contraignant, au moins pour ce qui est des demandes de participation.
37 Toutefois, une lecture des textes pertinents n’est, à première vue, pas de nature à confirmer cette thèse du requérant.
38 Ainsi, l’article 140 du règlement d’exécution place sur un pied d’égalité les offres et les demandes de participation en prévoyant, de manière globale, des « délais de réception des offres et demandes de participation ». Si ladite disposition souligne que ces délais sont des délais minimaux, en imposant au pouvoir adjudicataire de les fixer de manière suffisamment longue – le requérant ne reproche d’ailleurs pas à la Commission d’avoir fixé un délai minimal de réception trop court dans le cadre de la présente procédure –, il semble à priori évident que même de tels délais minimaux ont nécessairement un terme qu’il convient de respecter. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 39-46 | M4A1-1.27.a=M4-143.1.1
M4A1-1.28.a=M4-145.1
ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 39 Ensuite, l’article 145, paragraphe 1, du règlement d’exécution énonce que ne sont ouvertes par le pouvoir adjudicataire que « les demandes de participation et offres qui ont respecté les dispositions de l’article 143 » du même règlement. Or, le paragraphe 1 dudit article 143, après avoir prévu que les modalités de remise des demandes de participation étaient déterminées par le pouvoir adjudicataire (lettre, moyen électronique ou télécopieur), renvoie à la « date limite » prévue, notamment, à l’article 140 du règlement d’exécution.
40 S’il est vrai que ce renvoi est opéré en ce qui concerne la confirmation, par lettre ou par moyen électronique, de demandes de participation faites par télécopieur, il paraît évident que la portée de cette date limite ne peut être réduite à la seule hypothèse d’une demande faite par télécopieur, mais doit être valable pour tous les moyens de communication admis dans le cadre d’une même procédure de passation d’un marché public, et ce d’autant plus que, en vertu de l’article 143, paragraphe 1, du règlement d’exécution, les différents moyens de communication doivent avoir un caractère non discriminatoire. Or, l’avis de marché en cause en l’espèce prévoit, au point III.2.1, que les demandes de participation se font par lettre ou par télécopieur. Il s’ensuit que la date limite fixée pour le dépôt de ces demandes doit être identique pour l’un et l’autre de ces moyens de communication.
41 Ainsi que la Commission l’a relevé à juste titre, les moyens de communication décrits à l’article 143, paragraphe 1, du règlement d’exécution et repris dans l’avis de marché, au point III.2.1, apparaissent indissociables du délai dans lequel les demandes de participation doivent être déposées : si le délai de dépôt n’est pas respecté, les modalités de communication prescrites sur la base dudit article ne semblent en effet pas non plus pouvoir être respectées.
42 Il résulte prima facie de ce qui précède que la Commission pouvait se fonder, à juste titre, sur les articles 140, 143 et 145 du règlement d’exécution pour fixer, dans l’avis de marché en cause, une date limite pour le dépôt des demandes de participation, soit le 8 avril 2008, à 16 heures, au plus tard, et pour décider que celles déposées hors délai seraient, le cas échéant, exclues de la procédure pour méconnaissance de l’article 143 dudit règlement.
43 Dans ce contexte, ne saurait être retenu l’argument du requérant selon lequel l’avis de marché ne prévoit aucune sanction pour les candidatures tardives. En effet, en prévoyant, au point VI.3.2, que « [l]es candidatures incomplètes pourront être écartées d’office », l’avis de marché permet manifestement l’exclusion des candidatures tardives, ces dernières étant les candidatures les plus incomplètes imaginables.
44 Enfin, il importe de rappeler que le requérant, dans sa correspondance avec la Commission au cours de la procédure précontentieuse, s’est borné à expliquer par un « malentendu administratif » le non-respect de la date limite de dépôt prévue dans l’avis de marché, sans invoquer l’existence d’un cas fortuit, d’une force majeure ou d’une erreur excusable (voir point 7 ci-dessus).
45 Dans ces circonstances, il convient de conclure que, à première vue, la Commission, après avoir constaté que les demandes de participation qui avaient été présentées avant cette date limite étaient au nombre de quinze (voir point 5 ci-dessus), pouvait écarter la candidature du requérant, eu égard aux principes de sécurité juridique et d’égalité de traitement des candidats, sans commettre une erreur manifeste d’appréciation.
46 Par conséquent, le premier grief soulevé par le requérant ne saurait permettre d’établir l’existence d’un fumus boni juris. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 47-48 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl
ECT-249-impl | 47 Il en va de même pour ce qui est du grief tiré d’une violation de l’obligation de motivation, en ce que, dans la décision attaquée, la Commission n’indiquerait pas pour quelle raison elle s’est abstenue de faire usage de son pouvoir d’admettre la demande de participation du requérant et elle se serait fondée sur une disposition non pertinente, à savoir l’article 143, paragraphe 1, du règlement d’exécution. Ainsi qu’il vient d’être exposé, d’une part, ledit article apparaît tout à fait pertinent dans le présent contexte et, d’autre part, rien ne semble a priori permettre de conclure que la Commission aurait omis de faire usage de son prétendu pouvoir d’appréciation en rejetant la candidature du requérant.
48 Dans la mesure où le requérant fait encore grief à la Commission de ne pas avoir indiqué, dans la décision attaquée, les voies de recours qui lui étaient ouvertes, il suffit de relever qu’aucune disposition expresse du droit communautaire n’impose aux institutions une obligation générale d’informer les destinataires de leurs actes des recours juridictionnels ouverts ni des délais dans lesquels ils peuvent être exercés (ordonnance de la Cour du 5 mars 1999, Guérin automobiles/Commission, C-153/98 P, Rec. p. 1441, points 13 et 15 ; arrêt du Tribunal du 24 février 2000, ADT Projekt/Commission, T-145/98, Rec. p. II-387, point 210). En tout état de cause, l’avis de marché en cause mentionne, au point VI.4.1, l’instance chargée des procédures de recours. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 49 | Q4-89.1
ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 49 S’agissant du grief tiré d’une violation du principe de proportionnalité, à première vue la Commission a pu considérer à bon droit qu’une admission de la candidature du requérant qui, en raison de son caractère tardif, n’était pas conforme aux règles imposées à tous les candidats aurait risqué de porter atteinte aux principes d’égalité de traitement et de transparence consacrés par l’article 98, paragraphe 1, [actually 89.1] du règlement financier. Dans une telle hypothèse, le requérant aurait en effet bénéficié d’un temps de préparation plus long que les autres candidats et sa candidature aurait été admise bien que ne respectant pas toutes les conditions de participation, alors que d’autres candidatures ne respectant pas non plus l’ensemble de ces conditions auraient été rejetées. Compte tenu de la nécessaire mise en balance des principes généraux en cause, il ne semble donc pas, à première vue, que la décision attaquée soit contraire au principe de proportionnalité. | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 50-52 | M4-123.1
M4A1-1.8.b=M4-123.3
ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 50 En ce qui concerne le grief pris d’une violation de l’article 123, paragraphe 1, du règlement d’exécution, force est de constater que le premier alinéa de cette disposition, selon lequel le nombre de candidats invités à soumissionner ne peut être inférieur à cinq, ne semble manifestement pas avoir été violé, le nombre des candidats susceptibles d’être invités à soumissionner étant largement supérieur à cinq. Par ailleurs, ainsi que la Commission l’a fait observer, ce nombre de cinq ne paraît aucunement constituer un minimum absolu, étant donné que l’article 123, paragraphe 3, du règlement d’exécution permet au pouvoir adjudicataire de continuer la procédure même s’il ne reste plus qu’un seul candidat (« en invitant le ou les candidats »).
51 S’agissant enfin du troisième alinéa de l’article 123, paragraphe 1, du règlement d’exécution, aux termes duquel le nombre de candidats admis à soumissionner doit, en tout état de cause, être suffisant pour assurer une concurrence réelle, il convient de relever que tout indique, à première vue, que le nombre des candidats susceptibles d’être admis à soumissionner sera, en l’espèce, suffisant pour assurer une telle concurrence.
52 En tout état de cause, ainsi que la Commission l’a précisé, la question de savoir s’il existe suffisamment de candidats autorisés à soumissionner ne saurait, prima facie, remettre en cause la légalité d’une décision constatant qu’un candidat donné n’a pas déposé de demande de participation conforme aux modalités prescrites à l’article 145 du règlement d’exécution et dans l’avis de marché et que ce candidat n’est donc pas autorisé à participer aux étapes suivantes de la procédure. En effet, la question du nombre suffisant de candidats admis à soumissionner est examinée à un stade ultérieur, postérieur à celui de l’examen de la conformité des demandes déposées. À cette occasion, le pouvoir adjudicataire peut d’ailleurs être amené à renoncer au marché en cause et à en organiser un nouveau, s’il estime que le nombre des candidats n’est pas suffisant pour assurer une concurrence effective (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du Tribunal du 26 février 2002, Esedra/Commission, T-169/00, Rec. p. II-609, points 202 et 203). | T-202/08-R
Centre de langues | 53-54 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 53 Il résulte de ce qui précède que, sans préjudice des appréciations à effectuer dans le cadre du litige au principal, les griefs avancés par le requérant dans la présente procédure en référé ne permettent pas en l’état d’établir l’existence d’un fumus boni juris.
54 Ce n’est donc qu’à titre surabondant qu’il sera procédé ensuite à l’examen de l’urgence. | T-195/08-R
Antwerpse Bouwwerken | 17 | ECT-242
ECT-243 | 17 En vertu des dispositions combinées des articles 242 CE et 243 CE, d’une part, et de l’article 225, paragraphe 1, CE, d’autre part, le Tribunal peut, s’il estime que les circonstances l’exigent, ordonner le sursis à l’exécution d’un acte attaqué devant lui ou prescrire les mesures provisoires nécessaires. | T-195/08-R
Antwerpse Bouwwerken | 21-25 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 21 Ainsi qu’il ressort de la décision du 23 avril 2008, l’offre déposée par la requérante n’est que la troisième offre la moins disante. La Commission en déduit que la demande en référé est irrecevable à défaut d’intérêt à agir pour la requérante. En effet, à supposer même que l’offre du soumissionnaire retenu soit écartée de la procédure de passation du marché en cause, la requérante n’en tirerait aucun profit, étant donné que le marché serait attribué non à la requérante, mais à l’entreprise ayant remis la deuxième offre la moins disante.
22 À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, pour que des mesures provisoires, comme celles sollicitées par la présente demande en référé, puissent être ordonnées, la partie requérante doit, notamment, apporter la preuve de son intérêt à agir, qui constitue la condition essentielle et première de tout recours en justice (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du président de la deuxième chambre de la Cour du 31 juillet 1989, S./Commission, 206/89 R, Rec. p. 2841, point 8, et ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 27 mars 2003, Linea CIG/Commission, T-398/02 R, Rec. p. II-1139, points 44 et 45). Selon une jurisprudence bien établie, un tel intérêt suppose que l’action en justice puisse, par son résultat, procurer un bénéfice à la partie qui l’a intentée (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du Tribunal du 30 avril 2007, EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg/Commission, T-387/04, Rec. p. II-1195, point 96, et la jurisprudence citée).
23 En l’espèce, il ressort du rapport d’évaluation du 23 avril 2008 que l’offre déposée par la requérante (prix global offert : 10 295 995,37 euros) n’est que la troisième offre la moins disante, de sorte qu’une éviction du soumissionnaire retenu n’aurait pas comme conséquence automatique que le marché serait attribué à la requérante. Toutefois, s’agissant de l’entreprise placée en deuxième position (prix global offert : 10 140 841,12 euros), le même rapport d’évaluation précise qu’elle avait, tout comme le soumissionnaire retenu, omis d’indiquer le prix pour certains postes, mais que son offre avait néanmoins été qualifiée par la Commission de conforme aux règles, compte tenu des éclaircissements apportés par cette entreprise.
24 À supposer donc que l’offre du soumissionnaire retenu soit entachée du vice que la requérante lui attribue du fait que cette offre aurait fait l’objet d’une modification ultérieure illégale (voir point 14 ci-dessus), l’offre placée en deuxième position serait susceptible d’être entachée précisément du même vice. Par conséquent, dans l’hypothèse où la décision attribuant le marché au soumissionnaire retenu devrait être déclarée illégale pour cette raison, la Commission pourrait être juridiquement empêchée de l’attribuer à l’entreprise placée en deuxième position, dont l’offre serait susceptible d’être entachée de la même illégalité. Dans ces circonstances, l’entreprise placée en deuxième position ne saurait être un obstacle à ce que le marché revienne à la requérante. Les mesures sollicitées par la présente demande, si elles étaient adoptées, pourraient donc lui procurer un bénéfice.
25 Il s’ensuit que la requérante dispose d’un intérêt à agir et que sa demande en référé est recevable. | T-195/08-R
Antwerpse Bouwwerken | 37-59 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 37 Dans les circonstances du cas d’espèce, il convient d’examiner d’abord si la condition de l’urgence est remplie.
38 À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que le caractère urgent d’une demande en référé doit s’apprécier par rapport à la nécessité qu’il y a de statuer provisoirement afin d’éviter qu’un préjudice grave et irréparable ne soit occasionné à la partie qui sollicite les mesures provisoires. C’est à cette dernière partie qu’il appartient d’apporter la preuve qu’elle ne saurait attendre l’issue de la procédure au principal sans avoir à subir un préjudice de cette nature (voir ordonnances du président du Tribunal du 15 novembre 2001, Duales System Deutschland/Commission, T-151/01 R, Rec. p. II-3295, point 187 ; du 20 septembre 2005, Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, T-195/05 R, Rec. p. II-3485, point 124, et du 25 avril 2008, Vakakis/Commission, T-41/08 R, non publiée au Recueil, point 52, et la jurisprudence citée).
39 Lorsque le préjudice dépend de la survenance de plusieurs facteurs, il suffit qu’il apparaisse comme prévisible avec un degré de probabilité suffisant [ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 16 janvier 2004, Arizona Chemical e.a./Commission, T-369/03 R, Rec. p. II-205, point 71 ; voir, également, en ce sens, ordonnances de la Cour du 29 juin 1993, Allemagne/Conseil, C-280/93 R, Rec. p. I-3667, points 32 à 34, et du président de la Cour du 14 décembre 1999, HFB e.a./Commission, C-335/99 P(R), Rec. p. I-8705, point 67]. La partie requérante demeure cependant tenue de prouver les faits qui sont censés fonder la perspective d’un tel dommage grave et irréparable (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Arizona Chemical e.a./Commission, précitée, point 72 ; voir, également, ordonnance HFB e.a./Commission, précitée, point 67).
40 Il convient donc d’examiner si, en l’espèce, la requérante a démontré avec un degré de probabilité suffisant qu’elle subira un préjudice grave et irréparable si les mesures provisoires qu’elle sollicite ne lui sont pas octroyées.
41 S’agissant de la gravité du préjudice invoqué en l’espèce, il importe de rappeler que ce dernier serait subi à l’occasion d’une procédure d’appel d’offres pour l’attribution d’un marché. Or, une telle procédure a pour objet de permettre à l’autorité concernée de choisir, parmi plusieurs offres concurrentes, celle qui lui paraît le plus conforme aux critères de sélection prédéterminés. L’autorité communautaire qui institue une telle procédure dispose, par ailleurs, d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation quant aux éléments à prendre en considération en vue de la prise de la décision de passer le marché (arrêts du Tribunal du 24 février 2000, ADT Projekt/Commission, T-145/98, Rec. p. II-387, point 147 ; du 26 février 2002, Esedra/Commission, T-169/00, Rec. p. II-609, point 95, et du 14 février 2006, TEA-CEGOS e.a./Commission, T-376/05 et T-383/05, Rec. p. II-205, point 50).
42 Une entreprise qui participe à une telle procédure n’a, dès lors, jamais la garantie absolue que le marché lui sera adjugé, mais doit toujours tenir compte de l’éventualité de son attribution à un autre soumissionnaire. Dans ces conditions, les conséquences financières négatives pour l’entreprise en question, qui découleraient du rejet de son offre, font, en principe, partie du risque commercial habituel, auquel chaque entreprise active sur le marché doit faire face (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du juge des référés du Tribunal du 14 septembre 2007, AWWW/FEACVT, T-211/07 R, non publiée au Recueil, point 41).
43 Il s’ensuit que la perte d’une chance de se voir attribuer et d’exécuter un marché public est inhérente à l’exclusion de la procédure d’appel d’offres en cause et ne saurait être regardée comme constitutive, en soi, d’un préjudice grave, indépendamment d’une appréciation concrète de la gravité de l’atteinte spécifique alléguée dans chaque cas d’espèce (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, précitée, point 150).
44 En conséquence, c’est à la condition que l’entreprise requérante ait démontré à suffisance de droit qu’elle aurait pu retirer des bénéfices suffisamment significatifs de l’attribution et de l’exécution du marché dans le cadre de la procédure d’appel d’offres que le fait, pour elle, d’avoir perdu une chance de se voir attribuer et d’exécuter ledit marché constituerait un préjudice grave. Par ailleurs, la gravité d’un préjudice d’ordre matériel doit être évaluée au regard, notamment, de la taille de l’entreprise requérante (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, précitée, points 151 et 156, et la jurisprudence citée).
45 En l’espèce, force est de constater que la requérante ne produit pas les éléments permettant de considérer, compte tenu en particulier de sa taille, que la perte qu’elle risque de subir serait suffisamment grave pour justifier l’octroi de mesures provisoires. Dès lors, au regard des éléments figurant dans la demande en référé, le juge des référés n’est pas en mesure de considérer que, pour la requérante, la perte d’une chance de percevoir les revenus résultant de l’exécution du marché en cause serait suffisamment grave pour justifier l’octroi de mesures provisoires.
46 Il en va de même du préjudice financier subi du fait que la requérante aurait, à la suite de la lettre du 27 février 2008 (voir point 5 ci-dessus), adapté son planning de travail à l’exécution du contrat litigieux, en annulant des projets sur le marché local et en n’acceptant plus de nouveaux contrats. À défaut d’éléments chiffrés produits par la requérante, le juge des référés ne saurait vérifier ni la réalité ni la gravité des actes par lesquels la requérante aurait elle-même été conduite à amplifier les conséquences négatives des décisions des 23 et 29 avril 2008.
47 Par ailleurs, tout préjudice causé par des actes que la requérante aurait pris en s’attendant à l’attribution du marché en cause résulterait de son propre comportement négligent. En effet, dans sa lettre du 27 février 2008 précitée, la Commission avait expressément attiré l’attention de la requérante sur le caractère précaire et révocable de cette « attribution ». En outre, la requérante, en opérateur économique prudent et averti, est censée connaître l’article 101 du règlement financier, aux termes duquel « le pouvoir adjudicateur peut, jusqu’à la signature du contrat, soit renoncer au marché, soit annuler la procédure de passation du marché, sans que les candidats ou les soumissionnaires puissent prétendre à une quelconque indemnisation ».
