| | CFIR-43 (Rules of Procedure)Written procedure    
| CFI (Rules of Procedure) | Article 43 | 1. The original of every pleading must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer.
The original, accompanied by all annexes referred to therein, shall be lodged together with five copies for the Court of First Instance and a copy for every other party to the proceedings. Copies shall be certified by the party lodging them.
2. Institutions shall in addition produce, within time-limits laid down by the Court of First Instance, translations of all pleadings into the other languages provided for by Article 1 of Council Regulation No 1. The second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply.
3. All pleadings shall bear a date. In the reckoning of time-limits for taking steps in proceedings only the date of lodgment at the Registry shall be taken into account.
4. To every pleading there shall be annexed a file containing the documents relied on in support of it, together with a schedule listing them.
5. Where in view of the length of a document only extracts from it are annexed to the pleading, the whole document or a full copy of it shall be lodged at the Registry.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 5, the date on which a copy of the signed original of a pleading, including the schedule of documents referred to in paragraph 4, is received at the Registry by telefax or other technical means of communication available to the Court of First Instance shall be deemed to be the date of lodgment for the purposes of compliance with the time-limits for taking steps in proceedings, provided that the signed original of the pleading, accompanied by the annexes and copies referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, is lodged at the Registry no later than ten days thereafter. Article 102(2) shall not be applicable to this period of ten days.
7. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 or to paragraphs 2 to 5, the Court of First Instance may by decision determine the criteria for a procedural document sent to the Registry by electronic means to be deemed to be the original of that document. That decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| Case | Pte | Ref | Text | T-125/06
Centro Studi Antonio Manieri | 22-30 | ECT-230
ECS-45
CFIR-43.6 | 22 The fifth paragraph of Article 230 EC provides that proceedings for annulment must be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be. In accordance with Article 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, that period must also be extended by 10 days on account of distance.
23 In the present case, the decision of the Council was sent by letter of its General Secretariat dated 16 January 2006, and addressed to the applicant by fax the following day. At the hearing, the applicant expressly acknowledged that it received that letter on 17 January 2006.
24 Since the letter was received by the applicant on 17 January 2006, the time-limit for instituting proceedings for the annulment of the decision in question, extended by 10 days on account of distance, expired at midnight on 27 March 2006 (dies ad quem).
25 It is clear that a copy of the application was received at the Registry by fax on 20 March 2006 and the original application was subsequently lodged on 3 May 2006.
26 Under Article 43(6) of the Rules of Procedure, 20 March 2006 is deemed to be the date of lodgment for the purpose of compliance with the time-limits for taking steps in proceedings, provided that the signed original of the pleading was lodged at the Registry no later than 10 days thereafter, that is, no later than midnight on 30 March 2006. Given that, in the present case, the signed original application was lodged only on 3 May 2006, 20 March 2006 cannot be deemed to be the date of lodgment for the purposes of compliance with the time-limits for taking steps in proceedings. The only date that can be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the application was lodged out of time is therefore 3 May 2006. Since that date is after the dies ad quem, the action is out of time and must, in principle, be declared inadmissible.
27 However, it is necessary to examine whether, in the present case, there exist unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure which would permit the Court to derogate from the time-limit in question on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applicable to proceedings before the Court of First Instance pursuant to Article 53 of that statute.
28 The concepts of ‘force majeure’ and ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice contain both an objective element relating to abnormal circumstances unconnected with the person in question and a subjective element involving the obligation, on that person’s part, to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices. In particular, the person concerned must pay close attention to the course of the procedure set in motion and, in particular, demonstrate diligence in order to comply with the prescribed time-limits (Case C-195/91 P Bayer v Commission [1994] ECR I-5619, paragraph 32). Thus, the concept of force majeure does not apply to a situation in which, objectively, a diligent and prudent person would have been able to take the necessary steps before the expiry of the period prescribed for instituting proceedings (Case 209/83 Ferriera Valsabbia v Commission [1984] ECR 3089, paragraph 22, and order of the Court of Justice in Case C-325/03 P Zuazaga Meabe v OHIM [2005] ECR I-403, paragraph 25). It is therefore necessary to examine whether the circumstances relied on by the applicant may be regarded as exceptional circumstances which constitute a case of force majeure.
29 In the present case, the package containing the original signed application was sent by the applicant on 17 March 2006. By sending the original document on that date, the applicant could reasonably expect it to arrive at the Court before the expiry of the limitation period, especially since, in view of the fact that a copy of that document had been sent by fax, that period had been extended to 30 March 2006. The package in question had already reached the offices of the Luxembourg postal service on 21 March 2006, as demonstrated by the postmark on the package. The fact that the postal service kept the package for a period of 42 days (from 21 March to 3 May 2006) clearly constitutes abnormal circumstances unconnected with the applicant, which, for its part, demonstrated diligence in order to comply with the prescribed time-limits by sending the original application well before the expiry of the limitation period and by taking the steps necessary to extend that period in accordance with Article 43(6) of the Rules of Procedure by sending a copy of the application to the Court Registry by fax. Consequently, the fact that the original application was lodged out of time is attributable to a case of force majeure (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 25/65 and 26/65 Simet and Feram v High Authority [1967] ECR 33, p. 43).
30 It follows that, as the expiry of the time-limit is not enforceable against the applicant, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the Council’s plea alleging inadmissibility must be rejected. | T-125/06
Centro Studi Antonio Manieri | 31-34 | ECS-45
CFIR-43.6
CFIR-47.2-impl | 31 The time-limit for lodging the reply was 10 October 2006. Since the reply was received at the Court Registry on 12 October 2006, it was lodged out of time.
32 The original reply was sent from Brussels by post on 6 October 2006. Although the original was sent only four days before the expiry of the time-limit by which it was to be lodged, the applicant failed to avail itself of the possibility provided for in Article 43(6) of the Rules of Procedure to send a copy of the signed original to the Registry by fax or by any other technical means of communication available to the Court of First Instance, which could have extended the time-limit for lodging the reply by an additional period of up to 10 days.
33 In the light of those circumstances, the applicant failed to demonstrate the diligence to be expected of a reasonably prudent applicant in order to comply with the time-limits. On the contrary, it increased the risk that the reply would be delivered to the Court out of time, first, by failing to draw the appropriate conclusions from the problems encountered in lodging the application and, second, by omitting to send a copy of the signed original to the Registry by fax or by any other technical means of communication available to the Court.
34 Such a lack of diligence rules out the existence of a case of force majeure and it is therefore necessary to reject the reply as inadmissible. | T-465/04
Evropaïki Dinamiki | 26-27 | CFIR-43.6 | 26 The applicant brought the present action by application lodged at the Registry of the Court on 25 November 2004.
27 The written procedure was completed by the lodging of the defence, since the applicant did not lodge at the Registry of the Court, in accordance with Article 43(6) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, a copy of the original reply within the period of 10 days after it had been sent by fax. |
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