48 Or, selon une jurisprudence bien établie (voir ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 1er février 2001, Free Trade Foods/Commission, T-350/00 R, Rec. p. II-493, point 59, et la jurisprudence citée), l’urgence à ordonner une mesure provisoire doit résulter des effets produits par l’acte litigieux et non d’un manque de diligence du demandeur de ladite mesure. En effet, il incombe à ce dernier, au risque de devoir supporter lui-même le préjudice comme faisant partie des « risques de l’entreprise », de faire preuve d’une diligence raisonnable pour en limiter l’étendue.
49 Il convient d’ajouter que le préjudice d’ordre financier allégué par la requérante ne saurait être regardé comme irréparable, ou même difficilement réparable, dès lors qu’il peut faire l’objet d’une compensation financière ultérieure. La requérante n’a, notamment, pas allégué qu’elle serait empêchée d’obtenir une telle compensation par voie d’un éventuel recours en indemnité en vertu de l’article 288 CE (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 10 novembre 2004, European Dynamics/Commission, T-303/04 R, Rec. p. II-3889, point 72, et la jurisprudence citée). Au contraire, dans son recours au principal, elle a expressément formulé des conclusions visant à condamner la Commission à lui réparer le préjudice subi.
50 Dans ce contexte, il résulte d’une jurisprudence récente de la Cour que, lorsque le Tribunal accorde des dommages et intérêts sur la base de la valeur économique attribuée au préjudice subi en raison d’un manque à gagner, cette réparation est en principe susceptible de satisfaire à l’exigence d’assurer la réparation intégrale du préjudice individuel que la partie concernée a effectivement subi du fait des actes illégaux particuliers dont elle a été victime (voir, en ce sens, arrêt de la Cour du 21 février 2008, Commission/Girardot, C-348/06 P, non encore publié au Recueil, point 76).
51 Il s’ensuit que, dans l’hypothèse où la requérante obtiendrait gain de cause au principal, il pourra être attribué une valeur économique au préjudice qu’elle a subi en raison de la perte de la chance de remporter l’appel d’offres litigieux, valeur économique qui est susceptible de satisfaire à l’obligation de réparation intégrale du dommage individuel effectivement subi (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Vakakis/Commission, précitée, point 67).
52 À la lumière de ce qui précède, les mesures provisoires demandées ne se justifieraient, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, que s’il apparaissait que, en l’absence de telles mesures, la requérante se trouverait dans une situation susceptible de mettre en péril son existence même ou de modifier de manière irrémédiable sa position sur le marché (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance European Dynamics/Commission, précitée, point 73).
53 Or, la requérante n’a pas apporté la preuve que, en l’absence des mesures provisoires sollicitées, elle risquerait d’être placée dans une telle situation.
54 En effet, d’une part, elle s’est abstenue de fournir des données relatives à sa taille et à sa situation financière (voir point 45 ci-dessus). D’autre part, si la requérante fait valoir que, au cas où elle ne pourrait pas exécuter le contrat litigieux, son personnel spécialisé serait débauché par ses concurrents ou la quitterait de sa propre initiative, mettant ainsi en danger l’existence de la requérante, il y a lieu de constater qu’il s’agit là d’une pure affirmation qui n’est étayée par aucun élément de preuve susceptible de conduire le juge des référés à conclure que l’existence de la requérante sera mise en péril jusqu’à ce que le Tribunal statue sur l’affaire au principal.
55 La requérante soutient encore que le préjudice qu’elle subira ne saurait être réduit à un dommage financier et chiffrable, mais revêt aussi un caractère non financier. Ainsi, elle allègue que l’attribution du marché en cause constituerait, compte tenu de sa spécificité du point de vue technique, une référence importante pour les marchés suivants ayant un objet identique ou similaire et que la perte de cette référence représenterait pour la requérante un préjudice irréparable, d’autant plus qu’un maître d’ouvrage prestigieux, tel que la Commission, représenterait une référence excellente pour un adjudicataire dans la perspective de projets futurs.
56 Pour autant que la requérante entende invoquer ainsi une atteinte à sa réputation, il suffit de relever que la participation à une soumission publique, par nature hautement compétitive, implique des risques pour tous les participants et que l’élimination d’un soumissionnaire, en vertu des règles de la soumission, n’a, en elle-même, rien de préjudiciable. Lorsqu’une entreprise a été illégalement écartée d’une procédure d’appel d’offres, il existe d’autant moins de raisons de penser qu’elle risque de subir une atteinte grave et irréparable à sa réputation que, d’une part, son exclusion est sans lien avec ses compétences et, d’autre part, l’arrêt d’annulation qui s’ensuivra permettra en principe de rétablir une éventuelle atteinte à sa réputation (voir ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, précitée, point 126, et la jurisprudence citée).
57 Enfin, s’agissant de la prétendue perte d’une référence majeure à la suite de la perte du marché en cause et de la prétendue difficulté de soumissionner utilement à l’avenir dans le cadre de projets semblables, ainsi que la Commission le fait observer à juste titre, la requérante n’a pas encore acquis de référence par l’existence de la seule lettre du 27 février 2008 qui lui « attribuait » provisoirement le marché en cause, une telle référence n’étant créée que lorsque le contrat a été signé et que le marché a été complètement et convenablement exécuté. En tout état de cause, la requérante n’a pas démontré que cette référence lui était indispensable ni qu’elle serait empêchée à l’avenir de mener à bien d’autres projets de même envergure. Elle n’a en outre pas apporté Page 8 of 9 http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=fr&num=79919284T1908%20R0... 14/03/2009 d’éléments permettant de conclure qu’elle serait empêchée de participer aux futurs appels d’offres lancés par la Commission en relation avec l’IMMR.
58 Eu égard à ce qui précède, il y a lieu de considérer que la requérante n’a pas établi avec le degré de probabilité requis que, si le juge des référés ne lui accorde pas les mesures provisoires qu’elle sollicite, elle subira un préjudice grave et irréparable.
59 En conséquence, la demande en référé doit être rejetée pour défaut d’urgence, sans qu’il soit besoin d’examiner si les autres conditions d’octroi des mesures provisoires sollicitées sont remplies. | T-122/08
Cyprus | 6-7 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 6 Il y a lieu de constater que l’argumentation présentée par la République de Chypre pour établir l’urgence ainsi que les moyens de fait et de droit justifiant à première vue (fumus boni juris) l’octroi des mesures provisoires sollicitées est, en substance, identique à celle qu’elle avait présentée dans le cadre des affaires T-54/08 R, T-87/08 R, T-88/08 R et T-91/08 R à T-93/08 R ayant conduit à l’ordonnance du 8 avril 2008. Or, par cette ordonnance, les demandes en référé introduites dans ces affaires ont été rejetées au motif que la condition relative à l’urgence n’était pas remplie.
7 Dans ces circonstances, il y a lieu de renvoyer à la motivation de l’ordonnance du 8 avril 2008 (voir, s’agissant de la faculté pour le juge communautaire de motiver une décision par renvoi à une décision antérieure statuant sur des questions substantiellement identiques, arrêt de la Cour du 25 octobre 2005, Crailsheimer Volksbank, C-229/04, Rec. p. I-9273, points 47 à 49, et arrêt du Tribunal du 11 juillet 2007, Sison/Conseil, T-47/03, non encore publié au Recueil, point 102) et de rejeter également la présente demande en référé. | T-119/08
Cyprus | 6-7 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 6 Il y a lieu de constater que l’argumentation présentée par la République de Chypre pour établir l’urgence ainsi que les moyens de fait et de droit justifiant à première vue (fumus boni juris) l’octroi des mesures provisoires sollicitées est, en substance, identique à celle qu’elle avait présentée dans le cadre des affaires T-54/08 R, T-87/08 R, T-88/08 R et T-91/08 R à T-93/08 R ayant conduit à l’ordonnance du 8 avril 2008. Or, par cette ordonnance, les demandes en référé introduites dans ces affaires ont été rejetées au motif que la condition relative à l’urgence n’était pas remplie.
7 Dans ces circonstances, il y a lieu de renvoyer à la motivation de l’ordonnance du 8 avril 2008 (voir, s’agissant de la faculté pour le juge communautaire de motiver une décision par renvoi à une décision antérieure statuant sur des questions substantiellement identiques, arrêt de la Cour du 25 octobre 2005, Crailsheimer Volksbank, C-229/04, Rec. p. I-9273, points 47 à 49 [preliminary reference], et arrêt du Tribunal du 11 juillet 2007, Sison/Conseil, T-47/03, non encore publié au Recueil, point 102) et de rejeter également la présente demande en référé. | T-54/08-R
T-87/08-R
T-88/08-R
T91/08-R
T-92/08-R
T-93/08-R
Cyprus | 19-20 | ECT-242
ECT-243 | 19 Il importe de souligner que l’article 242 CE pose le principe du caractère non suspensif des recours (ordonnance du président de la Cour du 25 juillet 2000, Pays-Bas/Parlement et Conseil, C-377/98 R, Rec. p. I-6229, point 44, et ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 28 juin 2000, Cho Yang Shipping/Commission, T-191/98 R II, Rec. p. II-2551, point 42). C’est donc à titre exceptionnel que le juge des référés ordonne un sursis à exécution sollicité par le requérant.
20 En vertu des dispositions combinées des articles 242 CE et 243 CE, d’une part, et de l’article 225, paragraphe l, CE, d’autre part, le juge des référés peut, s’il estime que les circonstances l’exigent, ordonner le sursis à l’exécution d’un acte attaqué devant lui ou prescrire les mesures provisoires nécessaires. | T-54/08-R
T-87/08-R
T-88/08-R
T91/08-R
T-92/08-R
T-93/08-R
Cyprus | 53-80 | ECT-242-impl
ECT-243-impl | 53 Il y a lieu de relever que les États membres sont responsables des intérêts considérés comme généraux sur le plan national, tels que ceux relatifs à la défense de leur souveraineté nationale. Par conséquent, ils peuvent, dans le cadre d’une procédure de référé, faire état d’un préjudice que la mesure communautaire contestée serait susceptible de causer à ces intérêts (voir, en ce sens, ordonnances de la Cour du 29 juin 1993, Allemagne/Conseil, C-280/93 R, Rec. p. I-3667, point 27, et du 12 juillet 1996, Royaume-Uni/Commission, C-180/96 R, Rec. p. I-3903, point 85).
54 En l’espèce, il est constant entre les parties que la République de Chypre est la seule entité étatique de l’île reconnue au niveau international et que les zones en cause font partie de son territoire et relèvent de sa seule souveraineté.
55 La République de Chypre considère néanmoins que les actes attaqués, notamment les dispositions litigieuses, ont, en substance, pour conséquence de traiter – en violation flagrante du droit international et du droit communautaire, notamment de l’article 299 CE, du protocole n° 10 et du règlement n° – la communauté chypriote turque de la même manière qu’une entité étatique indépendante. La République de Chypre estime que la Commission reconnaît ainsi au moins implicitement l’existence dans les zones en cause d’« autorités » qui ne relèvent pas du gouvernement chypriote ainsi que l’existence d’une législation et d’une monnaie autres que les siennes, tout en acceptant le transport de personnes ou de marchandises via des ports et des aéroports que, dans l’exercice de sa souveraineté, elle a déclaré fermés ou dont elle n’autorise pas le fonctionnement. Ce comportement de la Commission risquerait de compromettre sa souveraineté, son indépendance, son intégrité territoriale, son unité et son ordre constitutionnel.
56 Il s’avère donc que le préjudice invoqué par la République de Chypre, à savoir le risque d’une violation de sa souveraineté étatique, consiste précisément en la prétendue méconnaissance, par les actes attaqués, du droit international et du droit communautaire.
57 Eu égard à cette particularité du cas d’espèce, il convient d’examiner conjointement la condition relative à la présence d’un fumus boni juris et celle relative à l’urgence.
58 S’agissant de l’interdépendance entre ces deux conditions, il a certes été jugé que l’urgence doit d’autant plus être prise en considération que le fumus boni juris paraît sérieux (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Autriche/Conseil, point 21 supra, point 110). Toutefois, la violation éventuelle d’une norme supérieure de droit par un acte ne saurait suffire à établir, par elle-même, la gravité et le caractère irréparable d’un éventuel préjudice causé par cette violation [voir, en ce sens, ordonnances du président de la Cour du 25 juin 1998, Antilles néerlandaises/Conseil, C-159/98 P (R), Rec. p. I-4147, point 62, et Pays-Bas/Parlement et Conseil, point 19 supra, point 45].
59 Par conséquent, il ne suffit pas pour la République de Chypre d’alléguer une atteinte flagrante au droit international et au droit communautaire pour établir la réunion des conditions de l’urgence, à savoir le caractère grave et irréparable du préjudice qui pourrait découler de cette atteinte, mais elle est tenue de prouver les faits qui sont censés fonder la perspective d’un tel préjudice [voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du président de la Cour du 14 décembre 1999, HFB e.a./Commission, C-335/99 P (R), Rec. p. I-8705, point 67 ; ordonnances du président du Tribunal du 15 novembre 2001, Duales System Deutschland/Commission, T-151/01 R, Rec. p. II-3295, point 188, du 25 juin 2002, B/Commission, T-34/02 R, Rec. p. II-2803, point 86, et du 7 juin 2007, IMS/Commission, T-346/06 R, non encore publiée au Recueil, points 121 et 123, et la jurisprudence citée].
60 Compte tenu de ces considérations, il y a lieu d’examiner tour à tour les différents préjudices invoqués par la République de Chypre.
61 Premièrement, s’agissant du préjudice qui serait constitué par le fait que le texte même des actes attaqués exprime une reconnaissance illégale de la RTCN dans les zones en cause, la Commission a relevé, à juste titre, que ce préjudice s’est déjà produit de façon irréversible lors de la publication desdits actes. À supposer même que les actes attaqués enfreignent effectivement le droit international et le droit communautaire, les sursis à exécution demandés ne seraient donc pas de nature à supprimer rétroactivement le préjudice invoqué. Les mesures provisoires n’étant pas de nature à éviter ce préjudice, il ne saurait être question d’urgence (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Autriche/Conseil, point 21 supra, points 112 et 113).
62 Deuxièmement, la République de Chypre affirme qu’elle risque de subir un préjudice du fait que le mauvais exemple donné par la Commission pourrait inciter des États membres de la Communauté ou des pays tiers à se comporter pareillement en adoptant, eux aussi, des actes de reconnaissance ou de soutien à l’égard de la RTCN.
63 À cet égard, il suffit de constater à l’instar de la Commission que, à supposer établie l’illégalité de son comportement, il s’agirait là d’un préjudice purement hypothétique, étant donné que sa survenance dépend d’événements futurs et incertains. Or, un tel préjudice ne saurait justifier l’octroi des sursis à exécution demandés (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Government of Gibraltar/Commission, point 51 supra, points 101 et 105). La République de Chypre n’a produit aucun élément susceptible d’établir, avec un degré de probabilité suffisant, l’imminence des conséquences préjudiciables qu’elle craint. Elle a plutôt admis, en réponse à une question posée par le juge des référés, qu’aucun pays n’avait déclaré publiquement qu’il attribuait au texte des actes attaqués l’interprétation qu’elle lui donnait ou qu’il était disposé à suivre l’exemple supposé de la Commission.
64 Troisièmement, les demandes en référé visent le préjudice causé par la prétendue violation du droit international et du droit communautaire pendant le déroulement des procédures de passation des marchés en cause, notamment à la suite de l’attribution des marchés par la signature des contrats prévus à cet effet et au cours de la mise en oeuvre de ces contrats selon les conditions décrites dans les dispositions litigieuses. Ce préjudice est caractérisé par l’application effective des dispositions litigieuses qui entraîne, selon la République de Chypre, un soutien matériel et la reconnaissance illégale, en pratique et à l’instigation de la Commission, de la RTCN et d’autorités ainsi que de réglementations autres que les siennes dans les zones en cause. S’agissant de ce préjudice, il ne saurait être prétendu qu’il s’est déjà irréversiblement produit, ni qu’il est de nature purement hypothétique.
65 Il y a donc lieu d’examiner si la République de Chypre est parvenue à établir, à suffisance de droit, que ce préjudice spécifique avait un caractère grave et irréparable et que la condition relative à l’existence d’un fumus boni juris était, à première vue, satisfaite en ce qui concerne la prétendue illégalité des dispositions litigieuses et de leur mise en oeuvre.
66 À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que la Cour, résumant la situation juridique de l’île de Chypre dans son arrêt Anastasiou e.a., point 34 supra (points 40 et 47), a, d’une part, expressément exclu toute coopération administrative avec les autorités d’une entité telle que celle établie dans la partie nord de Chypre, qui n’est reconnue ni par la Communauté ni par les États membres, ceux-ci ne reconnaissant d’autre État chypriote que la République de Chypre, et, d’autre part, jugé que la Communauté n’avait pas le droit d’intervenir dans les affaires intérieures de la République de Chypre, les problèmes résultant de la partition de fait de l’île relevant exclusivement de celle-ci, seul État internationalement reconnu.
67 Or, ainsi que le fait valoir la République de Chypre, le fait pour une institution communautaire telle que la Commission de prévoir dans des textes officiels, destinés à être mis en oeuvre dans le cadre d’activités déployées dans les zones en cause, que le pouvoir adjudicateur est la Communauté, représentée par la Commission, « au nom et pour le compte de la communauté chypriote turque » (point 5 de chacun des actes attaqués), pourrait, à première vue, être interprété comme reflétant un soutien à l’entité détentrice des pouvoirs politiques réels dans les zones en cause, d’autant plus que la communauté chypriote turque est considérée comme bénéficiaire de l’aide communautaire octroyée, et ce apparemment sur le modèle des pays tiers qui bénéficient normalement de ce type d’aide.
68 Il convient d’ajouter que les dispositions litigieuses paraissent prévoir que l’exécution, dans les zones en cause, des marchés attribués doit avoir lieu dans le respect d’une législation et d’une monnaie autres que celles de la République de Chypre, l’attributaire étant exempté des taxes grevant les biens qui entrent dans les zones en cause, ce qui revient à ce qu’un régime propre à la communauté chypriote turque et applicable aux importations et aux exportations de biens est pris en compte, tout comme d’ailleurs une fiscalité particulière des revenus du personnel étranger et local de l’attributaire dans les zones en cause. En outre, il est question d’autorités de cette communauté ainsi que de l’existence de certains actes, comme l’imposition de droits de douane et de taxes. Enfin, la mention de « matériaux importés via la République de Chypre » laisse, à première vue, entendre que les zones en cause ne font pas partie de la République de Chypre, alors que le droit international, l’article 299 CE et le protocole n° 10 prévoient que le territoire de la République de Chypre inclut les zones en cause.
69 Si l’argumentation de la République de Chypre peut donc apparaître suffisamment pertinente pour caractériser un fumus boni juris, on ne saurait, en revanche, affirmer à première vue que la Commission a commis une violation manifeste et grave du droit international et communautaire, de sorte que le prétendu préjudice résultant de cette violation ne saurait être qualifié de grave (voir, par analogie, ordonnance de la Cour du 29 juin 1994, Commission/Grèce, C-120/94 R, Rec. p. I-3037, points 91 et 92).
70 À cet égard, il convient de constater que les actes attaqués, malgré leur caractère officiel, n’ont pas de vocation politique intrinsèque et n’ont pas, notamment, vocation à aborder la problématique de l’éventuelle réunification de l’île de Chypre. Ils ne comportent pas non plus de déclaration par laquelle la Commission reconnaîtrait expressément la communauté chypriote turque ou la RTCN en tant qu’entité détentrice du pouvoir politique dans les zones en cause.
71 Il s’agit de textes de nature technique destinés à fournir aux soumissionnaires des informations utiles leur permettant de décider, en connaissance de cause, de leur participation à la procédure de soumission et de préparer leurs dossiers d’offre. Dans cette optique, il apparaît que les actes attaqués, en employant les formules critiquées ci-dessus, font état de la situation des rapports de force actuels, en vue d’informer les soumissionnaires de la manière la plus complète et fidèle possible, certes de façon ambiguë, mais sans pour autant révéler une atteinte délibérée et manifeste à la souveraineté de la République de Chypre.
72 En particulier, il importe de relever que les actes attaqués contiennent des déclarations expresses, univoques et inconditionnelles aux termes desquelles, d’une part, ces actes n’impliquent la reconnaissance d’aucune autorité publique autre que le gouvernement chypriote dans les zones en cause et, d’autre part, ils obligent les soumissionnaires et les adjudicataires de ne prendre aucune mesure susceptible d’impliquer une telle reconnaissance. Dans ces circonstances, il ne saurait, à première vue, être considéré que les actes attaqués constituent une atteinte grave à la souveraineté de la République de Chypre.
73 En outre, les actes attaqués étant tous explicitement fondés sur le règlement n° , il y a lieu de rappeler que ce règlement prévoit, en son article 1er, paragraphe 3, que l’octroi du soutien financier en question ne constitue pas une reconnaissance d’une autorité publique autre que le gouvernement chypriote dans les zones en cause. De plus, ces actes rappellent que les soumissionnaires et les attributaires doivent être conscients des contextes politique, diplomatique et juridique caractérisant l’île de Chypre et s’abstenir de tout contact de nature politique avec les deux communautés.
74 Enfin, le règlement n° qui a été adopté à l’unanimité, et partant avec l’approbation de la République de Chypre, et dont la légalité n’a pas été remise en cause par celleci, emploie, quant à lui, l’expression « communauté chypriote turque » – notamment dans son titre, son considérant 2 ainsi que son article 1er, paragraphe 1, et son article 2, quatrième tiret – d’une manière ambiguë telle qu’il ne saurait être exclu, au moins à première vue, que cette expression, tenant compte de la situation des rapports de force actuels, vise à désigner la partie de la population chypriote regroupée dans les seules zones en cause. Or, le principe d’un soutien financier communautaire à destination de cette communauté n’est pas contesté par la République de Chypre. Par ailleurs, l’article 1er, paragraphe 2, du règlement n° prévoit expressément que ce soutien bénéficie, notamment, aux collectivités locales et aux instances remplissant des fonctions d’intérêt général dans les zones en cause, ce qui semble impliquer, au moins à première vue et compte tenu de la situation prévalant sur l’île, certains contacts avec des entités chargées de fonctions administratives dans la mise en oeuvre dudit soutien.
75 S’agissant de l’invocation de l’arrêt Anastasiou e.a. aux points 34 et 66 ci-dessus qui interdirait toute coopération administrative avec la RTCN et toute ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de la République de Chypre, force est de constater que ce ne serait pas la Commission elle-même qui, lors de l’exécution des actes attaqués, procéderait à une coopération administrative directe avec l’une ou l’autre des « autorités » de la RTCN. Il ne saurait non plus être prétendu que ces actes interviendraient directement dans les affaires intérieures de la République de Chypre.
76 Il résulte de ce qui précède que les illégalités dénoncées par la République de Chypre dans le présent contexte n’entachent que la rédaction et la mise en oeuvre des modalités du soutien financier visant à encourager le développement économique de la communauté chypriote turque, dans le cadre et au titre du règlement n° , et que ces illégalités ne sauraient être qualifiées de graves.
77 Par conséquent, le préjudice causé par ces illégalités, à savoir la violation de la souveraineté de la République de Chypre, ne saurait non plus être considéré comme grave.
78 Du reste, ce préjudice n’apparaît pas irréparable. En effet, eu égard à la nature exclusivement morale du préjudice, le juge des référés estime qu’une éventuelle annulation des actes attaqués au terme des procédures au principal en constituerait une réparation suffisante. En effet, de tels arrêts d’annulation mettraient formellement en évidence que la Commission a fait preuve d’un comportement illégal en matière de passation de marchés en portant atteinte à la souveraineté de la République de Chypre, ce qui donnerait satisfaction à cette dernière.
79 Cette solution est confirmée par la mise en balance des intérêts en cause. Ainsi que la Commission l’a relevé à juste titre (voir points 48 et 49 ci-dessus), l’octroi des sursis à exécution sollicités porterait atteinte aux intérêts de tiers qui ne sont pas parties à la présente procédure et n’ont pas été entendus par le juge des référés. En effet, les mesures d’aide communautaire prévues par le règlement n° et lancées par le biais des actes attaqués – relatifs à l’assistance technique dans le domaine écologique, dans le secteur rural, en matière de télécommunications et dans le secteur de l’enseignement – sont d’une grande importance pour la qualité de la vie des habitants des zones en cause. Tout retard dans la mise en oeuvre de ces mesures risquerait de pérenniser le sous-développement structurel et économique de ces zones et les conditions de vie difficiles de leurs habitants, d’autant plus que l’aide communautaire vise, aux termes de l’article 2 du même règlement, la promotion du développement social et économique, notamment rural, le développement des infrastructures ainsi que le rapprochement entre la communauté chypriote turque et l’Union européenne.
80 Au vu de tout ce qui précède, il y a lieu de conclure que la condition relative à l’urgence n’est pas remplie, de sorte que les présentes demandes en référé doivent être rejetées, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de se prononcer sur la question de savoir si la République de Chypre conserve un intérêt à demander le sursis à l’exécution de l’avis EuropeAid/125051/D/SUP/CY faisant l’objet de l’affaire T-54/08 R, après que cet avis a été déclaré infructueux (voir point 9 ci-dessus). | T-41/08-R
Vakakis International | 22 | ECT-242
ECT-243 | 22 Under Articles 242 EC and 243 EC, in conjunction with Article 225(1) EC, the Court of First Instance may, if it considers that circumstances so require, order that application of the act contested before it be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. | T-41/08-R
Vakakis International | 52-73 | ECT-242
ECT-243 | 52 According to settled case-law, the urgency of an application for interim relief must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the relief. It is for that party to prove that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering damage of that kind (see order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-151/01 R Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2001] ECR II-3295, paragraph 187 and the case-law cited).
53 Where damage depends on the occurrence of a number of factors, it is enough for that damage to be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-369/03 R Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II-205, paragraph 71; see also, to that effect, the orders of the Court of Justice in Case C-280/93 R Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667, paragraphs 32 to 34, and of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-335/99 P(R) HFB and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-8705, paragraph 67). However, the applicant is still required to prove the facts which are deemed to show the probability of serious and irreparable damage (Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission, paragraph 72; see also, to that effect, HFB and Others v Commission, paragraph 67).
54 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in order to be able to determine whether the damage which applicants fear is serious and irreparable and therefore provides grounds for ordering interim measures, the judge hearing the application must have hard evidence allowing him to determine the precise consequences which the absence of the measures applied for would in all probability entail for each of the undertakings concerned.
55 In the present case, the applicant submits, in essence, that if the contested decisions were annulled and if interim relief were not granted, the contract in issue in the invitation to tender could not be subject to a subsequent re-tender that would repeat the same competitive conditions as those of the contested procedure, and that this loss of opportunity would cause it to suffer serious and irreparable harm.
56 In this regard, it should be pointed out that if the contested decisions were annulled by the Court, the Commission would be required, under the first paragraph of Article 233 EC, to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, without prejudice to any obligations resulting from the application of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-195/05 R Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission [2005] ECR II-3485, paragraph 128). Such measures could, in principle, include the launch of a new tender process, or the payment of compensation.
57 The President may not therefore prejudge the measures that the Commission might take to comply with a judgment annulling the contested decisions.
58 None the less, the general principle of the right to full and effective judicial protection means that parties before the Courts must be granted interim protection if this is necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of the subsequent definitive judgment, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Community Courts (see, to that effect, order of the Court in Case 27/68 R Renckens v Commission [1969] ECR 274, the judgments in Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I-415, paragraphs 16 to 18; order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-399/95 R Germany v Commission [1996] ECR I-2441, paragraph 46; and order in Austria v Council, paragraph 111).
59 It must therefore be considered whether it has been shown with a sufficient degree of probability that the applicant is likely to suffer serious and irreparable damage if the interim relief applied for is not granted (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-180/01 P(R) Commission v NALOO [2001] ECR I-5737, paragraph 53).
60 In this context, it must first be determined whether, following a judgment annulling the contested decisions, the Commission could organise a new tendering procedure, which would repair the damage caused to the applicant and, if the answer to that question is in the negative, it must be assessed whether the applicant could be adequately compensated.
61 With regard to the possibility of the Commission organising a new tendering procedure, it must be pointed out that the Commission’s provisional timetable for the disputed tender procedure provided that the contract would be signed on 7 January 2008 and that the provision of the contracted services would commence on 1 February 2008. The period of execution of the contract set out in the tender’s provisional timetable is 24 months, with a possibility of extending the programme by a further 24 months.
62 Although the Commission has submitted in its observations that a new tender remains a possibility, it is therefore highly unlikely that, following a judgment in which the contested decisions were annulled, which would probably not be delivered until after the contract, or at least a large part of the contract, had been performed, a new tendering procedure would be organised by the Commission. It is unlikely, therefore, that the damage suffered by the applicant could be repaired by means of a new tender.
63 It must therefore be considered whether, and how, the damage suffered by the applicant could be repaired by means of financial compensation.
64 In this regard, it should be pointed out, the applicant contends that compensation in the form of monetary damages would not make good the loss it is likely to suffer in the absence of the interim measures requested, whereas suspension of the disputed tender procedure until the judgment in the main proceedings had been delivered would preserve the possibility of its performing the contract and consequently prevent it from suffering serious and irreparable harm. In particular, the applicant contends, first, that it is next to impossible to quantify the pecuniary damage which Vakakis is likely to suffer due to the loss of opportunity to participate in the disputed tender procedure, and, therefore, that such damage is irreparable. Secondly, according to Vakakis, the exclusion from the disputed tender procedure would prevent it from being able to meet the shortlisting criteria of, and thus to participate in, similar tenders in the future. This would prejudice its position permanently and beyond repair.
65 As regards the first claim raised by the applicant, it should be recalled that the principle that the damage actually suffered must be made good in its entirety is a principle of law upheld by the Community judicature (see Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-203, paragraph 227). Accordingly, it must be considered whether the damage which the applicant alleges it is likely to suffer could be made good in its entirety notwithstanding the alleged difficulty in quantifying it.
66 In this context it should be recalled that, in cases where damage is not hypothetical or a mere possibility, and the existence of the alleged damage is, therefore, undisputable, it may be possible to put an economic value on such damage despite the continuing uncertainty regarding its exact quantification (see to that effect Case C-243/05 P Agraz and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I- 10833, paragraph 42). Specifically, in relation to loss of opportunity cases, it results from recent case-law of the Court of Justice that the award of damages by this Court on the basis of the attribution of an economic value to the damage suffered as a result of a loss of opportunity is capable, in principle, of complying with the requirement set out in the case-law that the individual damage actually suffered by the party concerned because of the particular unlawful acts of which it was the victim be fully compensated (see to that effect judgment of 21 February 2008 in Case C- 348/06 P Commission v Girardot, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 76).
67 It follows from the foregoing that, also in this case, should Vakakis be successful in the main proceedings, an economic value could be attributed to the damage suffered as a result of the loss of opportunity to win the disputed tender procedure, which would be capable of complying with the requirement that the individual damage actually suffered be fully compensated. The likelihood of such economic value accurately reflecting the actual damage suffered by the applicant is, on the other hand, an element which the President will consider, if necessary, when balancing the interests at stake.
68 Accordingly, the claim that the damage suffered by the applicant would be serious and irreparable based solely on the principle that it is not possible to quantify the loss of opportunity to participate in the disputed tender procedure and the negative consequences it may have cannot be entertained.
69 Secondly, however, the applicant contends that, in the absence of the interim measures requested, the damage caused by the alleged illegal conduct of the Commission, which led to the exclusion of Vakakis from the disputed tender procedure, would be serious and irreparable since, according to Vakakis, it would be prevented from being able to meet future tender criteria, and, therefore, from being able to participate in future tenders.
70 In particular, the applicant submits that it has focused heavily on providing services of the type covered by the disputed tender process to the Commission, has carried out projects in Turkey, Serbia, and Cyprus, and depends on the Community for much of its work. Since the criteria for the short-listing of candidates require that a candidate has specific experience in the type of services being tendered for in a determined period prior to the tender, that the tenderer has a minimum annual turnover, and that the tenderer has a specific number of permanent staff, Vakakis claims that losing the opportunity to compete for the contract tendered for is likely to have the result of excluding it from future tenders and, accordingly, to cause serious and irreparable harm to its business.
71 Although it cannot be excluded that consequences of this kind could in principle be deemed to give rise to serious and irreparable harm, as was pointed out by the Commission in its observations, the applicant’s assertions in this respect remain very general, hypothetical and unsubstantiated statements, which do not satisfy the condition of foreseeability of harm to the requisite degree of probability. Indeed, the applicant has failed to provide any concrete evidence to support its claims and to establish to the requisite degree of probability that any damage that it may suffer in the absence of interim measures would be serious and irreparable within the meaning of the case-law of the Community judicature.
72 By way of example, the applicant has not brought any concrete evidence to demonstrate that the short-listing requirements mentioned above apply to all tenders in this sector, and has provided no detail in relation to such requirements. Furthermore, no concrete evidence was provided to support the applicant’s statement that, should it fail to win the disputed tender process, it would not be in a position to meet the short-listing requirements mentioned above, by reference, for example, to current and projected turnover and employee headcount. Finally, no evidence was provided to demonstrate to the requisite level of probability that the applicant would not be in a position to provide the type of services in question to third parties or that it could focus on other sectors in which it might be active to amortise any losses it may suffer.
73 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicant has not established to the requisite degree of probability that without the interim measures sought it will suffer serious and irreparable harm. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 29-34 | ECT-230-impl
ECT-243-impl | 29. Before ruling on the application for interim measures, the subject matter of the application should be made clear. The applicant, in its application, is seeking suspension of the operation of the contested decision.
30. It should be pointed out that a decision relating to the award of a contract to a single tenderer inevitably and inseparably entails a corresponding decision not to award the contract to the other tenderers. It must therefore be held that the formal communication of the result of the tendering procedure to the rejected tenderers does not mean that a decision other than the decision awarding the contract will be adopted for the express purpose of stating a rejection (judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T183/00 Strabag Benelux v Council [2003] ECR II135, paragraph 28).
31. It must therefore be considered that the applicant is seeking suspension of the operation both of the decision not to award it the contract and of the decision to award the contract to IGN.
32. Moreover, it was confirmed at the hearing that the contract was concluded by the Commission on 19 December and by IGN on 30 December, that performance has begun but is not yet completed. The contract is thus the immediate extension of the Commission's decision to award the contract to IGN.
33. However, as was made clear at the hearing, the applicant puts forward claims for damages arising from performance of the contract and is therefore seeking to prevent serious and irreparable damage which would result, in its view, from such performance.
34. It must be considered therefore that the applicant is also seeking suspension of performance of the contract. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 99-104 | ECT-243-impl | 99. As regards the condition of urgency, it must be remembered that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the definitive future decision, in order to ensure that there is no lacuna in the legal protection provided by the Court (orders in Case 27/68 R Renckens v Commission [1969] ECR 255; Case C399/95 R Germany v Commission [1996] ECR I2441, paragraph 46; Case C393/96 P(R) Antonissen v Council and Commission [1997] ECR I441, paragraph 36; and Commission v NALOO , paragraph 52). For the purpose of attaining that objective, urgency must be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the interim relief (orders in Case C65/99 P(R) Willeme v Commission [1999] ECR I1857, paragraph 62, Commission v NALOO , cited above, paragraph 52 and Case C156/03 P(R) Commission v Laboratoires Servier [2003] ECR I6575, paragraph 35).
100. The applicant contends that if the contested decisions are annulled and if interim relief is not granted, the contract at issue in the invitation to tender could not be awarded to it or performed by it and it would therefore be deprived of certain benefits in terms of references and access to the international market for the services concerned.
101. It should be pointed out that if the contested decisions were annulled by the Court, the Commission would be required, under the first paragraph of Article 233 EC, to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, without prejudice to any obligations resulting from the application of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T195/05 R Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission [2005] ECR II0000, paragraph 128).
102. It addition, it should be borne in mind that under Article 233 EC, it is the institution whose act has been declared void which is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. It follows that the court which declares the measure void has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institution whose act has been declared void as to the manner in which it is to comply with the Court's judgment (order of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C199/94 P and C200/94 P Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission [1995] ECR I3709, paragraph 24) and that the President of the Court of First Instance cannot pre-judge measures which might be adopted as a result of the annulment. The measures necessary in order to comply with a judgment annulling a measure depend not merely on the measure which has been annulled and the scope of the judgment, which is to be assessed on the basis of the grounds which led to it (judgments of the Court of justice in Joined Cases 97/86, 99/86, 193/86 and 215/86 Asteris and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 2181, paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C442/03 P and C471/03 P P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) v Commission [2006] ECR I4845, paragraph 44) but also on the circumstances of each case, such as the time frame in which the annulment of the contested measure takes place or the interests of third parties.
103. In this case, if the contested decisions were annulled, it would be for the Commission, in the light of the circumstances of the case, to take the measures necessary to provide appropriate protection for the applicant's interests (see, to that effect, the orders in Capgemini Nederland v Commission , cited above at paragraph 57, paragraph 96, and Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraph 130).
104. The President may not therefore pre-judge the measures that the Commission might take to comply with a judgment annulling the contested decisions. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 105-107 | ECT-243-impl | 105. None the less, the general principle of the right to full and effective judicial protection means that parties before the courts must be granted interim protection if this is necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of the subsequent definitive judgment, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Community courts (see, to that effect, the order in Renckens v Commission , cited above at paragraph 99; the judgments of the Court of Justice in Case C213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I2433, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C143/88 and C92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I1415, paragraphs 16 to 18; and the orders in Germany v Commission, cited above at paragraph 99, paragraph 46, and Austria v Council , cited above at paragraph 26, paragraph 111).
106. It must therefore be considered whether it has been shown with a sufficient degree of probability that the applicant is likely to suffer serious and irreparable damage if the interim relief applied for is not granted (see, to that effect, the order in Commission v NALOO , cited above at paragraph 99, paragraph 53).
107. It must first therefore be considered whether, following a judgment annulling the contested decisions, the fact that the Commission could organise a new tendering procedure would repair the damage caused to the applicant and if the answer to that question is in the negative, to assess whether the applicant could be compensated. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 108-113 | ECT-243-impl | 108. With regard to the possibility of the Commission organising a new tendering procedure, it must be pointed out that the Commission awarded the contract to IGN and it was signed in December 2005, without the applicant being informed previously that it had not been awarded the contract. The Commission ultimately informed it of that fact, after several requests, only by letter of 1 March 2006.
109. In addition, in reply to a question at the hearing, the Commission initially indicated that although it could confirm that performance of the contract commenced after it was signed by the parties and that some of the equipment provided for under the contract, such as the printers and toner cartridges, were to be delivered at the end of April 2006, it was unaware of the stage which performance of the contract had reached, then, without any further explanation, it indicated that the equipment provided for under the contract had already been delivered.
110. For its part, the applicant indicated, without being contradicted by the Commission, that the final date fixed by the Commission for provision of the other services under the contract, in particular, the placing in service of the software, was 15 March 2007.
111. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the judgment which will close the main proceedings will probably not be delivered until after the contract, or at least, a large part of the contract, has been performed.
112. It is therefore highly unlikely that, following a judgment in which the contested decisions are annulled, which would probably be delivered after performance of the contract has been completed, a new tendering procedure would be organised by the Commission. The damage suffered by the applicant could not therefore be repaired by that means.
113. It must therefore be considered whether, and how, the damage suffered by the applicant could be repaired by an action under Article 235 EC. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 114-118 | ECT-243-impl | 114. It should be pointed out the applicant contends that compensation in the form of money damages would make good the loss it has suffered only in a very imperfect way whereas suspension of the contract until the judgment in the main proceedings has been delivered would preserve the possibility of its obtaining compensation in kind, that is to say, in this case, performance of the contract and consequently, the competitive advantages it believes would flow from being awarded such a contract.
115. As the principle that the damage actually suffered must be made good in its entirety is a principle of law upheld by the Community judicature (judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C104/89 and C37/90 Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [2002] ECR I203, paragraph 227), it must be considered whether the damage which the applicant alleges it has suffered can be made good in its entirety by an equivalent means.
116. The first paragraph of article 101 of Regulation No 1605/2002 provides that [t]he contracting authority may, before the contract is signed, either abandon the procurement or cancel the award procedure without the candidates or tenderers being entitled to claim any compensation'. Thus, contrary to the applicant's claim, it did not lose a contract but rather an opportunity, and, in this case, a particularly favourable one, to obtain the contract which was the subject of the Community tendering procedure.
117. Although the chances of obtaining the contract were good, it is none the less very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify them and consequently to determine with sufficient accuracy the damage resulting from failure to obtain it. It is settled case-law that damage which, once it has occurred, cannot be quantified with sufficient accuracy is to be regarded as difficult to repair (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C51/90 R and C55/90 R Comos-Tank and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I2167, paragraph 31; and the orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T41/97 R Antillian Rice Mills v Council [1997] ECR II447, paragraph 47, and in Case T65/98 R Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [1998] ECR II2641, paragraph 65; see also the order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraph 147 and the case-law cited therein).
118. That loss of opportunity may therefore be regarded as difficult to repair in an equivalent form (see, to that effect, the order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraph 148). | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 119-125 | ECT-243-impl | 119. In addition, the applicant contends, in essence, that the loss, properly so called, resulting from the failure to obtain the contract at issue is in addition to the loss of the competitive advantage attached to the award of the contract and that that advantage would have permitted it to enter the international market by allowing it to refer to the contract awarded by the Commission in the context of other invitations to tender.
120. It should be pointed out that, according to the applicant, there are only five traders present worldwide on this market, something which the Commission does not contest. It also does not contest the applicant's claim that references likely to advance the position of tenderers on the market in question constitute an important factor for potential customers of such tenderers.
121. In accordance with paragraph 11.8 of the Instructions to tenderers, references are one of the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether tenders are compliant in the procedure for awarding the contract laid down by the Commission.
122. It should be pointed out that such references represent, however, only one of many criteria taken into account by the Commission in the qualitative selection of service providers (Article 137 of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 357, p. 1); see also, to that effect, the orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T169/00 R Esedra v Commission [2000] ECR II2951, paragraph 49, and in Case T148/04 R TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission [2004] ECR II3027, paragraph 51).
123. However, in this case, having regard to the extremely limited number of traders on the world market, it cannot be excluded out of hand and without any further consideration that such references could represent a real competitive advantage, something which the Commission does not deny. Moreover, the references are being sought not with a view to obtaining contracts from the Commission - for which they represent only one of many criteria taken into account - , but to obtain contracts from other customers for whom such references could be the determining factor, something which the Commission does not contest either.
124. In this case, having regard to the special circumstances of the contract at issue, which concerns very specific software programmes for which the number of potential customers is relatively limited, and to the extremely limited number of suppliers, the alleged damage appears to be certain or, at least, established with a sufficient degree of probability (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T241/00 R Le Canne v Commission [2001] ECR II37, paragraph 34) and does not appear to be hypothetical and based exclusively on the unpredictable probability of future and uncertain events (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Joined Cases T195/01 R and T207/01 R Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2001] ECR II3915, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited therein).
125. The fact that the applicant would be able to point to a contract awarded by the Commission of the European Communities in a such a specialised market with such a limited number of suppliers, after being selected by Shell and NATO, could well represent a competitive advantage which could have been of benefit to the applicant if it had been awarded the contract. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 126-129 | ECT-243-impl | 126. It should also be noted that by failing to be selected, the applicant was placed at a competitive disadvantage in regard to IGN, which obtained the contract, and could use that fact for competitive purposes, although there are serious grounds for thinking that the contract should not have been awarded to it.
127. It would also be very difficult to quantify the value of that competitive advantage and, consequently, to determine with sufficient accuracy the damage resulting from failure to obtain it or to compensate for it fully and completely by an award of damages (see, to that effect, the order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraphs 147 and 148).
128. Clearly, the applicant is therefore fully entitled to argue that damages would constitute only an imperfect remedy for the loss it has suffered.
129. The damage relied on by the applicant could thus be regarded as difficult to repair unless operation of the contested decision was suspended. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 130-132 | ECT-243-impl | 130. However, in order to justify interim relief, the damage relied on by the applicant must be serious (order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraph 149).
131. The loss of an opportunity to be awarded, or to perform, a public contract is inherent in the exclusion from the tendering procedure at issue and cannot be regarded as constituting, in itself, serious damage independently of a concrete assessment of the specific damage alleged in each case (order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraph 150).
132. Consequently, the applicant's loss of the opportunity to obtain and perform the contract at issue will constitute serious damage only if the applicant can prove to the requisite legal standard that it would have obtained a sufficiently significant advantage from the award and performance of the contract concluded on the basis of the invitation to tender (order in Deloitte Business Advisory v Commission , cited above at paragraph 101, paragraph 151). | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 133-139 | ECT-243-impl | 133. A concrete assessment must therefore be made of the various advantages which would accrue to the applicant from the award and performance of the contract concluded on the basis of the invitation to tender.
134. When the applicant is an undertaking, the seriousness of material damage must be assessed in the light, in particular, of the size of the undertaking (see, to that effect, the order in Comos-Tank and Others v Commission , cited above at paragraph 117, paragraphs 26 and 31; and the order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T201/04 R Microsoft v Commission [2004] ECR II4463, paragraph 257). The President considers in this case that documents in the case do not permit him to assess the seriousness of the damage having regard to the size of the undertaking.
135. However, it is possible that the seriousness of the damage should also be assessed on the basis of other criteria, such as the seriousness of the effect on market shares or of the change in the competitive position of the undertaking (see, by analogy, the orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T13/99 R Pfizer Animal Health v Council [1999] ECR II1961, paragraph 138; Case T392/02 R Solvay Pharmaceuticals v Council [2003] ECR II1825, paragraph 107; and Case T369/03 R Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II205, paragraph 76).
136. As regards, first, financial advantages flowing from performance of the contract, it is clear that failure to perform the contract would deprive the applicant of the income it would have received if the contract had been awarded to it and loss of the opportunity to obtain the income that would have accrued to it under the contract would, having regard to the amounts at stake, seem likely to cause fairly serious damage to the applicant.
137. Secondly, the possibility that the applicant would be able to point to a contract awarded by the Commission of the European Communities in such a specialised market with such a limited number of suppliers could well represent a competitive advantage which could have been of benefit to the applicant if it had been awarded the contract.
138. Even if its precise value is difficult to estimate, the loss of such a competitive advantage is, in the light of the circumstances of the case, likely to cause serious damage to a company such as the applicant which develops very specific software intended for customers who, prima facie, are limited in number, in a highly competitive market in which there is a limited number of suppliers. That is all the more true inasmuch as IGN, one of its direct competitors, could rely, for competitive purposes, on the fact that it had obtained the contract, even though there are good reasons for thinking that it should not have been awarded to it.
139. It must therefore be concluded, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and the characteristics of the market on which the applicant and IGN do business, that the damage suffered by the applicant may be regarded as serious. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 140-141 | ECT-243-impl | 140. Lastly, the urgency which the applicant may consequently invoke must be taken into consideration a fortiori by the President of the Court because, as is apparent from paragraphs 54 to 84 of this order, the arguments of fact and law put forward by the applicant in the context of its first plea in law appear to be of a particularly serious nature (see, to that effect, the order in Austria v Council , cited above at paragraph 26, paragraph 110).
141. Having regard to all those factors, in order to guarantee the full effectiveness of the definitive future decision and, in particular, to preserve the possibility of obtaining compensation in kind, as the applicant has requested and which may well be the only means of making good, at least partially, the damage suffered, the application for suspension of the operation of the contested decision and of performance of the contract must be granted in so far as the balance of interests is in its favour. That is the matter which must now be considered. | T-114/06-R
Globe SA | 147-157 | ECT-233
ECT-243-impl | 147. Where, on an application for interim measures, the judge before whom the applicant claims that it will sustain serious and irreparable harm weighs up the various interests involved, he must consider whether the annulment of the contested decision by the court dealing with the main application would make it possible to reverse the situation that would have been brought about in the absence of interim measures and, conversely, whether suspension of the operation of that decision would be such as to prevent its being fully effective in the event of the main application being dismissed (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C182/03 R and C 217/03 R Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2003] ECR I6887, paragraph 142, and the order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Pfizer Animal Health v Council , cited above at paragraph 135, paragraph 167 and the case-law cited therein).
148. Account must be taken, first of all, of the applicant's interest in suspension of the operation of the decision awarding the contract to IGN, secondly, of IGN's interest in performing the contract and thirdly of the public interest, and the Commission's interest, in the performance of the contract.
149. Firstly, the President considers that continued performance of the contract awarded to IGN would cause the applicant to sustain serious and irreparable harm (see paragraphs 104 to 140, above).
150. Secondly, there are serious grounds for believing that IGN's tender did not comply with the specifications laid down in the Instructions to tenderers and should have been rejected by the Commission. Contrary to the latter's contention at the hearing, the lawfulness of the contested decision and the lawfulness of the contract entered into on the basis of it are not separate from each other; if the contested decision is annulled by the Court in the main proceedings and performance of the contract is suspended, the annulment decision could lead the Commission to terminate its contract with IGN.
151. Accordingly, IGN, as the Commission has pointed out, would probably be entitled to sue the Commission for damages arising out of the fault it had committed, bringing their action in the Belgian courts, which, according to the Commission, have jurisdiction under a choice of jurisdiction clause in the contract. It must therefore be concluded that IGN's interests could be protected by legal proceedings.
152. Consequently, the balance of interests cannot be in IGN's favour and to the applicant's disadvantage. There are serious grounds for believing that IGN's tender did not comply with the specifications laid down in the invitation to tender, whereas the Commission does not deny that the applicant's tender did comply with those specifications. Under those circumstances, IGN's interest in carrying on with the contract cannot take precedence over the applicant's interest in being awarded that contract, which would be possible, at least in part, if the contract was suspended until judgment has been delivered in the main proceedings.
153. Thirdly, the Commission has not substantiated its claim that further performance of the contract cannot be delayed if good relations are to be maintained with the Kazakh authorities as the Commission has submitted no evidence on that subject to the President.
154. Moreover, the arguments put forward by the Commission at the hearing seem to indicate that it was aware that the award of the contract to IGN could, or would, cause difficulties but that, for budgetary reasons, it preferred not to act on that possibility but to take the risk of being sued subsequently by tenderers whose bids had been improperly rejected.
155. Even supposing that budgetary considerations could justify such a course of action, the Commission has not shown that such considerations which, by its own account, lead it to conclude the contract with IGN before 31 December 2005 so as not to lose the credits available to it for that purpose, are such as to make it impossible to suspend performance of the contract at this point in time.
156. The Commission also cannot rely on its interest in the continued performance of the contract in order to avoid legal action by IGN in support of a claim that the President should refuse to accord judicial protection to the applicant.
157. Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the grant of interim measures is justified and adequately meets the need to guarantee effective provisional legal protection to the applicant. | | T-437/05-R | 39-40 | ECT-243-impl | 39 Le caractère urgent d’une demande en référé doit s’apprécier par rapport à la nécessité qu’il y a de statuer provisoirement afin d’éviter qu’un préjudice grave et irréparable ne soit occasionné à la partie qui sollicite la mesure provisoire (ordonnance du président de la Cour du 6 février 1986, Deufil/Commission, 310/85 R, Rec. p. 537, point 15, et ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 30 juin 1999, Pfizer Animal Health/Conseil, T-13/99 R, Rec. p. II-1961, point 134). C’est à cette dernière qu’il appartient d’apporter la preuve qu’elle ne saurait attendre l’issue de la procédure au principal sans avoir à subir un préjudice de cette nature (ordonnance du président de la Cour du 8 mai 1991, Belgique/Commission, C-356/90 R, Rec. p. I-2423, point 23, et ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 15 novembre 2001, Duales System Deutschland/Commission, T-151/01 R, Rec. p. II-3295, point 187).
40 L’imminence du préjudice ne doit pas être établie avec une certitude absolue, mais il suffit, particulièrement lorsque la réalisation du préjudice dépend de la survenance d’un ensemble de facteurs, qu’elle soit prévisible avec un degré de probabilité suffisant. Le requérant demeure cependant tenu de prouver les faits qui sont censés fonder la perspective d’un tel dommage grave et irréparable [ordonnance du président de la Cour du 14 décembre 1999, HFB e.a./Commission, C-335/99 P(R), Rec. p. I-8705, point 67]. | | T-437/05-R | 42-45 | ECT-243-impl | 42 En ce qui concerne le préjudice tenant à la prétendue indisponibilité d’une information complète et transparente sur le déroulement de l’appel d’offres et l’issue de celui-ci, ainsi qu’à la possibilité d’éviter un recours contentieux inutile, premièrement, il y a lieu de noter que, dans sa demande, la requérante allègue l’existence d’un préjudice tenant à un manque de clarification, d’une part, des modalités d’attribution du marché à Group 4 Falck et, d’autre part, des moyens à soulever dans le cadre de la présente procédure.
43 Or, quant à la clarification des modalités d’attribution du marché, la requérante n’a pas démontré en quoi consiste le dommage qui lui est prétendument causé, en l’absence de ladite clarification, dans l’attente de l’arrêt au principal. De même, s’agissant de la possibilité d’éviter un recours contentieux inutile, la requérante n’a pas fourni la preuve que le litige, en tant que tel, lui cause un dommage grave et irréparable.
44 Deuxièmement, force est de constater que la Commission, en cours d’instance et sur demande du Tribunal, a produit une version non confidentielle des certificats communiqués par l’intervenante pour se conformer au n° 28 du cahier des charges relatif au marché en cause. Or, lors de la procédure orale, la requérante n’a pas démontré que ces informations n’étaient pas suffisantes pour éclaircir de façon complète et transparente le déroulement de la procédure.
45 En conséquence, la requérante n’a pas établi qu’il était urgent de prononcer des mesures provisoires pour lui éviter un dommage grave et irréparable lié à un prétendu manque d’information sur le déroulement de l’appel d’offres. | | T-437/05-R | 46-58 | ECT-243-impl | 46 La requérante allègue également avoir subi un préjudice grave et irréparable lié au fait que, en raison de l’irrégularité de la procédure et de l’illégalité de la décision attaquée, elle aurait perdu une chance de se voir attribuer le marché en cause et, par voie de conséquence, de tirer les divers bénéfices qui pourraient résulter, le cas échéant, de l’exécution du contrat.
47 Il y a préliminairement lieu de constater que Brink’s avait, effectivement, une chance de se voir attribuer le marché en cause. En effet, tout d’abord, l’offre de Brink’s a reçu des notations d’évaluation de peu inférieures à celles attribuées à Group 4 Falck, dont la régularité est contestée au principal. Ensuite, Brink’s était en principe à même de proposer une offre intéressante, compte tenu de l’expérience acquise durant les années au cours desquelles elle a exécuté le marché. Enfin, aucun élément du dossier, à l’exception de ceux dont la légalité est contestée au principal, ne permet d’exclure que Brink’s disposait d’une chance de se voir attribuer et d’exécuter le marché en cause.
48 Il convient donc de vérifier si la perte de cette chance constitue, pour Brink’s, un préjudice à la fois grave et irréparable, de nature à justifier l’octroi des mesures provisoires demandées.
49 En effet, même à supposer que la requérante parvienne à démontrer que le préjudice subi en raison de la perte d’une chance de se voir attribuer le marché en cause était irréparable, il convient de constater que, pour justifier l’octroi de mesures provisoires, le préjudice invoqué par le demandeur doit aussi être grave (voir, en ce sens, ordonnances du président du Tribunal du 20 juillet 2000, Esedra/Commission, T-169/00 R, Rec. p. II-2951, point 43 ; du 27 juillet 2004, TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium/Commission, T-148/04 R, non encore publiée au Recueil, point 41, et du 20 septembre 2005, Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, T-195/05 R, non encore publiée au Recueil, point 149).
50 Or, la perte d’une chance de se voir attribuer et d’exécuter un marché public est inhérente au risque d’exclusion qu’encourt tout soumissionnaire participant à une procédure d’appel d’offres et ne saurait être regardée comme constitutive, en soi, d’un préjudice grave, indépendamment d’une appréciation concrète de la gravité de l’atteinte spécifique alléguée dans chaque cas d’espèce (ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, point 49 supra, point 150).
51 En conséquence, c’est, en l’espèce, à la condition que la requérante parvienne à démontrer à suffisance de droit qu’elle aurait pu retirer des bénéfices suffisamment significatifs de l’attribution et de l’exécution du marché en cause que le fait, pour elle, d’avoir perdu une chance de se voir attribuer et d’exécuter ledit marché constituerait un préjudice grave (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, point 49 supra, point 151).
52 Il convient donc d’apprécier concrètement les bénéfices qui, selon la requérante, découleraient pour elle de l’attribution et de l’exécution du marché en cause dans le cadre de la procédure d’appel d’offres (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, point 49 supra, point 152).
53 À cet égard, la requérante s’est bornée à alléguer que l’inexécution du contrat la priverait d’une part conséquente de son activité, ce qui serait de nature à porter atteinte à la poursuite efficace de ses activités.
54 En l’espèce, s’il est évident que l’inexécution de ce contrat priverait la requérante des revenus qu’elle aurait perçus si le marché lui avait été attribué, il convient de rappeler que, lorsque le demandeur est une entreprise, la gravité d’un préjudice d’ordre matériel doit être évaluée au regard, notamment, de la taille de cette entreprise (ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, point 49 supra, point 156 ; voir également, en ce sens, ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 22 décembre 2004, Microsoft/Commission, T-201/04 R, non encore publiée au Recueil, point 257).
55 Or, en l’espèce, la requérante, dans sa demande en référé, a soutenu que le marché en cause représentait un cinquième de son activité au Luxembourg. Dans ses observations orales, la requérante a, en revanche, soutenu que le même marché correspondait au quart de son activité au Luxembourg.
56 D’une part, il y a toutefois lieu de constater que la requérante, indépendamment de ses contradictions quant à la valeur exacte de la perte qu’elle risque de subir, n’a fourni à cet égard qu’une seule évaluation sans en expliquer la réelle portée, par exemple en ce qui concerne la valeur de la perte de bénéfice financier. De plus, même à supposer que la requérante se réfère au rapport existant entre la valeur du contrat passé avec la Commission et son propre chiffre d’affaires en 2005, elle n’a fourni aucun élément de preuve permettant de conclure que l’évaluation avancée par elle reflète bien le dommage qu’elle subirait si le juge des référés ne faisait pas droit à sa demande de mesures provisoires. En particulier, elle n’a pas démontré qu’elle allait perdre toutes les ressources antérieurement affectées à l’exécution du contrat avec la Commission, sans possibilité de les investir, au moins en partie, dans d’autres marchés.
57 D’autre part, même à supposer que le préjudice lié à la perte du marché en cause corresponde à une réduction de 25 % de l’activité commerciale de la requérante, force est de constater que, ainsi que celle-ci l’a confirmé lors de ses observations orales, elle appartient à un groupe de dimension internationale. Or, il ressort du dossier que la valeur de 25 % ne se réfère qu’aux activités de Brink’s Security Luxembourg SA au Luxembourg. La requérante n’a pas démontré que, compte tenu du groupe auquel elle appartient, la perte invoquée présente un caractère de gravité suffisant.
58 Dès lors, au regard des éléments présents dans la demande en référé et de ceux exposés lors de l’audition, le juge des référés ne saurait considérer que, pour la requérante, la perte d’une chance de se voir attribuer et d’exécuter le marché en cause constitue un préjudice suffisamment grave pour justifier l’octroi de mesures provisoires. | | T-437/05-R | 59-62 | ECT-243-impl | 59 En ce qui concerne l’argument de la requérante selon lequel celle-ci risque de subir un préjudice du fait qu’elle se voit privée de manière irrémédiable de son droit à participer à une procédure d’appel d’offres non faussée, force est de constater que les seules conséquences concrètes, qui, selon la requérante, résultent de l’atteinte à ce droit tiennent dans le fait que « [l]aisser se conclure le contrat sans permettre au préalable à la requérante d’obtenir une information complète sur le déroulement de la procédure en cause la priverait de son droit de réclamer une éventuelle régularisation, permettant ainsi d’éviter l’engagement de recours contentieux ».
60 Or, d’une part, pour autant que la requérante invoque l’impossibilité de procéder à la « régularisation » du contrat, son argumentation ne se distingue pas de celle visant à démontrer l’existence d’un préjudice lié à la perte d’une chance de se voir attribuer le marché, laquelle a déjà été écartée comme ne démontrant pas l’existence d’un préjudice grave et irréparable (voir points 46 à 58 supra).
61 D’autre part, pour autant que la requérante invoque la nécessité d’éviter un recours contentieux, il a déjà été jugé qu’une telle circonstance n’était pas susceptible de démontrer l’existence d’un préjudice grave et irréparable (voir points 42 à 45).
62 En conséquence, la requérante n’a pas établi qu’il était urgent de prononcer des mesures provisoires pour éviter un dommage grave et irréparable lié à une atteinte irrémédiable à son droit à participer à une procédure d’appel d’offres non faussée. | | T-437/05-R | 63-65 | ECT-243-impl | 63 En ce qui concerne le préjudice allégué par la requérante et lié à une perte de capital humain expérimenté, force est de constater, ainsi que le fait valoir, à juste titre, la Commission, que Brink’s connaissait les conditions du contrat conclu avec la Commission et savait que celui-ci devait expirer le 31 décembre 2005, sans possibilité de reconduction. Le risque pour Brink’s de ne pas se voir attribuer le marché lors de la conclusion d’un nouveau contrat est par conséquent inhérent au système de passation des marchés publics.
64 En outre, la requérante ne fournit aucune preuve permettant de démontrer que le préjudice allégué est irréparable et que, dans le cas où elle obtiendrait gain de cause au principal, elle ne pourrait pas reconstituer une équipe de la même qualité, par le biais du recrutement soit du même personnel, soit d’autres personnes aussi qualifiées.
65 En conséquence, la requérante n’a pas établi qu’il était urgent de prononcer des mesures provisoires pour éviter un dommage grave et irréparable lié à une prétendue perte de capital humain. Sur le préjudice prétendument lié à une atteinte à la réputation de la requérante
| | T-437/05-R | 66-71 | ECT-243-impl | 66 Enfin, la requérante allègue un préjudice quant à sa réputation, lié, d’une part, au fait qu’elle se verra obligée de procéder à un important plan de licenciement collectif et, d’autre part, au fait même de son éviction du marché.
67 Néanmoins, force est de constater que, ainsi que le rappelle à juste titre la Commission, la participation à une soumission publique, par nature hautement compétitive, implique des risques pour tous les participants et que l’élimination d’un soumissionnaire, en vertu des règles de la soumission, n’a, en elle-même, rien de préjudiciable (ordonnance du président de la Cour du 5 août 1983, CMC/Commission, 118/83 R, Rec. p. 2583, point 51, et ordonnance du président du Tribunal du 10 novembre 2004, European Dynamics/Commission, T-303/04 R, non encore publiée au Recueil, point 82).
68 En outre, lorsqu’une entreprise a été illégalement écartée d’une procédure d’appel d’offres, il existe d’autant moins de raisons de penser qu’elle risque de subir une atteinte grave et irréparable à sa réputation que, d’une part, son exclusion est sans lien avec ses compétences et, d’autre part, l’arrêt d’annulation qui s’ensuivra permettra en principe de rétablir une éventuelle atteinte à sa réputation (ordonnance Deloitte Business Advisory/Commission, point 49 supra, point 126).
69 Enfin, en l’espèce, à supposer qu’elle soit effectivement obligée de procéder à un plan de licenciement collectif, il n’est pas démontré que l’éventuel arrêt d’annulation qui s’ensuivra ne permettra pas d’exclure toute responsabilité de la requérante dans le licenciement.
70 En conséquence, la requérante n’a pas établi qu’il était urgent de prononcer des mesures provisoires pour éviter un dommage grave et irréparable à sa réputation.
71 Il découle de tout ce qui précède que la requérante n’a pas démontré qu’elle risquait de subir un préjudice grave et irréparable en l’absence de mesures provisoires. En conséquence, sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’examiner la condition relative au fumus boni juris et de mettre en balance les intérêts en présence, la demande en référé doit être rejetée. | T-376/05
TEA-CEGOS | ECT-243-impl | 28 | 28. By separate document registered at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 14 October 2005, TEA-CEGOS and STG submitted an application for interim measures, requesting suspension of the operation of the contested decision in that case and of all the other decisions taken by the Commission in the same call for tenders following that decision. By order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 14 October 2005, the Commission was ordered to suspend the tendering procedure bearing reference EuropeAid/119860/C/SV/multi-Lot 7' pending a final order on the application for interim measures. On account of an agreement reached between the parties on 26 October 2005, in the light of the settlement proposed by the President of the Court of First Instance, acting in his capacity as the judge hearing the application for interim relief, the order of 14 October 2005 was revoked by an order of the President of 13 December 2005. By an order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 11 January 2006, the application for interim measures submitted by TEA-CEGOS and STG was removed from the register of the Court of First Instance, costs being reserved. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 79-81 | ECT-243-impl | 79. In its application, the applicant claims inter alia that the President should prohibit the Commission from informing the successful tenderer of the award decision.
80. In its observations of 2 June 2005, the Commission stated, without being contradicted by the applicant or by any of the documents in the file, that it had already informed the successful tenderer that its tender had been selected by letter of 22 April 2005.
81. Consequently, the applicant's request for an order prohibiting the Commission from giving such information was devoid of purpose from the moment it was lodged. It must therefore be rejected as inadmissible (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-125/05 R Umwelt- und Ingenieurtechnik Dresden v Commission [2005] ECR II-1901, paragraph 36). | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 122-123 | ECT-243-impl | 122. In the light of the arguments put forward in the interlocutory proceedings, doubts must be raised on several points of the applicant's arguments. Its arguments must nevertheless be examined in detail in the main proceedings.
123. Without prejudice to the Court's position in the main proceedings, the applicant's arguments cannot therefore, at this stage, be rejected as entirely without foundation. The condition relating to a prima facie case is therefore satisfied. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 124-125 | ECT-243-impl | 124. According to settled case-law, the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed on the basis of the need for an interlocutory order in order to prevent serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must prove that it cannot wait for the outcome of the main proceedings without having to suffer damage of this kind (orders in Esedra v Commission , cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 43 [CHECK], and in TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission, cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 41 [CHECK]).
125. In the present case, the applicant's argument consists essentially of two parts where, on the one hand, the applicant's exclusion from the tendering procedure harms its reputation and, on the other, the absence of interim measures will, if the contested decisions are annulled, prevent it from being awarded and then performing the contract covered by the tendering procedure and, as a result, from deriving certain benefits in terms of prestige, experience and revenue. Those two parts should be considered in turn. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 126-128 | ECT-233
ECT-243-impl
ECT-288 | 126. First of all, the applicant claims that its exclusion from the tendering procedure harms its reputation. In that regard, the Commission rightly points out that participation in a public tender procedure, by nature highly competitive, involves risks for all the participants and the elimination of a tenderer under the tender rules is not in itself in any way prejudicial (orders in CMC v Commission , cited in paragraph 71 above, paragraph 51, and in European Dynamics v Commission , cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 82). Furthermore, the applicant's argument that this case-law does not apply where the tenderer has been unlawfully eliminated cannot be accepted. The case-law in question concerns cases where, like the applicant in the present case, the applicants were contesting the lawfulness of the act(s) contested in the main proceedings. In addition, where an undertaking has been unlawfully eliminated from a tendering procedure, there is even less reason to believe that it is liable to suffer serious and irreparable harm to its reputation, since its exclusion is unconnected with its competences and the subsequent annulling judgment will in principle allow any harm to its reputation to be made good.
127. Second, the applicant claims that, if the contested decisions are annulled and interim measures are not adopted, it will no longer be possible for it to be awarded the contract covered by the tendering procedure and then to perform the contract and, as a result, to derive certain benefits in terms of prestige, experience and revenue.
128. It should be noted in that regard that if the contested decisions were annulled by the Court, it would be for the Commission, under the first paragraph of Article 233 EC, to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, without prejudice to the obligations stemming from the application of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 129-131 | ECT-233
ECT-243 | 129. It should also be noted that, under Article 233 EC, it is the institution whose act has been declared void that is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the Court's judgment. It follows that the Court hearing annulment proceedings is not competent to indicate to the institution whose act has been declared void the manner in which its ruling is to be complied with (order of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-199/94 P and C-200/94 P Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission [1995] ECR I3709, paragraph 24) and that the judge hearing the application for interim measures may not prejudice the measures that might be taken following any annulling judgment. The manner in which an annulling judgment is complied with depends not only on the annulled provision and the scope of the judgment, which is to be assessed with reference to its grounds (Joined Cases 97/86, 99/86, 193/86 and 215/86 Asteris and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 2181, paragraph 27, and Joined Cases T305/94 to T307/94, T313/94 to T316/94, T318/94, T325/94, T328/94, T329/94 and T335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II931, paragraph 184), but also on the specific circumstances of each case, such as the time within which the contested act is annulled or third-party interests.
130. In the present case, if the contested decisions were annulled, the Commission would therefore have to adopt the necessary measures for ensuring appropriate protection of the applicant's interests, having regard to the specific circumstances of this case (see, to that effect, the orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T108/94 R Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II249, paragraph 27, and in Case T447/04 R Capgemini Nederland v Commission [2005] ECR II-257, paragraph 96).
131. It is not therefore for the President to prejudice measures which might be taken by the Commission in order to comply with any annulment judgment. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 132-140 | ECT-243-impl | 132. Nevertheless, the general principle of the right to full and effective judicial protection requires that interim protection be available to individuals, if it is necessary for the full effectiveness of the definitive future decision, in order to ensure that there is no lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the Community Courts (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of Justice in Case 27/68 R Renckens v Commission [1969] ECR 274, 276; judgments in Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I2433, paragraph 21, and in Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I415, paragraphs 16 to 18; orders of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-399/95 R Germany v Commission [1996] ECR I2441, paragraph 46, and in Austria v Council , cited in paragraph 25 above, paragraph 111).
133. It is therefore necessary to examine whether it is proven, with a sufficient degree of probability, that the applicant is likely to suffer serious and irreparable damage if the interim measures applied for are not adopted (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-180/01 P(R) Commission v NALOO [2001] ECR I5737, paragraph 53).
134. In the present case, ignoring the issue of the conflict of interest identified by the Commission, which is contested by the applicant and is the subject of the main proceedings, it must be held that Euphet had an opportunity to be awarded the contract covered by the tendering procedure. First of all, it is clear from the documents before the Court that Euphet was excluded from the tendering procedure irrespective of the value for money of its tender and solely because the tender showed that there was a risk of a conflict of interest. Second, nothing in the file suggests that Euphet did not have an opportunity to be awarded and to perform the contract in question, irrespective of the risk of a conflict of interest identified by the Commission.
135. However, because of its exclusion from the tendering procedure, Euphet lost its opportunity to be awarded the contract and, consequently, to derive the various financial and non-financial benefits that might result from the performance of the framework contract. It should therefore be examined whether, following an annulment judgment, the possibility of the Commission organising a new tendering procedure would allow such damage to be repaired and, if that is not the case, it should be assessed whether the applicant could be compensated accordingly.
136. As regards the possibility of the Commission organising a new tendering procedure, it should be stated that, even if Euphet could be restored under competitive conditions comparable to those that applied in the tendering procedure in question, it is highly likely that the subject of the new procedure organised by the Commission will be different from the subject of the first procedure.
137. Under Sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 of the specifications, the framework contract relates inter alia to an evaluation of the programme of Community action in the field of public health established by Decision No 1786/2002. Article 12(3) of that decision provides that an external assessment must be conducted by the end of the fourth year of the programme', that is 31 December 2006.
138. Consequently, even though the Commission rightly stresses that the framework contract does not necessarily concern just that evaluation, it is highly likely that, if interim measures are not adopted, at least some of the services to be provided under the framework contract will have been completed when the Court delivers its decision in the main proceedings.
139. Therefore, even if the Commission decides to or is required to organise a new call for tenders in order to comply with an annulment judgment, if Euphet can be restored under competitive conditions similar to those that applied in the tendering procedure in question, and if Euphet's tender is accepted by the Commission, it is unlikely that Euphet will in practice still have an opportunity to carry out all the services that it would have performed if it had been declared the successful tenderer at the outset.
140. In the circumstances of this case, it is therefore unlikely that the possibility of the Commission organising a new tendering procedure would in itself make it possible to preserve the opportunity that the applicant had to be awarded and to perform the contract covered by the tendering procedure and, as a result, to derive the various benefits that might have resulted. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 141-148 | ECT-243-impl
ECT-288 | 141. However, as was held above (paragraph 135), account should also be taken of the possibility that, if the contested decisions are annulled in the main proceedings, the Commission could compensate the applicant for any damage suffered and that, if the Commission chose not to award such compensation, the applicant could bring an action for damages on the basis of Article 288 EC. If any damage suffered by the applicant can subsequently be compensated, it cannot be regarded as irreparable (see, to that effect, the orders in Esedra v Commission , cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 44, and in TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission , cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 43).
142. In the present case, the Commission claims in its observations that, if the contested decisions are annulled, the applicant's interests could be adequately protected inter alia through the payment of compensation. However, the file does not contain anything to guarantee, with a sufficient degree of certainty, that, if the contested decisions were annulled, the Commission would compensate the applicant without an action for damages being brought.
143. Account must therefore be taken of the possibility of the applicant bringing an action under Article 288 EC.
144. According to settled case-law, the damage for which compensation is sought in an action under Article 288 EC must be real and certain (see, to that effect, Case T-54/96 Oleifici Italiani and Fratelli Rubino v Commission [1998] ECR II3377, paragraph 66, and Case T-231/97 New Europe Consulting and Brown v Commission [1999] ECR II2403, paragraph 29).
145. In the present case, as has already been held (paragraph 134 above), it must be regarded as established that Euphet had an opportunity to be awarded and to perform the contract covered by the tendering procedure. Therefore, the damage suffered by the applicant, consisting in the loss of that opportunity, must, at this stage and in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted in the interlocutory proceedings, be regarded as real and certain within the meaning of the case-law mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
146. However, it must be stated that that opportunity is very difficult to quantify. On the one hand, Euphet's tender was excluded at a very early stage in the procedure and the evaluation committee did not deliver an opinion regarding its economic value. On the other hand, even if that tender had been evaluated by the evaluation committee, the contracting authority would not be bound by its proposal and would have a broad discretion in assessing the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract (see, to that effect, Case T-13/96 TEAM v Commission [1998] ECR II4073, paragraph 76, and AFCon Management Consultants and Others v Commission , cited in paragraph 35 above, paragraph 113).
147. It is therefore very difficult, or even impossible, to quantify that opportunity and therefore to evaluate the damage resulting from its loss. According to settled case-law, damage, which once it has been suffered cannot be quantified, may be regarded as irreparable (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C51/90 R and C59/90 R Comos Tank and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I2167, paragraph 31; orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T41/97 R Antillean Rice Mills v Council [1997] ECR II447, paragraph 47, and in Case T-65/98 R Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [1998] ECR II2641, paragraph 65).
148. The loss of that opportunity may therefore be regarded as constituting irreparable damage. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 149-160 | ECT-243-impl | 149. However, in order to justify the grant of interim measures, the damage claimed by the applicant must be serious (see, to that effect, the orders in Esedra v Commission , cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 43, and in TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission , cited in paragraph 67 above, paragraph 41).
150. The loss of an opportunity to be awarded and to perform a public contract forms an integral part of exclusion from the tendering procedure in question and cannot be regarded as constituting in itself serious damage, whether or not a specific assessment is made of the seriousness and irreparability of the precise prejudice alleged in each case considered (see, by analogy, the order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-237/99 R BP Nederland and Others v Commission [2000] ECR II3849, paragraph 52).
151. Therefore, in the present case, the applicant's loss of an opportunity to be awarded and to perform the contract in the tendering procedure would constitute serious damage if it has shown satisfactorily that it would have been able to derive sufficiently sizeable benefits from the award and performance of that contract.
152. It is therefore necessary to make a specific assessment of the various benefits that, according to the applicant, it would derive from the award and performance of the contract covered by the tendering procedure.
153. First of all, the applicant claims that the performance of the framework contract would have brought it major benefits in terms of experience and prestige. However, in this respect, its claims are too general, too vague and too unsubstantiated to establish satisfactorily the likelihood and, a fortiori, the significance of those benefits. As regards the honour and prestige attached to the performance of the tasks to be carried out, the applicant pleads the value of the framework contract, the subject, the duration, the international and large-scale nature of the task' and the fact that it assembled a team of 65 people to perform the contract. Nevertheless, in the absence of more specific evidence allowing an assessment of the effects of performance of the framework contract, in particular on its customers, its prestige and its experience, these claims alone are too vague to prove satisfactorily the likelihood and, a fortiori, the significance of those benefits.
154. Second, as regards the financial benefits attached to the performance of the framework contract, their existence is clearly established. It is obvious therefore that non-performance of the contract would deprive the applicant of revenue that it would have received if it had been awarded the contract. The applicant is therefore liable to suffer irreparable damage linked to the loss of an opportunity to receive that revenue.
155. With regard to the seriousness of that loss, it should be noted that, having regard to its subject-matter, the framework contract concerns tasks with a considerable value. It can be seen from the specifications that the successful tenderer will be assigned three to five tasks each year and that, for the first year, the value of the remunerable services is EUR 1 million.
156. However, where the applicant is an undertaking, the seriousness of material damage must be assessed inter alia in the light of the size of that undertaking (see, to that effect, the order in Comos Tank and Others v Commission , cited in paragraph 147 above, paragraphs 26 and 31, and the order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-201/04 R Microsoft v Commission [2004] ECR II-4463, paragraph 257).
157. In the present case, it must be stated that the applicant does not produce evidence or arguments to show that, in the light of its size in particular, the loss that it is liable to suffer would be sufficiently serious to justify the grant of interim measures.
158. For example, it can be seen from an annex to the tender submitted by Euphet that the applicant realised a turnover of more than EUR 27 million in 2004. Furthermore, the information provided in Euphet's tender seeks to highlight the size of the group to which the applicant is linked. In that tender, it is stated that the group in question employs the services of almost 130 000 people throughout the world, approximately 20 000 of whom work within the European Union.
159. Consequently, in the light of the evidence and arguments contained in the application for interim measures, the President cannot take the view that the applicant's loss of an opportunity to receive revenue from the performance of the framework contract would be sufficiently serious to justify the grant of interim measures.
160. The condition relating to urgency cannot therefore be regarded as satisfied. | T-195/05-R
Deloitte | 161-167 | ECT-243-impl | 161. Lastly, it should be noted that the balance of interests is in any case in favour of not ordering interim measures.
162. As has already been noted, if interim measures are not adopted, the applicant is liable to suffer damage linked to the loss of an opportunity to receive revenue from the performance of the framework contract.
163. However, if the interim measures applied for were ordered, the Commission would be unable to conclude the framework contract. It is clear from recital 44 in the preamble to Decision No 1786/2002 that the evaluations of the programme of Community action in the field of public health are intended, where appropriate, to adjust or modify that programme. The performance of these evaluations therefore fulfils an important general interest.
164. Account must also be taken of the interest of the tenderer which was successful at the end of the tendering procedure and which, in the event of suspension, would be unable to perform the contract which it has been awarded.
165. Lastly, as can be seen from the examination of the prima facie case (paragraphs 83 to 123 above), it is not particularly strong, in the light of the evidence and arguments presented in the interlocutory proceedings, and is not capable of tipping the balance of interests in favour of the grant of interim measures.
166. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing, the balance of the interests at stake is in favour of not granting the interim measures applied for.
167. Consequently, without it being necessary to give a ruling on the applicant's request for the correspondence exchanged between the Commission and the other tenderers to be lodged with the Registry, the application for interim measures must be dismissed. | T-125/05-R
Umwelt- und Ingenieurtechnik | 35-36 | ECT-243-impl | 35. In its application, the applicant in essence requests the President of the Court of First Instance to prohibit the defendant, firstly, from awarding the contract at issue to All Trade and, secondly, from drawing up the contract envisaged at paragraph 21 of the invitation to tender file and offering it for signature by All Trade. It also requests the suspension of the decision not to award it Lot No 2 of the contract at issue and to suspend the execution of any contract signed with All Trade.
36. The Commission has stated, without being contradicted by the applicant, or by any of the documents on the file, that the contract between All Trade and Energoatom was signed on 23 December 2004. For that reason, the application for interim relief, in so far as it aims to avoid the award of the contract to All Trade and the signature of the contract, has been devoid of purpose since it was lodged. This head of claim is therefore inadmissible. | T-125/05-R
Umwelt- und Ingenieurtechnik | 37-43 | ECT-243-impl | 37. In relation to the head of claim seeking to obtain suspension of the execution of the decision not to award the contract to the applicant and the execution of the contract made with All Trade, the President of the Court of First Instance considers that, without there being any need to rule on the conformity of the application with the requirements of Article 104(2) of the Rules of Procedure, as interpreted by the Community judicature (Orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-306/01 R Aden and Others v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II2387, paragraph 52, and Case T-303/04 R European Dynamics v Commission [2004] ECR II-3889, paragraphs 63 and 64), it is appropriate to examine whether the condition for urgency is fulfilled.
38. In that regard, according to well-established case-law, the urgency of an application for the adoption of interim measures must be assessed in the light of the extent to which an interlocutory order is necessary to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking the adoption of the interim measure (Order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case 310/85 R Deufil v Commission [1986] ECR 537, paragraph 15, and Order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-13/99 R Pfizer Animal Health v Council [1999] ECR II1961, paragraph 134).
39. The party seeking the suspension of the operation of the contested decision must provide proof that he cannot await the conclusion of the main action without suffering prejudice of that nature (Order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-356/90 R Belgium v Commission [1991] ECR I2423, paragraph 23, and Order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-151/01 R Duales System Deutschland v Commission [2001] ECR II3295, paragraph 187).
40. In this case, the applicant limits itself to stating, without more, that the appeal does not have suspensive effect and therefore it must be feared that, in the context of the decision process at issue, the decision in favour of All Trade challenged... would take effect' and that this would create a fait accompli and would definitively affect the applicant's legal position'.
41. The applicant does not give any reasons as to why it cannot wait for the request for annulment to be decided and adduces no proof of such serious and irreparable damage.
42. In so far as the applicant can be understood as arguing that the damage alleged concerns the fact that its non-selection has caused financial loss, it suffices to recall that damage of such a kind cannot, save in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as irreparable, or even as being reparable only with difficulty, if it can ultimately be the subject of financial compensation (Orders in Esedra v Commission , cited above, paragraph 45, Neue Erba Lautex v Commission , cited above, paragraph 84, and TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission , cited above, paragraph 46).
43. In these circumstances it must be concluded that, since the condition regarding urgency is not satisfied, the present application must be dismissed without the need to consider whether the other conditions for the grant of interim measures are satisfied. | T-303/04-R1
European Dynamics | 40 | ECT-225.1
ECT-242-243
| 40. Pursuant to Articles 242 EC and 243 EC in conjunction with Article 225(1) EC, the Court of First Instance may, if it considers that circumstances so require, order that application of the contested act be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. | T-303/04-R1
European Dynamics | 65-71 | ECT-242-243
| 65. It is settled case-law that the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the need for an interim order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party seeking the interim measure. It is for that party to adduce proof that it cannot await the outcome of the main action without suffering such damage (see orders of the President of the Court in Case T169/00 R Esedra v Commission [2000] ECR II2951, paragraph 43, and Case T148/04 R TQ3 Travel Solutions Belgium v Commission [2004] ECR II0000, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
66. It must be stated at once that, as the Commission rightly points out, the applicant has not shown a link between the alleged damage and the acts suspension of whose operation is sought.
67. The applicant essentially complains of the way in which the contract relating to Lot ESP 5 was implemented, a lot which in its view was underused in comparison with Lot ESP 4. The applicant contests that allegedly improper implementation and the Commission's decision to start the tender procedure for the ESP-DIMA market for the purpose of renewing Lot ESP 4. However, the applicant has not challenged the Commission for improper implementation of its contract relating to Lot ESP 5, and has not sought suspension of operation of the tender procedure for the ESP-DIMA market. It should be recalled here that the ESP-DIMA call for tenders was published on 27 December 2003 and that the applicant's complaints against the very principle of that call for tenders were rejected by the Commission's letter of 30 January 2004.
68. This approach of the applicant has a direct effect on the value of its arguments relating to the condition of urgency. The applicant alleges only indirectly that serious and irreparable harm would flow from the award of the ESP-DIMA contract to another tenderer or from the very existence of that contract. On the contrary, it clearly states that it considers that the damage would flow from the possible non-execution or decrease of [Lot] ESP 5', which would be fatal' for it. The applicant attempts to show the existence of a causal link between the incorrect implementation of Lot ESP 5 and the award of the ESP-DIMA contract by saying, in its application, that it is more than obvious that the distorted implementation of [Lot] ESP 4 if it is prolonged by ESP-DIMA will mean the end of [Lot] ESP 5', that if the suspension sought is not granted the Commission will sign the relevant contracts opening thus the way for ESP-DIMA', and that as from this moment [Lot] ESP 5 will have no more room for services'.
69. The applicant has not, however, challenged either the defective implementation of Lots ESP 4 and ESP 5 which is essentially the source of its concerns or the foreseeable conditions of implementation of the ESP-DIMA contract. It is therefore clear that the applicant cannot show that the grant of the interim measures would bring about increased recourse to the Lot ESP 5 contracts, given that the Commission has clearly stated that in no circumstance would it use the Lot ESP 5 contracts to obtain services falling within the original Lot ESP 4 field or the ESP-DIMA contract. The applicant has not therefore shown that there is a causal link between, on the one hand, the acts suspension of whose operation is sought (the decision to award the ESP-DIMA contract to another tenderer and the letter giving reasons) and, on the other, the damage it is allegedly liable to suffer, namely a reduction in its turnover from Lot ESP 5. It thus appears that the interim measures sought will have no effect on the implementation of Lot ESP 5.
70. It follows that the interim measures sought are neither relevant nor necessary for avoiding the occurrence of the alleged damage.
71. In any event, even supposing that the alleged damage would flow from the contested acts, it is clear that that damage cannot be regarded as serious and irreparable as defined in the Court's case-law. | T-303/04-R1
European Dynamics | 72-75 | ECT-242-243
| 72. As regards the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant, it must be observed that, as the Commission has submitted, it is settled case-law that such damage cannot in principle be regarded as irreparable, or even reparable only with difficulty, if it may be the subject of subsequent compensation (see the order in Esedra , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). The applicant has not shown or even alleged that it would be unable to obtain such compensation by means of an action for compensation under Article 288 EC (see, to that effect, the order in Esedra , paragraph 47, and the order of the President of the Court in Case T230/97 R Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission [1997] ECR II1589, paragraph 38).
73. In the light of the foregoing, the interim measures sought could be justified in the circumstances of the present case only if it were apparent that in the absence of such measures the applicant would be in a situation which could endanger its very existence or irretrievably alter its position in the market (see, to that effect, the order in Esedra , paragraph 45).
74. The applicant has not, however, adduced proof that in the absence of the interim measures sought it is liable to be placed in such a situation.
75. It is clear in this respect that the applicant has not produced evidence concerning its financial situation from which the President could conclude that its existence would be endangered pending the Court's judgment in the main action. | T-303/04-R1
European Dynamics | 76-80 | ECT-242-243
| 76. In particular, it must be observed that the applicant's arguments concerning falling income are not supported by evidence and, in any event, that the applicant has not shown that such a fall in income will be such as to endanger its existence before the Court's decision in the main action.
77. It must be considered, on the contrary, that the elements in the case-file indicate that the applicant will continue to pursue sufficient activity to exist until the Court gives judgment in the main action.
78. As the applicant itself emphasises in its application, it regularly takes part successfully in calls for tenders by the Commission, and has developed a number of projects for the European institutions, not only the Commission.
79. That is also confirmed by the reports by EuroDB of 22 March 2004 and Dun & Bradstreet of 26 July 2004, annexed to the Commission's observations of 15 October 2004, which indicate that the applicant has a large number of clients, including European institutions, national public bodies and international companies. Moreover, those reports show that the applicant's financial situation is classified as good', with positive marks for sales, profitability and total assets. With respect to those reports, it must be stated that the applicant's assertion in its letter of 2 November 2004 that those reports are out of date and incorrect is in very general terms, and the applicant has not produced the slightest evidence to demonstrate the truth of that assertion.
80. It should be observed, finally, that the applicant will continue to take part in the ESP 5 consortium, as first contractor for Lot ESP 5, and will also take part in the ED consortium, as second contractor for the ESP-DIMA contract, precisely because it demonstrated to the Commission, in the context of taking part in the ESP-DIMA call for tenders, that it had the financial and technical capacity required for such a project. | T-303/04-R1
European Dynamics | 81 | ECT-242-243
| 81. As to the possibility that in the absence of the interim measures sought the applicant's position in the market would be irretrievably altered, while the applicant alleges in this respect that it will be forced to terminate half its activity and dismiss half its staff and that all the infrastructure intended for the implementation of Lot ESP 5 will have to disappear with fatal' consequences, the applicant has not supported those arguments and, moreover, has not shown or even attempted to show that structural or legal obstacles would prevent it from regaining a substantial proportion of the lost market (see, to that effect, the order of the President of the Court in Case T369/03 R Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II0000, paragraph 84). In particular, the applicant has not shown that it would be prevented from winning other contracts, including the contract at issue following a fresh call for tenders, or from taking on employees or recreating a technical infrastructure capable of supporting large projects such as those implemented in the framework of Lot ESP 5, if that proved to be necessary for regaining the lost market shares. In this respect, it should be noted that Lot ESP 5 will continue to exist, and also that the fact that the applicant takes part, and will be able to continue taking part, in other projects for European institutions and other clients ensures that its technical capacity will not disappear. | T-303/04-R1
European Dynamics | 82-85 | ECT-242-243
| 82. As to the non-pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant, with respect to its argument that the interim measures are urgent because of the irreparable harm which would be caused to its reputation and credibility, it must be observed that the award decision does not have the consequence of causing such damage. According to settled case-law, taking part in a public tender procedure, by nature highly competitive, necessarily involves risks for all the participants and the elimination of a tenderer under the tender rules is not in itself in any way prejudicial (order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case 118/83 R CMC v Commission [1983] ECR 2583, paragraph 51, and order in Esedra , paragraph 48).
83. Similarly, the applicant's arguments intended to show that urgency derives from the fact that the contract with the ESP-DIMA consortium will be concluded and the budget corresponding to the ESP-DIMA contract fixed, before delivery of the decision putting an end to the main action, at an amount liable to tie the Commission permanently to that consortium cannot be accepted. Such a situation does not constitute a circumstance establishing urgency, since if the Court were to consider the main action well founded, the Commission would have to take the measures necessary to ensure appropriate protection of the applicant's interests. In that event, the institution would be able, without encountering great difficulties, to organise a new call for tenders in which the applicant could take part. Such a measure might be combined with the payment of compensation. The applicant has not referred to any circumstance which could prevent its interests from being safeguarded in such a way (see, to that effect, the order in Esedra , paragraph 51, and the order of the President of the Court in Case T108/94 R Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II249, paragraph 27).
84. In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the evidence adduced by the applicant has not established to the requisite legal standard that it would suffer serious and irreparable damage if the interim measures sought were not granted.
85. It follows that the applicant has not succeeded in proving that the condition of urgency is satisfied. Consequently, the application for interim measures must be dismissed, without it being necessary to rule on its admissibility or examine whether the other conditions for the grant of interim measures are satisfied (order of the President of the Court in Joined Cases T38/99 R to T42/99 R, T45/99 R and T48/99 R Sociedade Agrícola dos Arinhos and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II2567, paragraph 48). | T-148/04-R
TQ3 Travel Solutions | 25 | ECT-225.1
ECT-242-243 | 25. Under Article 242 EC in conjunction with, first, Article 243 EC and, secondly, Article 225(1) EC, the Court may, if it considers that circumstances so require, order that the operation of the contested measure be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures. | T-148/04-R
TQ3 Travel Solutions | 41-45 | ECT-243 | 41. It is settled case-law that the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the need for an interim order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party who requests the interim measure. It is for that party to demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering such damage (see order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-169/00 R Esedra v Commission [2000] ECR II2951, paragraph 43, and the case-law cited there).
42. In the present case, the applicant argues that the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged damage arises from the fact that, in losing the disputed contract not only has it suffered damage consisting in loss of income and significant market share (pecuniary damage), but it has also lost an essential reference and suffered particularly serious harm to its reputation (nonpecuniary damage).
43. As regards the pecuniary damage relied on by the applicant, it should be pointed out that, as the Commission has stated, settled case-law provides that such damage cannot in principle be regarded as irreparable, or even reparable with difficulty, where it can be the subject of future pecuniary compensation (see order in Esedra v Commission , paragraph 44, and the case-law cited there).
44. In the present case, as the Commission rightly points out, the applicant appears to be able to quantify the pecuniary loss complained of, as it has not only brought proceedings on the basis of Articles 230 EC and 288 EC before the Court of First Instance, but also assessed its loss at the sum of EUR 44 900 000.
45. It follows that the pecuniary damage invoked by the applicant cannot be considered to be irreparable. Such damage represents a loss which is economically capable of being compensated for through the means of redress laid down under the Treaty, in particular Article 288 EC (order in Esedra v Commission , paragraph 47, and order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T230/97 R Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission [1997] ECR II1589, paragraph 38). | T-148/04-R
TQ3 Travel Solutions | 46-52 | ECT-243 | 46. In the light of the above, the interim measures applied for would be justified in this case only if it appeared that, if the order were not granted, the applicant would find itself in a situation which could jeopardise its very existence or irremediably alter its position in the market (see, to that effect, order in Esedra v Commission , paragraph 45).
47. The applicant has not shown that if the interim measures applied for are not granted it is at risk of being placed in a situation which could jeopardise its very existence or irremediably alter its share of the market.
48. It must be held in that regard that the applicant has produced no evidence regarding its financial position which would allow the Court to conclude that its existence will be jeopardised. On the contrary, it must be held that the fact that the disputed contract accounts for only 15 to 25 per cent of the applicant's annual turnover in Belgium demonstrates the applicant's ability to remain in business until the Court delivers its judgment in the main proceedings. That conclusion is supported by the fact that the applicant also carries on business outside Belgium, that it was in fact successful in bidding for other lots in the tendering procedure at issue and that it is a member of a large and profitable international group. The applicant's arguments regarding the difficulties faced by travel agencies do not alter that conclusion in any way. Even if it is accepted that travel agencies are in a difficult economic situation and that that situation will continue, the applicant does not explain how the loss of the disputed contract jeopardises its existence. In any event, the damage alleged is not the result of the refusal decision but arises from factors unconnected with it.
49. With respect to the possibility that if the interim measures applied for were not to be granted the applicant's position on the market would be irremediably altered, it is clear that the applicant has produced no evidence to show that its position will be altered in that way.
50. The applicant has failed to show that obstacles of a structural or legal nature would prevent it from regaining a significant proportion of the market share lost (see, to that effect, order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T369/03 R Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II0000, paragraph 84).
51. In particular, the applicant has not demonstrated that it will be prevented from being successful in other tendering procedures, including one having as its subjectmatter the disputed contract on the occasion of a new invitation to tender. The applicant's arguments based on the general economic situation faced by travel agencies do not show that its position on the market in question will be irremediably altered. The purported economic situation has the same consequences for all operators in the travel agency sector. There is nothing to prevent the applicant from recovering the lost market share, as it is fully open to it to recover that market share following a new invitation to tender. The fact that the applicant has lost an essential reference' does not preclude it from participating and being successful in new tendering procedures. Those references represent only one of many criteria taken into account in the qualitative selection of service providers (see Article 137 of Regulation No 2432/2002; see also, to that effect, order in Esedra v Commission , paragraph 49).
52. It follows that the applicant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to allow the Court to reach the view that the pecuniary damage alleged is serious and irreparable. | T-148/04-R
TQ3 Travel Solutions | 53-54 | ECT-243 | 53. As regards the non-pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant and its argument that interim measures are urgent because of the irreparable damage caused to its reputation and credibility, it must be pointed out that the refusal decision would not necessarily cause such damage. According to settled case-law, participation in a public tender procedure, by nature highly competitive, necessarily involves risks for all the participants, and the elimination of a tenderer under the rules on tenders is not, in itself, prejudicial (order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case 118/83 R CMC v Commission [1983] ECR 2583, paragraph 5, and order in Esedra v Commission, paragraph 48).
54. As the Commission and WT rightly point out, the fact that an undertaking is unsuccessful in renewing a contract for a set period in a new tender procedure arises from the periodic nature of invitations to tender in the public procurement sector and does not harm its credibility and reputation. | T-148/04-R
TQ3 Travel Solutions | 55-57 | ECT-243 | 55. The applicant's arguments seeking to establish urgency by reason of the fact that the contract entered into with WT will have been fully performed, or substantially performed, before the delivery of the judgment in the main proceedings also cannot be accepted. That is not a matter establishing urgency, since, if the Court considered the main proceedings to be well founded, the Commission would have to adopt the measures necessary to ensure appropriate protection of the applicant's interests (see, to that effect, order in Esedra v Commission , paragraph 51, and order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-108/94 R Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II-249, paragraph 27). As the Commission points out, it would be in a position in such a situation to organise a new tendering procedure in which the applicant would be able to participate without undue difficulty. Such a step could be coupled with payment of compensation. The applicant has not referred to any matter which might prevent its interests from being protected in that way (see, to that effect, order in Esedra v Commission , paragraph 51).
56. In those circumstances, it must be held that the evidence adduced by the applicant does not establish to the requisite legal standard that it will suffer serious and irreparable damage if the interim measures applied for are not granted.
57. The application for interim measures must accordingly be dismissed, and it is not necessary to consider whether the other conditions relating to the grant of such measures are satisfied. | T-169/00-R
Esedra | 43-54 | ECT-243-impl | 43 It is settled case-law that the urgency of an application for interim measures must be assessed in relation to the need for an interim order in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party who requests the interim measure. It is for that party to adduce proof that it cannot await the outcome of the main action without suffering such damage (orders of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-73/98 R Prayon-Rupel v Commission [1998] ECR II-2769, paragraph 36, in Joined Cases T-38/99 R to T-42/99 R, T-45/99 R and T-48/99 R Sociedade Agrícola dos Arinhos and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II-2567, paragraph 42, and in Case T-144/99 R IMA v Commission [2000] ECR II-2067, paragraph 42).
44 As regards the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant, it should be noted that, as the Commission has pointed out, according to settled case-law such damage cannot, in principle, be regarded as irreparable, or even reparable only with difficulty, if it may be the subject of subsequent compensation (orders of the President of the Court of Justice in Case C-213/91 R Abertal and Others v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, paragraph 24, and in Case T-70/99 R Alpharma v Council [1999] ECR II-2027, paragraph 128).
45 Pursuant to those principles, the requested suspension would be justified, in the circumstances of this case, only if it appeared that, if the measure were not granted, the applicant would find itself in a situation which could jeopardise its very existence or irremediably alter its position in the market.
46 The applicant has not been able to establish that, if the interim measures it has requested are not granted, the loss of the management of the CPE Clovis would jeopardise the day nursery management structure it has set up or, in any event, the applicant's very existence. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant has referred to several other projects in which it is already involved and which could lead to the establishment of day nurseries with a capacity of over 410 places.
47 It follows that the financial damage alleged by the applicant must be considered to be reparable. The damage constitutes a loss which can be redressed economically by means of the legal remedies provided for by the Treaty, particularly Article 235 EC (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-230/97 R Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission [1997] ECR II-1589, paragraph 38).
48 As regards the non-pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant, and its argument that interim measures are urgent because of the irreparable damage which would be caused to its reputation and credibility, it should be noted that the refusal will not necessarily cause such damage. Participation in a public tender procedure, by nature highly competitive, necessarily involves risks for all the participants, and the elimination of a tenderer under the rules on tenders is not, in itself, prejudicial (order of the President of the Court of Justice in Case 118/83 R CMC v Commission [1983] ECR 2583, paragraph 51). Furthermore, the applicant was aware of the risk when it decided not to seek renewal of its contract with the Commission, leading the Commission to initiate a new public contract tendering procedure.
49 As for the applicant's argument that references play a decisive role in the award of public contracts, it should be noted, as the Commission has rightly indicated, that it is apparent from Article 32 of Directive 92/50 that references represent merely one of many criteria taken into account in the qualitative selection of service providers. Furthermore, the prejudicial effects which the applicant claims would result if its credibility and reputation were compromised cannot be regarded as an inevitable consequence of the implementation of the award and refusal. The harm which that implementation could cause the applicant is therefore purely hypothetical (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-322/94 R Union Carbide v Commission [1994] ECR II-1159, paragraph 31).
50 In the same way, as regards the damage which would allegedly be occasioned by the redundancy of its members of staff, the fact that the applicant itself describes this as likely shows that it is hypothetical.
51 Finally, the fact that the performance of the contract concluded with the Centro Studi will already have commenced before judgment is delivered in the main action is not a circumstance establishing urgency. If the Court of First Instance considers the main action well founded, the Commission will have to adopt the measures necessary to ensure appropriate protection of the applicant's interests (order of the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-108/94 R Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II-249, paragraph 27). The applicant has not referred to any circumstance which might prevent its interests from being protected, possibly by payment of compensation together with a new tendering procedure.
52 In the circumstances, it must be concluded that the evidence adduced by the applicant has not established to the requisite legal standard that the non-pecuniary damage which it alleges is certain or irreparable and is the direct consequence of the decisions taken by the Commission or of their implementation.
53 It follows from the above that the applicant has not succeeded in proving that it will suffer serious and irreparable damage if the requested interim measures are not granted.
54 Accordingly, the application for interim measures must be dismissed, and it is not necessary to consider whether the other conditions for granting suspension of operation are fulfilled. | T-60/98-R
Ecord | 18 | ECT-242 [ex 185]
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 18. Under the combined provisions of Articles 185 and 186 of the Treaty and Article 4 of Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom, of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1988 L 319, p. 1), as amended by Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC, of 8 June 1993 (OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21), the Court of First Instance may, if it considers that circumstances so require, in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures. | T-60/98-R
Ecord | 28-33 | ECT-242 [ex 185]
ECT-243 [ex 186]
ECT-LexExp | 28. In support of its application for interim measures the applicant confines itself to pleading that the contested decision constitutes a prima facie breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
29. Despite the express warning in the invitation to tender (see paragraph 4 above), the applicant indicated on DHL's air consignment note that the consignment in question was intended for the 'European Commission (see paragraph 8 above).
30. The application for interim measures is therefore based on the incorrect premiss that the applicant followed scrupulously the instructions in the invitation to tender.
31. As is clear from the oral pleadings, the purpose of those instructions was precisely to prevent events such as those which occurred in this case. If the Commission's name features on the air consignment note there is a great risk that the consignment in question will be delivered to the central mail office at Evere, in accordance with the general instructions of 1991 (see paragraph 9 above).
32. The applicant cannot plead lack of experience in this area. It does not dispute the Commission's claims, first, that it had already responded to invitations to tender from the TACIS Procurement Unit without making any mistakes in the address and, second, that it recently signed an extension of contract following an invitation to tender organised in the same way as that in this case.
33. As it did not heed the warning in the invitation to tender, it could not legitimately expect that its tender would be delivered in time to the TACIS Procurement Unit. Accordingly, the plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations appears prima facie to be unfounded. | C-87/94-R
Belgium | 23-27 | ECT-243 [ex 186]
ECJR-83.2 | 23 According to Article 186 of the Treaty: "The Court of Justice may in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures."
24 Pursuant to Article 83(2) of the Rules of Procedure, an order for interim measures is conditional upon the existence of circumstances giving rise to urgency and of pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for granting the relief sought. As the Court has consistently held, it also presupposes that the balance of the interests at stake is conducive to granting such relief.
25 Those conditions are cumulative.
26 The urgency of the application must be assessed in relation to the necessity for an order granting interim relief in order to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure.
27 Moreover, the risk of serious and irreparable damage, which is the criterion for assessing urgency, is the first factor to be taken into account in determining the balance of interests. | C-87/94-R
Belgium | 23-27 | RC1-2.1.a
RU1-2.1.1.a
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 31 It should be noted that failure to comply with a directive applicable to a public contract constitutes a serious threat to the legality of the Community order and that the ensuing declaration by the Court on the basis of Article 169 of the Treaty - usually after the contract has been performed - to the effect that the Member State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations, cannot reverse the damage suffered by the Community legal order and by all the tenderers who were either rejected or deprived of the opportunity to compete effectively in compliance with the principle of equal treatment. The Commission, in its capacity as guardian of the Treaties, may therefore bring proceedings for the adoption of interim measures in parallel with an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations, in connection with a disputed procedure for the award of a public contract.
32 Furthermore, - Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33), and - Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (Official Journal 1992 L 76, p. 14), impose an obligation to ensure at national level that decisions which have infringed Community law with respect to the award of public contracts or national rules implementing Community law are reviewed effectively and as rapidly as possible; in the present case, Van Hool sought such redress before the Belgian Conseil d' Etat but failed ultimately to secure the suspension applied for.
33 As the Belgian Government has emphasized in the proceedings before the Court, both the travaux préparatoires and the actual provisions of those directives reveal that the Community legislature, aware of the differences between national laws and mindful of the need not to undermine in any way the principle of legal certainty, at first gave precedence to review before conclusion of the contract. In deciding that the consequences of review for a contract which has already been concluded are determined by national law, and by permitting Member States to limit those consequences to the award of damages to the injured party, the Community legislature acknowledged that a State may refuse at national level to set aside a contract which has already taken effect.
34 In those circumstances, the Commission itself must act at Community level as far as possible before the contract is concluded, or at least inform the Member State concerned, quickly and unambiguously, that it is in the process of reviewing possible infringements of the rules applicable to the contract in issue, and that it intends to seek the suspension either of the procedure for awarding the contract or of the contract entered into. That being so, the Member State may proceed with the award of the contract or with its performance, at its own risk. | C-87/94-R
Belgium | 23-27 | ECT-243 [ex 186] | 35 At the hearing, the parties acknowledged that under the relevant provisions of national law, the contract was deemed to be concluded as a result of the notification of the order to EMI by SRWT on 17 November 1993. At the same time, they also recognized that, contrary to a statement in the defendant' s written observations, the substantive provisions of Belgian law, according to the most recent case-law, do not preclude a public contract which has already been concluded from being set aside.
36 It is common ground that, in principle, the first deliveries of buses were scheduled to take place at the end of April 1994.
37 Thus, on the date that proceedings for interim measures were initiated, the application for relief concerned a contract which had not only been concluded but was already being carried out. The process of obtaining the necessary materials and of manufacturing and assembling the buses called for the implementation of an appropriate plan several months before the first deliveries.
38 After stating in its application in the main action that a complaint from Van Hool had first been laid before it on 6 October 1993, the Commission pointed out orally on 14 April 1994, then in writing on 15 April, that in fact it had been apprized of the matter by letter of 29 October 1993, as recorded in the case-file. In any event, the Commission evinced the intention of seeking the suspension of the contract only in its reasoned opinion of 8 February 1994, that is to say, more than three months after receiving the letter of 29 October 1993 and more than two months after sending its letter of formal notice of 30 November 1993, which did not contain any reference to that point. Therefore, the Commission failed to act in such a way as to make the contracting authority aware as early as possible that it could proceed only at its own risk with the performance of a contract which had been concluded with exceptional speed on the same day - 17 November 1993 - as the decision of the Belgian Conseil d' Etat. Yet, in its complaint of 29 October 1993, Van Hool had stressed in alarmist terms the urgent need for action by the Commission. In those circumstances, the Commission has not displayed the diligence to be expected of a party which has subsequently lodged an application for interim measures.
39 On the question of the balance of interests, the Kingdom of Belgium disputes the Commission' s allegation of serious and irreparable damage by referring to the state of SRWT' s bus fleet. That fleet contains numerous old vehicles, in particular 194 vehicles which were brought into service during 1976, 1977 and 1978. The condition of those vehicles has given rise to urgent requests for replacements from some of SRWT' s regional managers. It is likely to cause problems, even accidents, which could have dramatic consequences for the staff, the passengers and the good name of the company generally. A woman passenger has already been the victim of an accident necessitating hospital treatment: her foot went through the deck of a bus which she had just boarded. Suspension of the contract would entail its immediate termination, followed by the opening of a new procedure for the award of a public contract, which would delay each of the scheduled deliveries by approximately thirteen months.
40 The defendant' s submissions regarding the state of the buses to be replaced are supported by the documents produced. Their condition effectively undermines the safety requirements which should govern all public utilities. However, the defendant has itself contributed significantly to the creation of this state of affairs. While, according to its own recommendations, the normal length of service for the buses to be replaced should have been from ten to twelve years, it did not consider it necessary to ensure the timely replacement of the vehicles, a large number of which have now been in use for 16 to 18 years. What is more, it allowed more than two years to elapse between a request for the replacement of 103 buses whose state of dilapidation was emphasized by the local management concerned, and the publication of the contract notice on 22 April 1993. Thus the Kingdom of Belgium has omitted to ensure that all appropriate measures were taken to avoid endangering the safety of SRWT' s customers and staff, as well as that of other road-users.
41 In principle, such an omission is likely to prevent the balance of interests from tilting in favour of the party in default (see the order of the President of the Court in Case 194/88 R Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 5647, at paragraph 16). However, in the circumstances of the present case and in view of the seriousness of the risk involved, it is likewise incumbent on the Court not to exacerbate that risk.
42 In the light of the foregoing it is clear that the Commission has failed to display the diligence required of a party relying on the urgency of interim measures, and that the balance of interests tilts in favour of the Kingdom of Belgium.
43 In those circumstances, the application for interim measures must be dismissed without there being any need to consider whether the Kingdom of Belgium, in its pleadings and documents adduced in support, has successfully established that the Commission' s ostensibly well-founded submissions as to the existence of a prima facie case are in fact groundless. | C-272/91-R
Italy | 17 | ECT-243 [ex 186] | 17 It should be noted that under Article 186 of the EEC Treaty, the Court may in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures. | C-272/91-R
Italy | 20-24 | ECT-43 [ex 52]
ECT-49 [ex 59]
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 20 As far as concerns, first, the requirement for a prima facie case, the Commission states that the infringement of Articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty is manifest and that the situation here is wholly analogous to that underlying the abovementioned judgment in Case C-3/88. In particular, the concession of the computerization system in issue cannot be considered to involve the exercise of official authority within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 55 of the Treaty. The Italian Government used the same argument concerning the contracts to develop data-processing systems for the public authorities which were in issue in Case C-3/88. The Court pointed out that the exception in Article 55 of the EEC Treaty from the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services must be restricted to activities which in themselves involve a direct and specific connection with the exercise of official authority, and declared that that was not the case for activities concerning the design, programming and operation of data-processing systems, which are activities of a technical nature.
21 The defendant claims that the concession of the lottery computerization system involves a real transfer of official powers to the concessionaire and cannot be treated in the same way as a contract to provide goods or services. That would be irreconcilable with the remuneration of the concessionaire by a percentage of the receipts. Gaming in the form of the lottery is under Italian legislation strictly reserved to the State and any activity relating to the lottery accordingly falls within the exercise of official powers, which for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 55 of the EEC Treaty include not only powers to take decisions but also powers to organize, inspect or certify. The technical specification for the invitation to tender, filed by the defendant at the hearing, sets out the powers which the concession transfers to the concessionaire. They include in particular the taking of bets, since in order to be valid the lottery tickets must be issued by the concessionaire' s terminals installed at the collection points, and the determining of the winning tickets, to be done by the concessionaire' s record centres in each lottery area.
22 It should be noted first that the introduction of the computerized system in issue does not appear at first sight to change the various operations inherent in the lottery, as currently implemented according to the description in the specification filed by the defendant. On the face of it, no responsibility for any of these processes is transferred to the concessionaire. The collection points remain responsible for taking the bets, while the function of the concessionaire' s terminal is simply to record, to check automatically, and to transmit the data entered by the person in charge of the collection point who, according to the specification, must be able to correct the entry if there is an error and even cancel a ticket issued by the terminal. Similarly for the determination of the winning tickets, the Area Commission, an administrative body, retains responsibility for checking and validating the tickets.
23 Secondly, the services to be provided by the concessionaire of the lottery computerization system do not appear at first sight to differ from those entailed by the contracts for the development of data-processing systems for the public authorities at issue in Case C-3/88. Both cases involve developing computerized systems, providing the necessary hardware and software and operating the system. Although the lottery computerization system does not become State property until the term of the concession has expired, and the concessionaire' s remuneration consists of a share of the returns from operating the system, those factors are, on the face of it, irrelevant to the rules of Community law in issue.
24 It must therefore be held, taking account of the abovementioned judgment in Case C-3/88, that the Commission' s application does not appear at this stage to be without substance and that the requirement for a prima facie case is satisfied. | C-272/91-R
Italy | 25-29 | ECT-243 [ex 186] | 25 As far as concerns the requirement for urgency, the Commission claims that it cannot wait until the decision on the substance without suffering serious and irreparable damage in its capacity as the institution responsible for ensuring the application of the Treaty. By the time the Court decided on the substance, the lottery computerization would have been in place for some time, and the Commission would have to accept the fait accompli, notwithstanding the flagrant violation of Community law. In order for the forthcoming judgment of the Court to be effective, the Commission claims that it is necessary for interim relief to be ordered.
26 The defendant, for its part, observes that the concession with the consortium Lottomatica was signed on 22 November 1991; the first phase of the concession should be completed by 1 April 1992 and the second phase by 31 December 1992. Implementing the computerization system will considerably improve the lottery, which is the only way of eradicating clandestine gambling which is currently widespread. The loss of revenue for the State if the computerization system is not implemented can be estimated at LIT 500 000 million a year. Elimination of clandestine gambling and the very significant fiscal revenue resulting from the lottery computerization should accordingly be weighed against the Commission' s interest in ensuring compliance with specific Treaty rules.
27 It should be held that, as the Commission has stated, if it succeeds in the main proceedings, the judgment would have no practical effect in the absence of interim measures.
28 As to the balance of interests, the defendant' s interest in rapidly completing the lottery computerization must be set against the Commission' s interest, as guardian of the Treaties, in preventing any breach of fundamental rules in the Treaties. In the light in particular of the judgment of the Court in Case C-3/88, the interest of the Commission must prevail over that of the Member State in issue.
29 Since the condition as to urgency is thus also satisfied, the interim measures sought should be ordered. | 45/87-R2
Ireland | 12 | ECT-243 [ex 186] | 12 Pursuant to article 186 of the EEC treaty, the court of justice may in cases before it prescribe any necessary interim measures. | 45/87-R2
Ireland | 17 | W1-2-impl
ECT-28 [ex 30]
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 17 In the written observations submitted by it in these proceedings for interim measures, the defendant argues that article 30 of the EEC treaty is not applicable since there is no barrier to trade or, in any event, no barrier to trade as a result of a commercial provision or other measure adopted by Ireland. It refers to the judgment of the court of 22 march 1977 (iannelli & volpi spa v meroni ((1977)) ecr 577) in paragraph 9 of which the court stated that the field of application of article 30 of the EEC treaty "does not include obstacles to trade covered by other provisions of the treaty ". It points out that, in any event, any barrier to trade in this field would be covered by other provisions of community law, namely council directive 71/305/EEC adopted pursuant to article 57 (2 ) and articles 66 and 100 of the EEC treaty, and is thus excluded from the scope of article 30 of the treaty. The proper course for the commission to take in order to put an end to the barriers to trade resulting from disparity between national standards is to propose measures of harmonization under article 100 of the EEC treaty rather than to apply article 30. | 45/87-R2
Ireland | 18-19 | W1-3.5
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 18 It does not appear that the first submission relied on by the commission can establish a prima facie case for the interim measures applied for. It is clear from the sixth recital in the preamble to directive 71/305/EEC read in conjunction with article 5 (3 ) [actually 3.5], which provides that : "the provisions of this directive shall not apply to public works contracts awarded by the production, distribution, transmission or transportation services for water and energy", that the public works contract no 4 of the Dundalk water supply augmentation scheme does not fall within the scope of that directive and is not subject to the requirements laid down therein.
19 As regards the commission’s second submission, it should be pointed out that once it is found that prima facie directive 71/305/EEC did not apply to the public works contract in question, Ireland’s arguments against the applicability of article 30 of the EEC treaty which it bases on the judgment in iannelli & volpi spa v meroni become wholly irrelevant. Furthermore, as the commission has rightly pointed out, secondary community legislation such as a directive cannot derogate from a directly applicable provision of the EEC treaty such as article 30. | 45/87-R2
Ireland | 20-24 | ECT-28 [ex 30]
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 20 The next step is to examine whether clause 4.29 of the specifications may amount to a barrier to trade and whether such a barrier is imputable to a measure adopted by Ireland.
21 Although it would seem normal that in a public works contract such as that at issue the materials to be used may be required to comply with a certain technical standard, even a national standard, in order to ensure that they are appropriate and safe, such a technical standard cannot, without creating prima facie a barrier to trade which is contrary to article 30 of the EEC treaty, have the effect of excluding, without so much as an examination, any tender based on another technical standard recognized in another member state as providing equivalent guarantees of safety, performance and reliability
22 In this case it should be observed that the automatic effect of clause 4.29 of the specifications, by itself and without any other justification, is to exclude any tender based on the use of any types of pipes other than those certified to comply with is 188, that is to say those manufactured by the only undertaking certified to that standard, tegral pipes ltd, Ireland, although there are a number of features in the documents before the court that suggest that the possibility cannot necessary be ruled out that equivalent technical standards exist in other member states.
23 Since that clause was inserted in the specifications by Dundalk urban district council, a body subject to the authority of the minister for the environment and for whose acts Ireland is responsible, the barrier to intra-community trade to which it prima facie gives rise is imputable to Ireland.
24 In the light of the foregoing it must be considered that the commission has indeed raised a material argument which establishes a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for. | 45/87-R2
Ireland | 25-33 | ECT-243 [ex 186] | 25 Although it may be considered that in this case the commission has indicated factual and legal grounds establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for, the court still has to assess the circumstances giving rise to urgency.
26 The court has consistently held that the urgency required by article 83 (2 ) of the rules of procedure in regard to an application for interim measures must be assessed on the basis of the need to adopt such measures in order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking those measures.
27 The commission submits that if the contract in question were awarded in a manner contrary to community law, irreparable harm would be caused not only to the interests of the community but also to those of contractors whose tenders were not considered as a result of clause 4.29 and their suppliers. The award of the contract will create a situation whereby the infringement becomes progressively irreversible as commitments are entered into by the contractor, orders are placed and physical work commences on the execution of the contract. The urgency for the interim measures applied for is sufficiently highlighted by the mere fact that Ireland’s undertaking not to award the contract in question expired on 20 February 1987.
28 The commission also states that a delay in the award of the contract will not involve serious inconvenience for the Irish authorities since other phases of the Dundalk water supply augmentation scheme are still at the design stage. A delay in the award of the contract in question will therefore scarcely delay the achievement of the ultimate objective of increasing the water supply in the Dundalk area.
29 Ireland contends that the commission has not raised any serious arguments showing that the damage to which the situation would allegedly give rise would be serious and irreparable. The commission has merely inferred as much from the trite observation that the pipeline can only be constructed once and reference to all the consequences that entails. It has not stated who will suffer damage and how or the nature and extent of the damage. Besides, tenderers wrongfully excluded from consideration for the contract can always claim damages.
30 Ireland emphasizes that contrary to what the commission asserts, the interim measure applied for would have the effect of delaying completion of the scheme itself which would have very serious implications for the people of Dundalk and the surrounding region.
31 Ireland cites the following examples of the repercussions for the people of Dundalk if the interim measure applied for is granted: the overall project, whose objective is to provide water to the town of Dundalk by 1990, has been subdivided into eight contracts. The completion of three of those contracts is dependent on the commencement of work on the contract at issue, contract no 4. The work under contract no 4 must be started by June at the latest if the project is to be completed by 1990. From a public inquiry held in 1982 it emerged that the 30*000 inhabitants of Dundalk have for many years been faced by acute water shortages which have frequently necessitated water rationing. Evidence was also given at the inquiry that the water shortage constitutes a serious fire hazard and even a health hazard. It is also a serious disincentive to attracting industry to the region.
32 Although at first sight the problem seems to be a matter of some urgency, particularly since the damage to the commission, as guardian of the interests of the community, will arise as soon as the contract at issue is awarded, it may be necessary in proceedings for interim measures under articles 185 and 186 of the EEC treaty to weigh against each other all the interests at stake.
33 In this case the objective of the public works contract in question, namely to secure water supplies for the inhabitants of the Dundalk area by 1990 at the latest, and the aggravation of the existing health and safety hazards for them if the award of the contract at issue is delayed tilt the balance of interests in favour of the defendant. It should be stressed that a quite different assessment might be arrived at in the case of other public works contracts serving different purposes where a delay in the award of the contract would not expose a population to such health and safety hazards. | 45/87-R1
Ireland | 7-8 | ECJR-84
ECT-243 [ex 186] | 7 According to article 84 (2) of the rules of procedure, the president may grant an application for interim measures even before the observations of the opposite party have been submitted. That decision may be varied or cancelled even without any application being made by any party.
8 It appears necessary to make use of this power in the present case so as to ensure that the application for interim measures is not prejudiced by the existence of a fait accompli. If the contract in question were awarded before the application for interim measures is decided, difficult questions might arise as to the possibility of subsequently cancelling it. Moreover, the commission states that other phases of the scheme (for example, the pumping station ) are still at the design stage and that a delay in the award is therefore unlikely to delay the ultimate objective of increasing water supply in the Dundalk area. The interests of justice and of the parties involved can therefore best be maintained by an order maintaining the status quo until there has been the possibility of hearing the parties and deciding the application for interim measures with all due deliberation. | 118/83-R
CMC | 33-38 | ECT-230 [ex 173]
ECT-243 [ex 186 | 33 The Commission claims that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain either the main application or the application for the adoption of interim measures. It raises two fundamental objections regarding the jurisdiction of the court and an objection of inadmissibility based on two grounds with particular reference to the action for annulment.
34 In the first place , the Commission argues that the ACP state is responsible for the preparation , negotiation and conclusion of the contract. It follows that it is the ACP state and not the Commission which deals directly with the tenderers. Whilst it is true that the convention provides for cooperation between the community and the ACP state , the fact remains that the state in question takes the various decisions required in the course of the procedure , including the final decision on the award of the contract. The cooperation to be given by the Commission in that connection is therefore said to be of a purely ' ' internal ' ' nature.
35 In the second place , the Commission contends that article 132 of the convention and the joint declaration which forms the subject-matter of annex xiii have set up an arbitration procedure , with the result that any dispute between a tenderer and an ACP state falls outside the jurisdiction of the court.
36 With particular reference to the action for annulment , the Commission argues that in this case there was , on its part , no decision within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 173 of the EEC treaty. The ' ' order ' ' to eliminate the applicants and to give preference to Rush and Tompkins bv which , the applicants allege , the Commission gave to the Ethiopian authorities and which came to the applicants ' knowledge when they visited Addis Ababa on 15 march 1983 , did not , according to the Commission , constitute a measure which could be the subject of annulment. In any event , the action against that ' ' order ' ' is out of time since the applicants themselves state that it came to their knowledge on 15 march 1983.
37 The answers to all those questions , the complexity of which should not be underestimated , is a matter for the court ' s decision on the substance of the main application. However , since the preliminary objections raised by the Commission regarding the jurisdiction of the court and the admissibility of the main application constitute a prerequisite for the decision on the admissibility of the application for the adoption of interim measures , the judge hearing that application cannot escape the necessity of resolving provisionally the various problems raised. From his point of view , it is sufficient if he can establish , with a sufficient degree of probability , that there is a basis , albeit partial , on which the court may found its jurisdiction in order to enable him to acknowledge the existence of a legitimate interest in the adoption of interim measures designed to preserve the existing position pending a decision on the substance of the case.
38 Subject to those reservations , the following observations may be made with regard to the preliminary objections raised by the Commission.
| 118/83-R
CMC | 39-44 | ECT-230 [ex 173]
ECT-243 [ex 186 | 39 As the Commission rightly pointed out , the tenderers established a legal relationship solely with the ethiopian national authority and more particularly with the national authorizing officer , who , according to the information supplied during the proceedings , is the ethiopian government acting , for the purposes of the present project , through the intermediary of EELPA , under the terms of clause it-i , paragraph (2), of the conditions of tender.
40 Nevertheless the provisions of the convention at the same time impose specific obligations on the Commission and more particularly on the chief authorizing officer with regard to ensuring equality of conditions for participation in invitations to tender , the elimination of discrimination , selection of the tender which is economically the most advantageous , the open nature of tenders and the participation on equal terms of all natural persons and companies or firms falling within the scope of the EEC treaty.
41 It is impossible therefore to accept the view that , by participating in a tender organized , under the terms of the convention , by an ACP state , in close cooperation with the community institutions , with a view to the execution of a project financed entirely by the european development fund , an undertaking established in the community is automatically placed outside the judicial protection afforded to it by the provisions of the EEC treaty.
42 it does not appear that article 132 , concerning the settlement of disputes , and the joint declaration on that subject , embodied in annex xiii to the convention , has the effect of eliminating any judicial protection with may be available under the treaty. As the Commission has acknowledged , the convention could not derogate , as far as community subjects are concerned , from the provisions of the EEC treaty governing access to the court. Moreover , it was apparent from the arguments of the parties that it remains doubtful whether article 132 applies only to disputes which may arise , on the occasion of the placing or performance of a contract , between the ACP state and the undertaking which is awarded the contract or whether that provision is also applicable to disputes which arise between the ACP state and any undertaking which is not awarded the contract but has participated in the tender procedure. That doubt is increased by the uncertainty regarding the interpretation which the ACP states , and ethiopia in particular , may give to the terms of article 132 and annex xiii.
43 Moreover , the question arises whether , in arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to article 132 and annex xiii , that is to say within the framework of the procedure for conciliation and arbitration of the international chamber of commerce , acts of the Commission may be challenged and whether an arbitral decision to be given in that context may contain a judgment on the validity of acts of the Commission or establish a basis for community liability.
44 Consequently , whilst it seems certain that the contract concluded between the ACP state and the successful tenderer falls outside the juridictionof the court , that does not mean that there can be not judicial review under the EEC treaty of acts of the Commission in the context of the tender procedure set up by the convention. | 118/83-R
CMC | 49 | ECT-230 [ex 173]
ECT-243 [ex 186 | 49 It follows from the foregoing that , although the placing of the public works contract in question occurred outside the sphere of jurisdiction of the community , there are nevertheless sufficient connecting factors between the circumstances of the dispute and the provisions of the treaty governing access to the court - namely , the active participation of the Commission in the process for reaching a decision on the award of the contract , the financing of the project in question by the european development fund and the judicial protection to which the applicants are , as communty subjects , entitled to claim in the implementation of a convention concluded by the community - to allow the finding that there exists a legitimate interest in the adoption of interim measures pending the court ' s decision on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility raised by the Commission. | 118/83-R
CMC | 50-53 | ECT-243 [ex 186 | 50 The applicants claim that an interim decision of the court is required as a matter of urgency owing to the irreparable damage which would be caused to their corporate reputation in the international tender market if they were eliminated in spite of their status as ' ' lowest qualified tenderer ' ' in the tender procedure in question, particularly since it has received wide international publicity. Only the intervention of the court at this stage could prevent damage which otherwise would be irreversible for them.
51 The applicants are mistaken in thinking that in the circumstances their elimination would damage their reputation. Participation in a public tender procedure, by nature highly competitive, involves risks for all the participants and the elimination of a tenderer under the tender rules is not in itself in any way prejudicial. That is all the more true since the applicants ' tender was not the lowest and since the favourable prospects which seemed to be emerging at the beginning of the procedure for the award of the contract were due not to the characteristics of their tender but to the fact that there was some doubt at that time concerning the qualifications of a competing tenderer.
52 On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the applicants have a legitimate interest in seeking the adoption of an interim measure as soon as possible, in order to prevent - should the procedure for the award of the contract be found to be irregular - a contract from being concluded and, should it be concluded, its performance from reaching a stage at which an irreversible de facto situation would be created. In that sense the requirement of urgency laid down by article 83 of the rules of procedure must be recognized as being satisfied. The nature of a possible interim measure and the grounds establishing a case for its adoption
53 For the reasons stated above, the court has no power to intervene in the conclusion and performance of a contract concluded between the tenderer and an authority of a non-member country. On the other hand, there does not seem to be any reason precluding the court from issuing, on a provisional basis, appropriate injunctions to the Commission either in order to prevent the conclusion of a contract as a result of a tender which appears to be contrary to the rules of the convention, or to other relevant rules, or in order to prohibit the Commission from allocating funds for the performance of such a contract if it has already been concluded. | 118/83-R
CMC | 54-59 | ECT-243 [ex 186 | 54 The question arises whether the applicants have been able to make out a prima facie case for the existence of circumstances which could justify such a measure.
55 The facts which the applicants have alleged and which the Commission has been unable to contest do indeed raise serious doubts concerning the regularity of the procedure followed for the award of the contract. As has already been mentioned, the applicants had been summoned by the competent national authority in circumstances which afforded grounds for believing that the contract would be signed upon the conclusion of a final round of negotiations. It appears from the communications of the employer, endorsing the findings of the tender committee and the consultant engineer, that the lowest tenderer was not regarded as technically and financially qualified and for that reason it had originally been intended to award the contract to the applicants. It also appears that that situation was changed not as a result of a decision of the employer but at the request of the Commission.
56 When the Commission was questioned on this matter, it stated that following investigations which are normal in public tender procedures it became apparent that the lowest tenderer, rush and tompkins bv, which is a member of the british rush and tompkins group, whose technical and financial qualifications are undeniable, had the backing of that group and that the group undertook to guarantee, for the benefit of its netherlands subsidiary, that the work would be successfully completed. The Commission produced in that connection a letter of guarantee issued by the rush and tompkins group, dated 21 june 1983.
57 The applicants contest the regularity of that procedure. In their view, the introduction of the letter of guarantee had the effect of altering, after the opening of the tenders, certain essential tender conditions, to such an extent that it is doubtful whether the tenderer and the undertaking to which the contract was awarded are still strictly identical.
58 In reply to that argument, the Commission contended that the tender submitted on 4 november 1982 already contained a guarantee by the Rush and Tompkins group, but it was not in a position to produce a copy of that letter or to indicate in what way the guarantee of 21 june 1983, which was apparently a decisive factor in the award of the contract, differed from the original guarantee.
59 Consequently, viewed as a whole, the circumstances in which the undertaking which was awarded the contract was chosen seem to be questionable. However, it is not possible at this stage to determine whether there was in this case any irregularity of such a nature as to vitiate the tender procedure or whether the inquiries and clarifications regarding the lowest tenderer are in accordance with normal practice in public tender procedures. | 118/83-R
CMC | 60-65 | ECT-243 [ex 186 | 60 However, those doubts, even though they are genuine, do not constitute sufficient justification for a measure as serious as the suspension of the performance of the contract, concluded by the ethiopian authorities and endorsed by the Commission, by means of the blocking of the funds earmarked for the performance of the contract.
61 It must be borne in mind that the applicants were only the second lowest tenderers. The Commission, which is responsible for the financial administration of the fund, was therefore under a duty to give priority to its examination of the tender submitted by the lowest tenderer with a view to clarifying, in conformity with the criteria laid down by article 130 of the convention, the question of the qualifications and guarantees of that tenderer which were in dispute. As regards the designation ' ' lowest qualified tenderer, which the applicants bestowed upon themselves, following a preliminary appraisal made by the employer, it should be observed that that status was at no time conferred upon them by the competent authority, namely the national authorizing officer.
62 It appears, moreover, from the explanations supplied by the Commission that, following checks carried out on the technical and financial qualifications of the lowest tenderer, both the national authorizing officer and the chief authorizing officer are now satisfied with the choice made for the award of the contract. This attitude emerges from a telex message sent on 22 june 1983 by EELPA to the applicants, in which the employer, after explaining the situation, requests the applicants ' ' to drop the whole matter and let bygones be bygones. ' '
63 In those circumstances it seems that the blocking of the funds earmarked for the execution of the project, with the grave consequences which such a measure would entail for all the parties concerned, would be a disproportionate response to the doubts which the facts alleged by the applicants have raised concerning the regularity of the tender procedures.
64 It is open to the applicants to pursue their action with a view to enabling the court, after a more thorough examination of the matters involved in the dispute, to give judgment on its own jurisdiction and to state the consequences to be drawn from any irregularities in the tender procedure, in particular with regard to the issue of liability.
65 For all those reasons, it must be held that, at this stage, the applicants have failed to establish circumstances making out a prima facie case for an interim measure within the meaning of articles 185 or 186 of the EEC treaty. |
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